How did Mei Xiangrong turn Yingke from a "cosmic mega-firm" into a "money-sucking black hole"?

Jiemian News Reporter | Sun Yizhen, Zhao Meng, Wang Zhen

Editor | Song Yejun

The so-called “Universal Law Firm” Yingke Law Firm (hereinafter “Yingke Law”) is currently embroiled in a financing crisis triggered by former director Mei Xiangrong.

Recently, Jiemian News uncovered through investigation that the financial risks under the Yingke model have existed for a long time. The family business empire behind Mei Xiangrong, the long-term mixing of law firm and personal assets, and the governance risks behind large-scale expansion together form a dual shock to the legal industry and capital markets.

Yingke’s Financing Tactics Under Its Name

Several investors told Jiemian News that they purchased “investment products” promoted under the Yingke Law Firm name through “salespeople” and “lecturers,” in the form of signing so-called “Yingke Market Partner Agreements” and “Legal Service Contracts.” The involved amounts range from tens of thousands to over ten million yuan.

“I was attracted by the Yingke Law Firm’s brand. The salespeople promoted it in the name of the law firm,” said Wang Yun, an investor from Shanghai.

Jiemian News found that the current contracts signed by investors mainly include two types. One is the “Yingke Market Partner Supplementary Agreement,” signed by the investor, Mei Xiangrong, and Beijing Yingke Law Firm; the other is the “Legal Service Contract,” signed between the investor and Beijing Yingke Law Firm.

Jiemian News observed that the official receipts confirming payments bear the seal of Beijing Yingke Law Firm.

Source: Provided by Investors

According to an internal document from someone close to Yingke Law, the firm once launched a so-called “Legal-Business Integration Product,” raising funds externally under the guise of “Legal Services and Market Partners,” with different investment levels and returns set for various tiers.

Source: Provided by Interviewed Lawyer

From the chart, the investment thresholds range from 100,000 to 1 million yuan, with terms of one or three years. The annual return for one-year investments is roughly between 5.5% and 8.5%, while the three-year cumulative return reaches 20.5% to 29.5%. This “higher amount, longer term, higher return” structure is generally seen in the industry as a typical capital-raising incentive mechanism.

Source: Provided by Investors

Multiple investors told Jiemian News that initial investment contracts were collected and replaced by salespeople around July 2025, then re-signed under the two agreements named for legal services and partnership.

Documents show that the original contract’s Party A was Shanghai Yingke Enterprise Management Company (hereinafter “Yingke Enterprise”). Yingke Enterprise is a core related company of Mei Xiangrong, controlled 95% by Mei Xiangrong’s sister, Mei Yaping. Several investors said that the funds were also received by Yingke Enterprise.

On the afternoon of March 13, Yingke Enterprise’s office in Jing’an District, Shanghai, was inspected by police.

“We actually invested in the Yingke Law Firm’s AI Space Station project, not in any law firm market partner,” Wang Yun said. “Around July 2025, the salespeople suddenly told us the contracts needed to be re-signed. But they gave us a list of investment projects, which still listed the AI Space Station.” Another supplementary document shown by Li Yun indicated that the investment target was Yingke Law Firm’s AI Space Station “Yingfa Bao,” with a three-year term.

Public information shows that “Yingfa Bao AI Legal Space Station” was independently developed by Yingke Law Firm, integrating IoT, new media, video interaction, and AI technology, providing users with legal consulting, document generation, risk assessment, and other intelligent services.

A family member of an interviewee, Ms. Zhang, said her sister had invested nearly 8 million yuan in total. The initial projects were promoted under the names of “Legal Technology” and “Legal Services,” with promises of fixed returns. She recalled that the promised yields at different stages ranged from about 5% to over 8% annually.

Several legal professionals told Jiemian News that, in form, including small investors under the “Legal Service Contract” might make the capital inflow appear as normal business income, weakening its investment nature; while large sums are handled via “Partnership Agreements,” nominally giving certain identities. This arrangement causes different amounts of funds to appear differently in legal terms, but whether their actual fund nature is consistent remains controversial.

“Splitting the same fund-raising logic into two contract types—Legal Services and Partnership—requires further scrutiny of the real transaction purpose,” said an industry insider. This arrangement could be seen as a “technical handling” of fund attributes. If the funds lack a direct connection to specific legal services and more resemble fixed or quasi-fixed returns based on investment amounts, it may raise compliance issues.

A lawyer who worked at Yingke Law Firm for many years said industry insiders believe Mei Xiangrong’s financing issues “will eventually lead to trouble.”

He recalled that over ten years ago, the Yingke system had cases of raising funds under the guise of investment projects. In Shanghai and other places, some teams set up multiple limited partnerships to raise funds from investors, covering sectors like tourism and investment holding, using the law firm’s brand for promotion.

“Many activities were held at the law firm’s offices, even using the law firm’s name and logo for endorsement, creating a strong credit image,” he said. In the public eye, lawyers are seen as highly reputable, and this reputation, once used for commercial financing, can easily build trust among ordinary investors. “Few would think that a law firm system would involve such financing models, which is the risk.”

He also revealed that such fundraising was not only aimed at the public but also involved internal lawyer groups. Early projects raised funds under the names of coffee, investment funds, promising dividends.

The Mei Family’s Business Empire

Mei Xiangrong is not a law school graduate. He graduated in 1995 from Tsinghua University’s Department of Automotive Engineering, then self-studied to obtain a lawyer qualification, beginning his legal career.

In 2007, when he joined Yingke, which had only 24 practicing lawyers, few could have foreseen that under his leadership, the small firm would transform over a decade into the world’s largest law firm by headcount.

A senior industry lawyer said: “When mentioning Yingke, two prominent labels come to mind: its strong marketing ability and its large scale.”

In his view, Mei Xiangrong has long been more of a capital operator than a traditional practicing lawyer. “He rarely handles specific cases, focusing more on expanding the firm’s size and capital operations.” Yingke Law Firm has grown into one of China’s largest, with over 25,000 employees nationwide.

Jiemian News learned from multiple sources that Mei Xiangrong’s business empire extends well beyond Yingke Law. Several lawyers mentioned that Zhiheng Law Firm and Shuke Law Firm are also “satellite firms” of Yingke.

“The ‘satellite firm’ setup is no secret in the legal community,” said one lawyer. “But the actual controlling of a law firm is often through ‘drawer agreements,’ and even some junior partners are unaware, making verification difficult.” Another lawyer recalled attending the opening ceremony of Zhiheng Law Firm in Guangdong years ago, where colleagues mentioned, “Mei Xiangrong is actually the real controller of Zhiheng.”

Mei Xiangrong’s ambitions are not limited to legal services. Tianyancha shows he is associated with 40 companies, including Beijing Yingke Law Firm and Shanghai Data Port Co., Ltd. He has publicly stated multiple times: “I don’t hide the fact that I am a businessman.”

The core of his business empire is Beijing Yingke Global Holdings Co., Ltd. (“Yingke Global”), established in 2015. According to Tianyancha and reports, Yingke Global once controlled over 80 subsidiaries, with businesses spanning tourism, film, health, education, studying abroad, coffee, and even hydrogen-powered vehicles.

Source: AiQicha

As the empire expanded, Mei Xiangrong’s family—his sister Mei Yaping and brother Mei Chunhua—began to appear more prominently.

Business registration data shows that Yingke Global’s shareholding structure has shifted several times within the Mei family. Initially, Mei Xiangrong held 95%, and Mei Chuanhua 5%. In December 2021, Mei Xiangrong transferred all shares to Mei Yaping, exiting as a shareholder. Currently, Mei Yaping owns 95% and is the legal representative, while Mei Chuanhua holds 5% and is a supervisor.

Tianyancha shows Yingke Global controls key companies like Yingke Meichen International Travel Agency and Yingke Enterprise Management.

In January 2026, Mei Xiangrong withdrew from Beijing Xiangrong Qingneng Automotive Technology Co., Ltd., another key enterprise, with Mei Yaping as the successor. Public info indicates Xiangrong Qingneng focuses on hydrogen fuel smart commercial vehicles, and in 2021, announced a high-profile 10 billion yuan leasing cooperation with Xinqiao Leasing, with Mei Xiangrong as the “initiator.”

On March 17, Jiemian News visited Xiangrong Qingneng’s office. Compared to its early high-profile hydrogen energy narrative, the company now shows signs of registration, recruitment, and cooperation, but no clear project entity.

Source: Photo by Jiemian News Reporter Wang Zhen

Xiangrong Qingneng was established in August 2021 and later renamed Beijing Xiangrong Qingneng Technology Co., Ltd. Its initial registered address was in Beijing Daxing, Fengyuan Street, No. 9 Courtyard, Building 2, Room 102, located within the Daxing International Hydrogen Energy Demonstration Zone. Staff Zhu Huawei confirmed it was registered in the zone.

He said Xiangrong Qingneng rented a few open workshop spaces during registration, paying 20,000 yuan annually, but no staff were present during the visit.

In December 2021, Xiangrong Qingneng announced entry into the hydrogen fuel commercial vehicle sector. Tsinghua University’s Professor Li Jianqiu, then dean of the School of Vehicles and Transportation, said they would deepen cooperation and build a technology transfer platform.

Jiemian News tried to contact Professor Li but received no response. Tsinghua’s School of Vehicles and Transportation replied that “Professor Li is on a business trip and cannot be interviewed.”

On November 2, 2023, Xiangrong Qingneng changed its registered address to 603, Building C, No. 76 Dongsi Huan Middle Road, Chaoyang District, Beijing. Jiemian News found that the elevator floor displayed signs for “Yingke Travel” and “Yingke Global Holdings,” but no Xiangrong Qingneng signage was visible.

Between 2022 and 2025, Xiangrong Qingneng publicly posted job openings twice: in June 2022 for an intelligent connected (smart cockpit) engineer, and in 2025 for a steer-by-wire chassis control engineer.

The address listed was 18F, West Building, Block D, Tsinghua Tongfang Science Park. Property staff told Jiemian News that this floor has always been the office of Beijing Yingke (Haidian District) Law Firm, and they had never heard of Xiangrong Qingneng.

Xiangrong Qingneng also invested in Nanjing Qingyan Yiwai New Energy Power Co., Ltd. Public records show it owns about 4.486% of the company, with a registered capital of 162,500 yuan in 2022.

Nanjing Qingyan Yiwai said there is only an investment relationship, no cooperation, and Xiangrong Qingneng has not used its technology products or participated in management. They also said Xiangrong Qingneng might exit its stake.

Business registration shows that Xiangrong Qingneng had 7 employees in 2022, dropping to zero after 2023.

Who Really Owns “Yingke”?

On March 10, Beijing Yingke Law Firm held a global board meeting, appointing Li Jingwu as the new chair of the Yingke Global Board and China Executive Director. Mei Xiangrong no longer served as chair of the Yingke Global Board.

Following the incident, Yingke Law Firm emphasized that “the issue was caused by problems in his family’s company, unrelated to our practice activities.”

Earlier, on March 2, the Beijing Justice Bureau announced that Yingke Law Firm had changed its organizational form from a general partnership to a special general partnership.

On March 17, Jiemian News called Li Jingwu but received no response. Zhao Chunyu, deputy director of Yingke China and director of Yingke Beijing Management Committee, replied that “the firm is very united, and we are actively and honestly resolving the issues. Lawyers support the measures taken.”

Despite Yingke Law’s swift disassociation from Mei Xiangrong and his family’s divestment from related companies, the long-term confusion over the “Yingke” brand remains a hidden risk.

Many legal professionals pointed out that the long-term confusion between the Yingke brand and Mei Xiangrong’s family enterprises is key to the trust collapse.

The core dispute concerns the separation of trademarks and ownership. “The trademark of legal services should be the law firm’s most core intangible asset, but the ownership of ‘Yingke’ has always been outside the firm. This separation itself is a risk,” said several lawyers.

Jiemian News found that as early as August 2010, Yingke Law applied for the “Yingke” trademark in the legal services field (No. 8353411), but the application was rejected.

Later, in September 2022, Beijing Yingtian Kedi Intellectual Property Agency applied for the “Yingke” trademark (No. 67202910), which was approved in September 2024. The major shareholder of this company is Mei Yaping.

According to the “Lawyer Law,” engaging in profit-making activities as a lawyer or law firm is strictly restricted or prohibited.

A lawyer who worked at Yingke Law recalled that over ten years ago, there were fierce disputes over capital operations and development directions within Yingke. Some core members even said Mei Xiangrong’s investment approach was too aggressive, “putting our entire assets on the line,” which caused heated arguments.

He explained that Yingke’s long-standing “Partner Title System” has obvious financing attributes. “The ‘Lawyer Law’ only recognizes ‘partners,’ but senior or equity partners are essentially a form of capital raising.”

He recalled participating in related projects early on with about 150,000 yuan, earning the title of “equity partner,” with an agreed annual return of about 8%. At the time, this was seen as an incentive combining status and income. However, his “equity partner” status was significantly different from traditional partners—he was not registered with judicial authorities nor did he have governance rights under the “Lawyer Law.” In other words, this role was more of an internal title than a legally recognized partnership.

He also mentioned signing an agreement that his “partner rights” would be exercised by Mei Xiangrong, meaning operational control was largely concentrated in Mei Xiangrong.

This incident has also brought the governance and large-scale expansion issues of the law firm into public discussion.

A week before the “Yingke explosion,” Beijing lawyer Yang Lin had a deep conversation with a Yingke global partner. “Everyone feels that Boss Mei has been a bit reckless these years.” The combined number of lawyers in the second and third largest firms still lagged far behind Yingke.

He pointed out that Yingke’s “headquarters-led + branch system” results in highly centralized funds and decision-making. “It’s nominally a partnership, but in practice, it’s closer to single control.” Although some branches are independently accounting, they lack real autonomy in major investments and fund dispatching, meaning risks from core financial issues could propagate to branches.

Law firms usually have clear withdrawal rules and cycles, with centralized settlement of lawyer fees, some of which can only be withdrawn after case completion, leading to capital accumulation.

Beijing lawyer Huang Jun, who interned at Yingke, said that the large scale of some law firms leads to long-term fund accumulation in firm accounts. “If it’s purely legal work, it’s fine. But if they pursue diversification, risks are easier to introduce,” he said.

Yang Lin believed that after this incident, Yingke might face lawyer attrition and client loss, making recovery difficult. “It’s somewhat like a bank run—once trust cracks, recovery is very hard.”

Recently, Yingke Law changed from a “general partnership” to a “special general partnership.” The former requires all partners to bear unlimited joint liability, while the latter isolates fault, with only at-fault partners bearing unlimited liability, and others responsible only up to their capital share.

On the legal responsibility front, Liu Chang believes that simply “cutting off personal actions” from the firm cannot fully resolve the issue. “If actions are taken in the firm’s name and stamped, it’s hard to completely dissociate from the organization legally.” Post-facto adjustments to partnership structure or liability are usually ineffective retroactively. Whether unregistered partners should bear civil liability is also a key controversy.

Currently, Beijing Justice Bureau and Beijing Lawyers Association have launched investigations at Yingke Beijing headquarters. An insider told Jiemian News that Mei Xiangrong has already turned himself in.

The widespread “Yingke storm” remains unresolved in terms of investor asset recovery and future industry compliance governance.