How to manage a Layer 2, 200-million-level treasury? An in-depth analysis of governance structures: Arbitrum vs Optimism vs Base

June 8, 2026, an on-chain vote that could influence the governance direction of the entire Layer 2 track is about to launch on Arbitrum DAO. The Arbitrum Foundation has officially submitted a proposal for a total operational budget of approximately $43.5 million for fiscal year 2027 to the DAO treasury, comprising $16 million in stablecoins and real-world assets (RWA), 1,740 ETH (about $3.5 million), and 230 million ARB tokens (about $24 million). This proposal is not merely a straightforward budget approval but a stress test on the core question of "how DAO treasuries manage multi-billion dollar assets" within the Layer 2 space.

Meanwhile, Arbitrum’s competitor Optimism is advancing its governance transition from an "experimental DAO" to a "new organizational model," while Coinbase’s Base network announced in February 2026 that it would detach from OP Stack, moving toward a self-managed unified tech stack and governance architecture. The divergence in governance paths among these three mainstream L2 networks reflects deeper industry tensions: is the pursuit of on-chain voting-driven decentralization an ideal, or should pragmatic efficiency favor centralization?

Arbitrum $43.5M Budget Proposal: Funding Flows and Controversies

Background and Voting Timeline

The proposal was published by the Arbitrum Foundation on the governance forum on May 22, 2026. After a one-week "temperature check," the official on-chain voting is scheduled to begin on June 8. The requested funds will support Arbitrum’s operations, technical infrastructure maintenance, and ecosystem growth in FY2027.

In terms of scale, the foundation’s requested $43.5 million is below its estimated total operating expenses for 2027 (roughly $27.6 million plus 244.9 million ARB), with the difference covered by the foundation’s existing balance sheet. In other words, the foundation is not requesting full reimbursement but is leveraging its existing assets to fill the gap and seeking incremental funding from the DAO.

Four Main Uses of Funds

According to the proposal details, the funds are divided into four core areas:

Technology and Security Expenses (about $14.81 million)

This is the largest single item, accounting for approximately 54% of the total budget, covering maintenance of the core infrastructure for Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova. Specific items include: security audits, bug bounty programs, block explorers, cloud hosting, rewards for technical contributors, simulation tools, analytical tools, and supporting systems. The foundation positions this expenditure as an essential "infrastructure necessity" that cannot be cut.

General and Administrative Management (about $10.4 million)

This budget covers personnel salaries, external contractors, legal compliance, insurance, and external service providers. The proposal explicitly states that these funds are fundamental expenses to maintain the foundation as a "legal shell" and operational entity.

Ecosystem Incentives and Growth Projects (disbursed in ARB tokens)

The 230 million ARB tokens are mainly allocated for ecosystem growth rather than daily operational costs. The foundation lists existing growth initiatives such as Trailblazer, Audit Subsidy, ArbiFuel, and DRIP, and notes that previously supported projects include Pendle, Ostium, USDAI, Instadapp, CowSwap, and El Dorado.

Variable Marketing Expenses (about $2.38 million)

Marketing funds are flexible, used for brand promotion, community activities, and developer relations.

Controversy Focus: The Gap Between Spending and Revenue

The main controversy surrounding the proposal is that the requested funds (including ARB) significantly exceed the on-chain revenue generated by Arbitrum DAO in 2025 through transaction fees, Timeboost auctions, and Arbitrum expansion plans. Data shows that Arbitrum’s gross profit on-chain in 2025 was about $23.49 million, while the full-scale estimated valuation of the proposal approaches $53 million, roughly 2.3 times DAO revenue.

A forum participant (Arbit1) summarized the core concern: “Ecosystem growth itself should not automatically equate to token holder value.” In other words, DAO continues to fund ecosystem expansion, but token holders lack a direct mechanism to capture benefits.

Participants have raised accountability demands including:

• More detailed disclosure of project-level KPIs
• Releasing funds in milestones rather than a lump sum
• Quarterly financial reporting
• Policies on ARB expenditure and refunds of unused funds
• Clear disclosure of potential ARB sales volume, fund flows to wallet addresses, and quantifiable tracking of funded outcomes

From a healthy DAO governance perspective, these demands reflect token holders’ rational calibration of the "transparency-efficiency-accountability" triangle in treasury management.

Arbitrum Network Growth Data

Supporters of the proposal cite key growth metrics:

• February 2026 daily transaction volume: 4.7 million
• Stablecoin supply: approximately $8.6 billion
• RWA assets: about $800 million
• Total ecosystem transaction volume: over 2.3 billion

These figures indicate Arbitrum remains one of the top Ethereum L2s in TVL and activity. However, the proposal also comes amid scrutiny of governance and security incidents—recent cross-chain minting events involving vsdCRV have reignited discussions on cross-chain token accounting and bridge security.

Comparing Governance Structures of the Three Main L2s: From "On-Chain Democracy" to "Centralized Efficiency"

Understanding the governance core of Arbitrum’s budget proposal requires elevating the view to the macro level of the L2 space. Arbitrum, Optimism, and Base represent three fundamentally different governance philosophies and technical routes, which directly influence treasury management, tokenomics, and community participation.

Arbitrum DAO: Two-Layer Governance and Delegated Representation

Arbitrum DAO currently controls about $3 billion in treasury assets, with a "two-layer" governance structure.

Governance Architecture: Through proposal AIP-1, Arbitrum DAO transferred approximately 43.5M ARB tokens to the DAO treasury, which has direct on-chain governance over the treasury. The governance process involves four stages: forum temperature check, Snapshot off-chain voting, Tally on-chain proposal execution, and a delay period. Snapshot handles about 96% of major DAO votes.

Security Council: The security council, elected by DAO every six months, consists of 6 members and acts as a key safety valve. It can trigger protocol upgrades either via regular DAO proposals or in emergencies through direct action. In the March 2026 election cycle, 16 candidates were nominated, each needing at least 0.2% of voting power (~9.8 million ARB) to advance. This "dual-track" balances decentralization with emergency responsiveness.

Delegated Representation: Protocols like Arbitrum, Optimism, Uniswap, and Aave currently rely on 30-100 active representatives to cast most votes, with transparent voting records and policy stances. This marks a shift from "full public voting" toward "representative democracy." Representative compensation ranges from a few thousand dollars annually to six-figure budgets, with some US institutions (e.g., Berkeley Blockchain, Michigan Blockchain) operating full-time DAO representative teams.

Treasury Maturity: Larger DAOs tend to hold stablecoins or tokenized US Treasuries rather than volatile native tokens. Arbitrum DAO’s treasury assets are managed via Safe, which oversees over $22 billion in assets.

Optimism Collective: Bicameral Governance and a "Non-Company, Non-DAO" New Paradigm

Optimism’s governance structure is the most unique among the three L2s, designed to address the "platform enshittification" risk—where short-term profit motives erode long-term platform viability.

Bicameral Structure: Optimism Collective comprises the Token House and Citizens’ House. The Token House, composed of OP token holders and their delegates, uses a "one token-one vote" model to oversee ecosystem grants, OP treasury, and some network parameters (e.g., sequencer settings). The Citizens’ House represents non-financial stakeholders, participating via reputation mechanisms to prevent capital-centric decision-making.

Capital Allocation 2.0: In early 2026, Optimism announced a "Capital Allocation 2.0" reform aiming to: restructure investment in the Superchain, enhance OP’s role within the Superchain, and increase accountability of OP Labs. The foundation plans to establish a legal structure (possibly DUNA) to enable more on-chain voting rights and transfer specific assets and governance powers on-chain.

Treasury Scale and Governance Philosophy: Optimism Collective holds about $200 million worth of OP tokens and other assets. Its core philosophy is that "governance is not about empowering voters to push progress through capital allocation but about preventing short-term greed that jeopardizes platform longevity." This is reflected in its decision-making design: protocol upgrades aim to reduce risks, while Capital Allocation 2.0 seeks to prevent short-term extraction.

From Experiment to Organization: In its 2026 Season 9 vision, Optimism explicitly states the goal to establish a "new organizational norm that is neither DAO nor corporation." This reflects its conscious experimental approach: avoiding the short-termism of traditional corporate governance and the inefficiencies of typical DAOs in capital allocation.

Base: Corporate Governance and Technical Independence

Base’s governance model differs fundamentally from Arbitrum and Optimism: it is not governed by a DAO but by Coinbase-led centralized operations. In February 2026, Base announced migrating from Optimism’s OP Stack to its own "unified tech stack," a move that significantly alters its governance stance.

Autonomous Governance Architecture: Post-migration, Base will introduce dedicated governance structures, a security council of signers, and fee mechanisms. The security council will replace Optimism-related seats with independent signers to limit external influence on protocol decisions.

Technical Route: Base plans to implement up to six hard forks annually—about twice the previous upgrade pace. It will also introduce multi-proof systems to accelerate withdrawals and deploy TEE and ZK proof mechanisms. Currently classified as a Stage 1 rollup, the team believes the new unified architecture will accelerate toward Stage 2.

Flow of Sequencer Revenue: Previously, Base shared part of sequencer revenue with Optimism Collective. With the shift to independent operation, it may retain a larger share internally, impacting long-term earnings expectations for OP token holders. Following the announcement, OP’s price dropped about 7%, reflecting market concern over Base’s reduced participation in the OP Stack Superchain ecosystem.

Base’s governance path clearly indicates: for L2s tied to centralized exchanges, "governance" aligns more with "corporate strategic decisions" than with "community consensus mechanisms." This model offers advantages in decision speed and execution but raises ongoing questions about decentralization.

Summary of the Three Approaches

| Dimension | Arbitrum DAO | Optimism Collective | Base | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Governance Architecture | Two-layer (DAO + Security Council) | Bicameral (Token House + Citizens’ House) | Corporate governance (Coinbase-led) | | Token Power | ARB holdings determine voting weight | OP tokens + reputation | No governance tokens | | Treasury Management | On-chain control (~$3 billion assets) | Token House oversight (~$2 billion assets) | Managed by Coinbase as a company | | Security Mechanism | 6-member Security Council elected biannually | Protocol upgrade framework + capital allocation | Stage 1 rollup, evolving toward Stage 2 | | Decision-Making Efficiency | Four-stage process, relatively slow | Experimental bicameral, iterative | Centralized, fastest | | Representation Professionalization | 30-100 active delegates, delegated voting | Delegated Token House + reputation-based Citizens’ House | Not applicable | | Core Philosophy | Community-driven on-chain governance | Preventing platform enshittification | Enterprise-level L2 infrastructure |

Deep Challenges in DAO Treasury Management

Centralization and Voting Participation

Although delegated representation addresses participation issues in full voting, new challenges emerge. Data shows only about 10% of ARB is actively used for governance, with participation declining. This concentrates governance power among a small group of active delegates, conflicting with the original vision of "decentralized autonomous governance."

Token Price and Governance Incentive Mismatch

As governance token prices decline (ARB down about 76% over the past year), holders’ willingness to participate in governance often diminishes. This creates a negative feedback loop: lower participation → decision quality concerns → token devaluation → further reduced engagement. The criticism from representatives in the $43.5M proposal about "detaching ecosystem growth from token holder value" exemplifies this micro-mismatch.

Legal and Regulatory Uncertainty

DAO legal status has seen some progress in 2026 but remains uncertain. US courts have issued preliminary rulings on DAO legal standing, but issues like tax frameworks, limited liability, and cross-border compliance are unresolved. Over 13,000 DAOs operate globally, managing about $40 billion in assets, but only around 220 hold over $1 million in treasury, and fewer than 80 have recognized governance activities. This "pyramid" indicates that truly mature DAOs with robust governance are still few.

Conclusion

The $43.5M Arbitrum budget proposal, scheduled for on-chain vote on June 8, 2026, is not only a resource allocation decision for Arbitrum DAO but also a collective test of treasury management models across the entire Layer 2 space. The ongoing questions from delegates about KPI quantification, milestone releases, and accountability mechanisms fundamentally mark DAO governance’s shift from "narrative-driven" to "data-driven."

Meanwhile, Arbitrum, Optimism, and Base each exemplify three parallel governance paths: Arbitrum’s on-chain delegated democracy, Optimism’s experiment with a "non-company, non-DAO" bicameral model, and Base’s corporate efficiency route. None is inherently superior; rather, they reflect different technical philosophies, founding principles, and community cultures in addressing the core tension of "decentralized efficiency." For investors, developers, and ecosystem participants, understanding these governance differences is increasingly a prerequisite for engaging in the Layer 2 ecosystem—not merely an option.