ShizukaKazu

#OneGate见证计划 #FIL After the FIL halving! Can it take off and break above 100U?
FIL has started being discussed by many people again. Especially after market sentiment recovered, an old question has once again come to the forefront: if FIL undergoes a halving, does it have a chance to reclaim $100?
This question sounds crazy, but it is not entirely without merit. After all, during the 2021 bull market, FIL once surged above $200. Looking back now, that market performance was truly impressive.
But the question now is, how far is FIL from $100?
If we calculate based on around $1, reaching $100 would mean an increase of roughly 100 times.
So the first thing that must be made clear is this: it is not entirely impossible for FIL to reach $100 in the future, but it absolutely cannot be interpreted as “halving = a guaranteed 100x increase.” These are two completely different concepts.
When many people hear “halving,” they immediately think of Bitcoin. After a Bitcoin halving, new supply decreases. If market demand continues to grow, the supply-demand relationship changes, and the price may receive support. Some people then directly apply this logic to FIL.
But in reality, Filecoin’s economic model is more complex. FIL issuance, miner rewards, locked-up tokens, and network transaction fees all affect its actual circulation and supply.
Therefore, what truly needs attention is not the simple phrase “halving,” but rather: how much will FIL’s new supply actually decrease in the future? At the same time, can market demand genuinely grow? That is the core issue.
More importantly, Filecoin’s development priorities are also changing. In the past, people mainly discussed “how much storage capacity Filecoin has” and “how much computing power the entire network has.” Now, what truly deserves attention is this: is anyone actually paying to use that storage?
One of Filecoin’s strategic priorities in 2026 is to promote paid on-chain storage, increase network economic activity, and attract more large-scale customers.
This is actually very important. Because for a token to rise over the long term, it cannot rely solely on reduced supply. There must also be people willing to buy it. More importantly, people must actually use it.
Suppose FIL’s supply decreases, but there are no new users, no real storage demand, and no more capital entering the ecosystem. Then simply reducing issuance would make it difficult to support a rise from $1 all the way to $100.
Conversely, if demand for AI data, on-chain data, decentralized cloud computing, and other areas continues to grow in the future, and Filecoin can truly convert that demand into paid business, the situation would be completely different. If supply contraction is added on top of that, price elasticity could naturally be amplified.
So FIL will truly need to go through three stages in the future. First, it must prove that it can continue developing.
Don’t rush to shout “$100” every day. First, see whether FIL can regain market attention, whether its price can stabilize, and whether its ecosystem can continue generating real activity. Second, it must establish real demand.
This is the most crucial step. If Filecoin can continuously increase paid storage, real users, and actual economic activity, then FIL’s fundamentals may truly change.
Third, it must wait for the major cycle.
If the entire crypto market enters a strong bull market in the future, BTC and ETH continue rising, capital begins flowing into high-quality altcoins, and Filecoin itself also experiences significant business growth, then FIL may display substantial price elasticity. Only then would it truly make sense to discuss $10, $20, $50, or even $100.
So, how difficult is $100?
Extremely difficult.
Because rising from $1 to $100 is essentially a 100x move. This requires not only market sentiment, but also enormous simultaneous changes in market capitalization, capital, and real demand.
So if someone tells you, “FIL will hit $100 immediately after the halving!”
It is advisable to stay calm. The truly reasonable logic should be: reduced supply + growing real demand + a crypto market bull run + continued ecosystem development + sustained capital inflows.
If these conditions appear simultaneously, FIL’s future valuation potential could indeed be reopened.
But if there is only a “halving” without demand growth, $100 would still be extremely difficult.
So, can FIL break above 100U?
The answer is: it is possible, but definitely not because of the halving itself.
What ultimately determines FIL’s long-term value is still demand. What we should really watch in the future is not how many percentage points it gains each day, but three questions: Are the number of real users increasing? Is paid storage growing? Can Filecoin truly turn its technology and narrative into sustained economic value?
If all three questions can receive strong answers, then $100 will at least have a basis for discussion. If not, then no matter how many stories there are about “halving,” “AI,” “Web3,” and “bull markets,” it will still be difficult to support a sustained price of $100. So for those who have held FIL for a long time, instead of shouting “100U” every day, it would be better to calmly observe whether it has undergone any real changes.
The halving changes supply. A bull market amplifies sentiment. What truly determines whether FIL can take off is still demand. This is the most crucial card for FIL to break above $100.$FIL

#非农就业数据 #每周来晒 September U.S. nonfarm payroll weakness may be merely an illusion, and expectations for a Fed rate hike this year may be difficult to change!
U.S. nonfarm payrolls increased by only 29,000 in September, significantly below expectations, prompting markets to quickly lower expectations for a rate hike in October. However, the household survey showed employment actually increased by 406,000, the labor force participation rate rose to 61.8%, and the unemployment rate edged up only slightly to 4.2%. Combined with continued strong U.S. economic growth, the nonfarm payroll data may not be as pessimistic as it appears, and the possibility of further Fed rate hikes this year cannot be ignored.
I. U.S. nonfarm employment came in below expectations in September, increasing by only 29,000, while the unemployment rate edged up to 4.2%.
The U.S. labor market suddenly poured cold water on the market.
On October 2, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics released data showing that U.S. nonfarm employment increased by only 29,000 in September 2026, far below the market's previous expectations of approximately 84,000–90,000; the unemployment rate edged up from 4.1% to 4.2%.
More notably, data for the previous two months were also revised down significantly: July employment was revised from an increase of 21,000 to a decrease of 10,000, while August was revised from an increase of 162,000 to 133,000, meaning the combined figure for the two months was 60,000 jobs lower than previously reported. In other words, the U.S. labor market has indeed been cooling over the past few months, and the issue is not limited to September alone.
By industry, September's employment growth mainly came from healthcare, construction, and manufacturing. Healthcare added approximately 17,000 jobs, construction added 11,000, and manufacturing added 9,000; government employment fell by 17,000, information-sector employment declined by 10,000, and financial activities employment decreased by 7,000.
On the surface, this was clearly a weak nonfarm payrolls report. But that is precisely where the issue lies—weak nonfarm payroll data does not mean that the U.S. labor market has already deteriorated significantly. If U.S. companies were truly cutting jobs on a large scale, the unemployment rate would normally rise more noticeably, whereas in September it increased by only 0.1 percentage point.
More importantly, another set of survey data is telling a completely different story. Therefore, whether this nonfarm payrolls report reflects genuine weakness or a significant divergence between statistical methodologies deserves further examination.
II. After the nonfarm payrolls data were released, Treasury yields and the dollar index fell, while U.S. stocks rose as the probability of a Fed rate hike in October declined.
After the nonfarm payrolls data were released, the financial market's first reaction was very direct: weaker employment meant less pressure on the Fed to raise rates. After U.S. September nonfarm payrolls came in far below expectations, markets quickly reduced their bets on a rate hike at the Fed's October meeting, the dollar weakened temporarily, and U.S. stocks received support.
U.S. Treasury yields fell in response: the 10-year yield declined by approximately 3–6 basis points to around 5.18%–5.20%; the more policy-sensitive 2-year yield fell even more, dropping by 8–10 basis points at one point.
The market interpreted the cooling labor market as reducing near-term pressure on the Fed to raise rates, pushing bond prices higher and yields lower. The dollar index weakened in tandem, falling approximately 0.1%–0.2% that day to around 101.8–101.9. The weaker dollar directly reflected cooling rate expectations, while funds' relative attraction to U.S. Treasuries declined. At the same time, U.S. stocks gained support and rose.
Futures and cash markets for all three major stock indexes opened higher, with major indexes such as the S&P 500 and Nasdaq recording moderate gains, exceeding 0.5%–1% during some periods. Investors believed that slower employment growth reduced the risk of rapid policy tightening, supporting risk-asset valuations.
The CME FedWatch tool showed that market expectations for the Fed's October 27–28 meeting shifted sharply. In the week before the nonfarm payrolls report, the probability of a rate hike had been as high as approximately 70%, but had fallen to the 20%–30% range before the report; after the data were released, the probability of a 25-basis-point hike fell further to approximately 14%–22%, while the probability of keeping rates unchanged in the current 3.75%–4.00% range rose to approximately 78%–86%. However, markets still priced in a possible rate hike in December, while action in October was essentially ruled out.
Overall, weak nonfarm payrolls data reinforced the narrative of “slowing employment and inflation still requiring observation,” suppressing the urgency of a rate hike in the short term, driving yields lower, weakening the dollar, supporting a stock-market rebound, and sharply reducing the probability of an October hike.
Subsequent data such as CPI will continue to influence the final decision. Fed officials are weighing economic conditions and their implications for the next rate adjustment, and this report significantly changed the market's short-term pricing of the interest-rate path. This is actually easy to understand.
The Fed is currently facing not simply the question of whether employment is weak or strong, but a more difficult combination: economic growth remains resilient, inflation has not returned to the 2% target, and yet the labor market is beginning to show signs of cooling.
III. Nonfarm payrolls are misleading, and other data indicate that the U.S. labor market may be performing better than the nonfarm payrolls data suggest.
What truly deserves attention is the stark contrast between the two sets of employment data in September. The U.S. nonfarm payrolls survey primarily draws on businesses, while the unemployment rate and household employment data come from a household survey. In September, the establishment survey showed that U.S. nonfarm employment increased by only 29,000; however, the household survey showed that U.S. employment increased by 406,000, while the labor force grew by 485,000, and the labor force participation rate rose from 61.6% to 61.8%.
What does this mean? The establishment survey tells you that businesses did very little hiring. The household survey, however, tells you that employment increased substantially and that more people are entering the labor force. The two figures even appear to “contradict” each other. But that does not mean one of them is necessarily false. The two surveys differ in their subjects, sampling methods, and statistical methodologies, so significant short-term divergence is not unusual. At least one important fact is conveyed by this month's household survey: the U.S. labor market currently looks more like “low hiring, low unemployment” than “mass corporate layoffs.” These are fundamentally different situations. If companies were laying off workers in large numbers, we would typically see a significant increase in unemployment, a rapid rise in the unemployment rate, and a sustained increase in initial jobless claims. But the U.S. has not seen such a combination. On the contrary, the unemployment rate was only 4.2% in September, while the labor force participation rate continued to rise. A broader measure of unemployment, including discouraged workers and those working part-time for economic reasons, also fell from 7.7% to 7.6%, its lowest level since January 2025.
That is why some economists believe that although this nonfarm payrolls report was weak, it cannot simply be defined as a precursor to a U.S. recession.
Another extremely important signal is wages.
In September, average hourly earnings for private-sector nonfarm employees in the U.S. rose only 0.1% month over month and 3.0% year over year, the lowest growth rate since May 2021; average weekly hours remained at 34.4 hours. Slower wage growth is of course not a particularly positive employment signal, but from the Fed's perspective, it means that the pressure on inflation from labor costs is easing. The problem is that U.S. inflation has still not been fully resolved. At its September meeting, the Fed clearly stated that inflation remained elevated, while its long-term target is 2%. The latest data show that the personal consumption expenditures price index remains significantly above the target level. At the same time, U.S. economic growth has not displayed typical recessionary characteristics.
After revisions, economic data previously released by the U.S. Department of Commerce showed that economic growth in both the first and second quarters of 2026 was higher than previously estimated; the Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model at the end of September projected that U.S. real GDP growth in the third quarter of 2026 would be approximately 3.7% annualized.
It should be emphasized that GDPNow is a real-time estimation model, not an official forecast by the Atlanta Fed, but it at least indicates that current U.S. economic activity remains quite resilient. The question, then, becomes very clear. If the U.S. economy continues to grow at a relatively rapid pace, inflation remains above 2%, and the labor market is merely shifting from “overheating” to “low hiring, low unemployment,” why would the Fed have to completely abandon rate hikes because of one weak nonfarm payrolls report? The answer is: there is no need to do so. This is why the market currently tends to view the October meeting as a period of observation rather than interpreting it as the end of the rate-hike cycle.
A latest Reuters report showed that markets have significantly lowered expectations for an October rate hike, but investors still regard whether to raise rates in December as an important variable, while Fed officials have also emphasized the need to wait for more inflation and employment data.
In other words, what September's nonfarm payrolls truly changed may have been only the timing of rate hikes, not their direction. Of course, the biggest variable here remains inflation. If CPI and core inflation continue to decline over the coming months and employment deteriorates further, the Fed could pause rate hikes or even revisit an easing policy. But if inflation picks up again while economic growth remains resilient, the Fed will still have reasons to continue raising rates.
Therefore, do not focus solely on the 29,000 nonfarm jobs added in September. What truly determines U.S. monetary policy is never a single data point, but rather the relationship among employment, inflation, and economic growth.
This time, U.S. nonfarm payrolls data was indeed very weak. But when the household survey, labor force participation rate, unemployment rate, wages, jobless claims, and GDP growth are considered together, the U.S. economy may be far less weak than the nonfarm payrolls figure suggests. This also means that lower expectations for an October rate hike do not mean that expectations for a rate hike this year have disappeared. For global capital markets, the real test may still lie ahead.

#OneGate见证计划 Weekend Check-In: Positive nonfarm payrolls sent Bitcoin to $87k, but $85k was regained and lost again—Uptober's opening was less smooth than expected
What I most want to discuss today is the subtle way this wave of “good news being priced in” played out 📊
First, the conclusion: On the night of the nonfarm payrolls report (10/2), BTC briefly surged to **$87,250** intraday, but failed to hold over the weekend—closing at **$84,791** on 10/2 and continuing to consolidate around **$84.5K** on 10/3. Regaining and losing $85K shows three things:
① The positive nonfarm payrolls news was fully priced in by “front-running positions”; ② There is heavy trapped and profit-taking supply above $85K; ③ Weekend liquidity is thin, and no one wants to catch a falling knife at this level.
This does not mean Uptober has failed; Uptober’s “first wave” simply needs to be digested first.
Review of the past three days:
10/2 (nonfarm payrolls day): The 29k figure came in, sending BTC straight from $86K toward $87,250—but it retreated immediately after hitting the top, with resistance everywhere above $87K, ultimately failing to hold even $85K at the close
​10/3-10/4 (weekend): $84.5K moved sideways as both bulls and bears waited—buyers waited for a “buy-the-dip entry point,” while sellers waited for a “rally distribution level”
​DOGE moved in sync: sliding from $0.095-$0.096 to $0.093, with plans to break $0.10 remaining on hold—altcoins are still following BTC’s lead
The three things to really watch next week:
1. The $85K battle: Holding above it = the launchpad for Uptober’s second wave, targeting the previous high at $87.25 and $90K; breaking below $84K = a pullback to $82-83K (the old lifeline)—the first two days of next week should decide
​2. October FOMC (10/27-28): The market is currently pricing in “no move in October and an 80% probability of a rate hike in December”—any hawkish or dovish remarks from officials next week will amplify volatility
​3. U.S. Treasury bond turmoil: The aftershocks of the 30-year yield at 5.62% are still being felt; if Treasuries remain unstable, BTC cannot keep rising
Uptober’s script is a “slow bull market,” not a “short squeeze”—that move to $87K was the market testing the waters, not the end of the rally.
Next week will reveal the truth—how much dry powder have you kept for your position? Let’s discuss in the comments 👇$BTC ‌

#每周来晒 #BTC BTC’s chip concentration is nearing the warning zone, and the crypto market may be on the verge of a major trend shift
Bitcoin’s recent market performance has drawn significant attention, with analysts warning that BTC’s chip concentration has approached the warning range and that market volatility is highly likely to expand significantly in the near future.
PANews reports that analyst Murphy posted an analysis of the current BTC market on social media. From the candlestick patterns, BTC has formed consecutive doji candles on the daily chart, with frequent wicks on both sides—a typical signal of intensifying competition between bulls and bears.
On-chain chip data is even more noteworthy. On August 1, two chip columns formed in the $62,000-$63,000 price range, totaling approximately 1.68 million BTC, with chip concentration at 12.9%. By October 3, two similarly prominent chip columns appeared in the $83,000-$84,000 range, totaling approximately 1.52 million BTC, while chip concentration rose to 12%, very close to the warning range.
Looking back at historical market movements, after a similar chip structure appeared in August, BTC surged from $60,000 to $80,000 in just 17 days, producing a strong upward trend. Many traders are also watching to see whether this instance of concentrated chips will replicate the previous market movement.
However, the analyst also issued an important reminder: the accumulation and rising concentration of chips do not directly equate to a rise or fall, and historical market movements cannot simply be used to predict the subsequent direction.
The true meaning of this indicator is that differences between bulls and bears are continuously accumulating, the conditions for a major market move are maturing, and subsequent price volatility will increase significantly.
Across the broader crypto market, once BTC enters a high-volatility trend-shift window, the entire crypto market will be affected. As a market barometer, Bitcoin’s sharp volatility will directly spill over into various major cryptocurrencies, accelerating sector rotation.
If BTC subsequently breaks upward, market sentiment will quickly recover and capital will accelerate its inflow into the market; if it instead chooses to correct downward, it will also bring the risk of broad-based pullbacks.
For traders, blindly taking oversized positions should be avoided during this stage, as both gains and losses will be amplified in a highly volatile market. With the market at its current position, both bulls and bears are accumulating strength.
Chip concentration is merely a precursor signal for a trend shift, not a definitive indication of direction. The market’s capital flows should be monitored continuously, with risk management in place to cope with the intense market conditions ahead.

#OneGate见证计划 #ZEC Zcash Falls 21% From Its High as ETF Outflows and North Korean Hacker Rumors Converge, but the Rally May Not Be Over
After surging 253%, Zcash has pulled back 21%, while the Grayscale ETF saw more than $30 million in single-day outflows, compounded by suspected North Korean hackers using its privacy pool to move stolen funds—the market's biggest question under this triple pressure is: Is this a pullback or the end? This article uses on-chain data and indicators to break down whether the privacy coin rally still has a second half.
Thursday was a tough day for Zcash.
ZEC is currently quoted at around $1,333.50, down 7.29% on the day, with about three hours remaining before the daily close. This means the privacy coin has fallen about 21% from the $1,698.00 peak it reached at the end of September. It also shows just how sharply ZEC had risen: it climbed about 253% from a starting point of $480.72 to reach that high.
The broader market offered little respite either.
Bitcoin surged to $85,600 on Wednesday after PCE inflation data came in below expectations, then quickly gave back its gains. The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield closed at 5.29%, while CME FedWatch data showed the probability of a Federal Reserve rate hike in October had fallen from 70% to below 50%.
First, let's look at ETF flows.
Grayscale launched the Zcash ETF, ticker ZCSH, on August 25, and by mid-September it had attracted $233 million in net inflows.
The fund recorded $30.25 million in net outflows yesterday, reducing cumulative net inflows to nearly $268 million. Its 3-for-1 share split also officially took effect that morning.
The Bit hack is another factor to consider, especially for market sentiment.
A group of hackers stole about $387 million from the exchange on September 24, up from the initial estimate of $351.6 million—because more transfers were later discovered on the Zcash and Tron chains. Bit's CEO said the attack bore the hallmarks of a North Korean hacking group, but the exact attribution remains under investigation. For a cryptocurrency determined to build a positive image on Wall Street, this is undoubtedly bad news.
On Wednesday, blockchain investigator ZachXBT flagged 2,746 ZEC (about $3.9 million) flowing from hacker-linked addresses into Zcash's privacy pool, where the sender, recipient, and amount are all concealed. The hacking incident was probably not the trigger for today's decline, and the $3.9 million involved is relatively limited in scale, but it certainly did not help.
What the chart says
Overall, Zcash remains in a strong bullish structure, but its price action over the past five days is pointing to a sharp correction. The Relative Strength Index (RSI) is a buying and selling momentum indicator ranging from 0 to 100. Its current reading is 50.2, in completely neutral territory, indicating that ZEC is neither overextended nor oversold.
Technically speaking, this is a relief compared with the persistently overbought readings during the previous advance. The Average Directional Index (ADX) reads 52.0. ADX measures trend strength rather than direction, and any reading above 25 is considered a genuine trend. A reading of 52 is very strong, but it mainly reflects the previous vertical surge, and because ADX lags, it may remain elevated even as prices fall. Exponential moving averages (EMAs) track average prices but assign greater weight to the most recent days. The 50-day EMA remains above the 200-day EMA, keeping the trend structure bullish on paper. If the decline continues, the two lines will converge—which is usually how a trend change first becomes visible. However, reaching that point would require a sustained and rapid plunge in Zcash, which is unlikely in the short term.
Is the rally over, or is this a dip worth buying?
A 21% pullback after a 253% surge is not unusual. In June, ZEC fell from $635 to an intraday low of $309 after a key vulnerability in its privacy pool was disclosed. It then climbed steadily, eventually breaking above $1,600.
So at least for now, the charts look more like a correction than a collapse. Trend indicators have not turned bearish, but momentum has cooled, and the ETF has just recorded $30.25 million in outflows. A daily close below $1,233.00 will activate the golden zone, while reclaiming $1,410.72 would indicate that the rally is back on track.$ZEC ‌

#HYPE财库公司持仓超32亿美元 Publicly listed company hoards 37 million HYPE: $3.2 billion in “insider” holdings—is it conviction or exit liquidity? 💰
Let’s clarify the data first: this purchase was 1.9 million HYPE worth $167.2 million (about $88 per token)—the “$3.2 billion” refers to the total holdings of this company, Hyperliquid Strategies, which is listed on Nasdaq: approximately 37 million HYPE worth $3.26 billion, plus $293 million in cash.
The essence of this move is that a publicly listed company is accumulating HYPE the way Strategy accumulates BTC—with institutional-grade real-money purchases and continued accumulation, providing genuine buying support and confidence for the token price. But in the same week, the foundation wallet unstaked 3.75 million HYPE (about $330 million)—as buyers entered, sellers were also unloading. Bullish in the short term; in the medium term, it comes down to a race between the “accumulation speed vs. unlock speed.”
I. The three implications of this move
Demand side: $167 million bought at market price—not a paper commitment; every purchase reduces the circulating supply
Signal side: A Nasdaq-listed company is backing it with its balance sheet—the same logic as Strategy buying BTC, which the market will interpret as “the people who understand HYPE best are willing to keep adding”
Flywheel side: More importantly, approximately $14.58 million in USDC revenue has been transferred to the assistance fund for HYPE buybacks under the AQAv2 framework—buyback funds are decoupled from trading volume, so buybacks can continue even on low-volume days. Most protocols lock treasury revenue in multisig wallets or distribute subsidies; Hyperliquid directly cycles its revenue back into the token.
II. Don’t just look at the buying: the other hand that same week
On 9/30, Hyperliquid Labs (the foundation wallet) unstaked 3.75 million HYPE (about $330 million)—a routine withdrawal of staking interest, but its nature is “unlocking”; these tokens could hit the market at any time.
So HYPE is now in a “two-way race”:
Bulls: Publicly listed company accumulation ($167 million per purchase) + buybacks ($14.58 million/month) + trading-fee buybacks
Bears: Foundation unlocks ($330 million) + early holders taking profits
In the short term, the token price will favor whoever moves faster.
III. Two risks to watch
Unlock pressure is ongoing: 3.75 million tokens was just a “routine withdrawal”—larger unlocks are still queued up. Accumulation is buying, while unlocking is selling; don’t treat “accumulation bullishness” as a reason to go blindly long.
“A publicly listed company buying its own token” is a double-edged sword: token price rises → treasury market value rises → it dares to keep buying (positive cycle); token price falls → treasury shrinks → financial statements look worse → it is forced to reduce its holdings (negative cycle).
$81-88 is the observation range for this race.
IV. Conclusion
The accumulation is a tangible positive: “institutional-grade buying + confidence backing,” while AQAv2 makes the buyback flywheel more resilient—but with 330 million tokens unlocked and queued up on the other side that same week, HYPE’s core tension has shifted from “is anyone buying?” to “who is buying faster or selling faster?”
Bullish thesis: Holding above $88 + continued monthly accumulation by the publicly listed company + diversification of buyback funding—the path to $100+ in the medium term remains intact.
Risk level: $81 (the 50-day moving average) is key support—breaking below it means unlock pressure exceeds accumulation buying power, so exit first; $95-100 is the previous-high resistance zone.
Strategy: Don’t chase the price—publicly listed company purchases are “dollar-cost averaging”; you should learn from it: scale in on a pullback to $82-85, reduce at $95+, and don’t go all-in at once.
Reminder: The intraday wick on the day of bullish accumulation news is often the most brutal.
Finally: HYPE’s narrative has evolved from a “decentralized exchange” into a “public-company treasury + buyback flywheel”—the story is more attractive now, but don’t forget that it also contains 37 million tokens held by “insiders”; they understand better than you when to sell. #每周来晒 $HYPE ‌

#TRUMP团队8个月套现2.49亿美元 This is the “classic script” for celebrity coins, not news
On-chain data shows that wallets linked to the TRUMP team transferred approximately 81.87 million TRUMP to bm, OK, and other CEXs over the past 8 months, worth approximately $249 million at the time of transfer (average price: $3.04). This is not a “sudden negative catalyst,” but rather the data finally confirming that the “draining machine” has been running for 8 months—the key figures are: the team controls 80% of the allocation (800 million tokens), and this transfer involved only 81.87 million tokens (approximately 10%), leaving approximately 718 million tokens in the wallets.
In other words, cashing out $249 million is merely an “appetizer.” At $3, there is still more than $2 billion in potential selling pressure sitting in the team’s wallets. For anyone buying TRUMP, the true counterparty is not the shorts, but the issuer itself.
The structure of TRUMP: a total supply of 1 billion, with the team/creators receiving 80% (800 million tokens) while retail investors receive 20% with unlocking requirements—this is a game where the issuer always has 8 times more tokens than you.
This cash-out:
8 months, in batches, transferred to CEXs—not a one-time dump, but “continuous drainage”: whenever the market rallies a little, some tokens are transferred to exchanges for sale
​Average price of $3.04—even if the team “sold cheaply,” it still pocketed $249 million; what about retail investors who bought at $10, $20, or $50?
​Historical reference: A Senate investigation showed that approximately 1 million retail investors collectively lost $3.8 billion on this project, while Trump earned approximately $636 million from TRUMP—this is not a coincidence, but a structural feature.
Three direct impacts on the token price
Impact one: Continuous selling pressure, with a clear ceiling. The team’s wallets still hold 718 million tokens—every rally provides the team with a “better exit price.” This is the “sword of Damocles” hanging over TRUMP, and the underlying reason it has fallen from its ATH of $74 to its current level (just a fraction of the high).
Impact two: Positive catalysts become “exit windows.” The “crypto dinner” a few days ago (which invited the top 185 holders) sparked a rally—but the market quickly realized that the rally driven by the event news was precisely a window for the team to continue transferring tokens.
The pattern of celebrity coins: positive news ≈ cover for the issuer to sell.
Impact three: Regulatory narrative intensifies. TRUMP has already become a focal topic in the Senate’s CLARITY Act debate—each confirmed instance of the “team cashing out” adds fuel to tighter regulation, putting pressure on the entire “political celebrity meme coin” sector.
The TRUMP team cashing out $249 million is not news, but an inevitability as the “celebrity coin cycle” reaches its midpoint—the issuer makes money, retail investors pay the bill, and regulators close in. It teaches everyone buying “political celebrity meme coins” a lesson: when the issuer holds 80% of the tokens, you are not investing—you are providing liquidity for someone else’s cash-out plan. $TRUMP ‌

#每周来晒 #非农就业数据 29,000! U.S. nonfarm payroll growth suddenly stalls—will the Fed still dare to raise rates?
The U.S. September nonfarm payrolls data was just released. On the surface, tonight’s report simply shows “tens of thousands fewer jobs,” but what really matters is that the U.S. labor market is clearly cooling, and wages are cooling along with it. For global markets, the biggest significance of this data is that it puts the brakes on further Fed rate hikes.
Let’s start with the most important figures. The U.S. added only 29,000 nonfarm jobs in September, versus market expectations of 90,000. The previous figure was initially 162,000, and the August data was also revised down to 133,000. September was far below expectations.
In other words, not only was September far below expectations, but the previous month’s data was not as strong as it had initially appeared. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate rose from 4.1% to 4.2%. Taken together, these two figures send a very clear signal: U.S. companies are rapidly slowing the pace at which they hire.
But what is actually more important is not the nonfarm payrolls—it is wages.
Average hourly earnings rose just 0.1% month-on-month in September, versus expectations of 0.3%; year-on-year growth was only 3.0%, also below the market expectation of 3.2%.
Why is this figure particularly important?
Because slower wage growth means less upward pressure on services inflation. The “wage-inflation spiral” that worries the Fed most has not worsened further, at least based on this report.
So this nonfarm payrolls report can be summed up in eight words: employment cooling, wages cooling.
Why, then, is the market actually happy?
Because what the market fears most right now is not a slightly weaker economy, but further Fed rate hikes.
After the employment data was released, gold and silver surged, U.S. Treasury yields fell significantly, U.S. stocks opened higher, the Nasdaq briefly led gains, and expectations for another rate hike in October declined further.
But don’t immediately interpret this as meaning that “the U.S. economy is heading into recession.” It is not that serious yet.
The latest U.S. initial jobless claims remain near historic lows, and there has been no sign of large-scale layoffs. So the more accurate description is: companies are less willing to hire new workers, but they have not yet begun laying off workers on a large scale.
Therefore, this nonfarm payrolls report is broadly positive for asset prices in the short term. It is positive for gold and silver because rate hike expectations have declined and interest-rate pressure has eased;
It is positive for U.S. technology stocks because high-valuation assets are most vulnerable to further increases in interest rates;
For A-shares, especially technology and growth sectors, any easing of global liquidity pressures is likewise marginally positive.
But what will ultimately determine whether the market trend can continue is still U.S. inflation.
So tonight’s nonfarm payrolls report can be summed up in one sentence:
The U.S. labor market has clearly hit the brakes, but the economy has not stalled. This combination is precisely the outcome that capital markets are most willing to see at this stage.

##美国9月非农新增2.9万 #每周来晒 How should we view the sharp weakening in nonfarm payrolls? — Review of the September U.S. Nonfarm Employment Data
New nonfarm payroll growth fell sharply month-on-month. U.S. nonfarm payrolls increased by just 29,000 in September, far below the market expectation of 90,000. Regarding revisions, the July figure was revised down from 21,000 to -10,000, while the August figure was revised down from 163,000 to 133,000, for a cumulative downward revision of 60,000 over the two months. We believe that monthly nonfarm payroll growth is highly volatile, and a sharp weakening in a single month does not indicate a shift in the employment trend. On a cumulative basis, the U.S. added a total of 612,000 jobs from January to September 2026, 232,000 more than during the same period last year, indicating that overall U.S. labor demand is showing signs of stabilizing at the bottom. Private-sector employment increased by 46,000 in September, with a three-month average of 54,000, compared with 48,000 previously, marking a bottoming recovery for two consecutive months. In terms of market reaction, the sharp weakness in monthly job growth led the U.S. Dollar Index to retreat from elevated levels, Treasury yields to fall across the curve, and U.S. stock futures to strengthen, while rate markets significantly reduced pricing for a Federal Reserve rate hike in October.
Government and information-sector employment were the main drags. By industry, education and health services added 20,000 jobs, remaining the core pillar of employment growth. Leisure and hospitality added 10,000 jobs, while the previous figure was also revised down to 37,000. Construction and manufacturing added 11,000 and 9,000 jobs, respectively. Both edged down month-on-month, but showed clear signs of bottoming and stabilizing, potentially benefiting from the expansion of data-center construction driven by AI capital expenditure and a recovery in manufacturing production. Employment in wholesale trade, transportation and warehousing, retail trade, and utilities remained at low levels and volatile, continuing to provide small marginal gains. Government employment fell by 17,000 month-on-month, making it the biggest drag this month. However, government employment has been highly volatile in recent months, with changes of -38,000 and 44,000 in July and August, respectively, indirectly contributing to the sharp fluctuations in overall nonfarm payroll growth. By comparison, the government sector cut a cumulative 287,000 jobs in 2025, while it reduced employment by only 40,000 from January to September this year, meaning its negative drag on overall nonfarm payrolls has eased significantly. Information-sector employment contracted by another 10,000, while financial-sector employment continued to decline, falling by 7,000. On a cumulative basis, the information industry has lost 224,000 jobs from its employment peak in early 2024, while the financial industry has cut 129,000 jobs from its peak in May 2025. Constrained by the labor-substitution effect brought about by the industrialization of AI, the broad trend of employment contraction in the technology and financial sectors has yet to reverse.
Labor supply continued to increase. The U.S. unemployment rate rose to 4.2% in September, weaker than the market expectation and up from 4.1% previously. Structurally, the employed population increased by 406,000, rebounding significantly for two consecutive months, which may indicate that the impact of immigration on labor supply has weakened somewhat; the unemployed population increased by 78,000, with the actual unemployment rate reading rising further from 4.14% to 4.18%. By reason for unemployment, the number of people voluntarily leaving jobs fell by 173,000, while the numbers reentering and newly entering the labor market increased by 152,000 and 116,000, respectively. The data indicate that workers’ willingness to switch jobs has cooled, while more people are willing to seek employment, leading to a clear increase in labor supply. The labor-force participation rate continued to rise to 61.8%, above the market expectation of 61.6% and up from 61.6% previously; the employment-population ratio also rose by 0.1 percentage point to 59.2%. By age group, the labor-force participation rate among prime-age workers aged 25–54 rose to 83.7%, up from 83.4%, with the core labor supply remaining stable. The continued return of younger workers to the labor force was the main reason for the successive improvement in the labor-force participation rate in this cycle. The participation rate among those aged 16–19 continued to rebound, rising by 1.3 percentage points to 37%, while that among workers aged 20–24 increased by 0.6 percentage point to 71.5%. The participation rate among older workers aged 55 and above fell by 0.3 percentage point to 36.9%; constrained by population aging, the long-term trend for this group’s labor-force participation rate remains downward.
Labor market supply and demand were relatively balanced. The number of U.S. JOLTS job openings fell to 7.079 million in August, down from 7.335 million previously, and remained broadly at low levels with fluctuations; the job-openings rate fell to 4.3%, from 4.4%. Labor demand weakened marginally, while its absolute level remained low. At the same time, labor supply recovered slightly, with the labor shortfall, measured by the difference between job openings and the number of unemployed people, falling back to 48,000.
Overall, the U.S. labor market showed some recovery in supply and a marginal decline in demand, maintaining a relatively balanced pattern.
Nominal wage growth continued to slow. Average hourly earnings for U.S. nonfarm employees rose just 0.1% month-on-month in September, below the expected 0.3% and the previous 0.3%; year-on-year growth fell to 3.0%, a new low since the pandemic began in 2020, down from 3.1% previously. Looking at the year-on-year and month-on-month data of recent months, wage growth is clearly trending downward, and wage inflation pressures have eased significantly. Against the backdrop of slowing wage growth, the resilience of U.S. private consumption has increasingly relied on the depletion of personal savings. In addition, persistently rising long-term Treasury yields have increased borrowing costs for durable-goods consumption, with interest payments continuously eroding households’ disposable income. By August 2026, the U.S. household saving rate had fallen to 4.1%, the lowest since December 2022, further amplifying the risk of subsequent weakness in private consumption.
Utilities still had the highest wage growth. In September, year-on-year average hourly earnings across U.S. nonfarm industries showed clear divergence, with wage growth rising in some sectors and falling in others. In absolute terms, utilities wages were still up 5.95% year-on-year, significantly outpacing other industries; wage growth in most other industries was below 5%, with wholesale trade and education and health services at the bottom, rising 2.51% and 2.1% year-on-year, respectively. In terms of year-on-year changes, utilities wage growth continued to decline by 0.77 percentage point, the largest drop among all industries; year-on-year wage growth in finance and manufacturing also fell by 0.52 and 0.29 percentage point, respectively. Leisure and hospitality and education and health services rebounded by 0.25 and 0.31 percentage point year-on-year, respectively, the largest increases among all industries.
Real wage growth turned more negative. After adjusting for prices, the year-on-year decline in U.S. real hourly earnings widened to -0.3% in August, from -0.1% previously, while the month-on-month change also fell by 0.1%, returning to negative growth. In terms of the drivers, this was mainly due to a further slowdown in nominal wage growth: August PCE inflation remained at 3.4% year-on-year, while nominal hourly earnings growth fell to 3.1%, a new low since March 2020. It is worth noting that international oil prices have risen again since August, creating a risk of a rebound in U.S. inflation. Even if nominal wage growth stabilizes at the bottom, household purchasing power will remain under pressure. Against this backdrop, real consumption by the U.S. private sector may remain under sustained pressure, and the K-shaped divergence within the economy may intensify further.
Expectations for an October rate hike eased significantly. Employment data this month fell broadly short of expectations, showing a combination of unexpectedly weak total employment growth, a rise in labor supply that pushed up the unemployment rate, and continued slowing wage growth. After the data were released, market expectations for a Federal Reserve rate hike cooled significantly: the probability of rates remaining unchanged in October rose from 62.4% to 83.9%, while the probability of a rate hike before December fell from 89.5% to 73.6%. In asset markets, futures on the three major U.S. stock indexes rose in the short term, the U.S. Dollar Index weakened, gold prices rebounded, and the 2-year Treasury yield briefly fell by more than 10 basis points. Overall, we believe that employment data at this stage are unlikely to be the core variable influencing the direction of Federal Reserve monetary policy. The policy focus remains on medium- and long-term inflation risks. Given that both short- and long-term U.S. interest rates have risen sharply since mid-to-late September, the market has significantly increased its pricing for the number of subsequent Federal Reserve rate hikes. If September inflation data subsequently undershoot expectations, there may be room for markets to trade on easing expectations for Federal Reserve rate hikes, potentially driving a phased decline in the 2-year Treasury yield; however, constrained by worsening bond supply and demand dynamics, long-term Treasury yields will remain unlikely to fall significantly under the dominance of the term premium.
Risk warnings: 1) U.S. inflation rises more than expected. Commodity and services inflation rises more than expected;
2) Federal Reserve monetary tightening exceeds expectations. Due to higher-than-expected inflation, the Federal Reserve maintains high policy rates for an extended period;
3) U.S. economic downturn exceeds expectations. U.S. consumption and investment weaken unexpectedly.

#OneGate见证计划 SEC Approves 3x Leveraged ETPs: Bitcoin and Ethereum Gain a New Tool—How Will the Crypto Market Change?
Recently, Bloomberg ETF analyst Eric Balchunas posted on social media that the U.S. SEC had officially approved 3x long Bitcoin and Ethereum ETPs under the Securities Act of 1933. Also approved during the same period were 3x leveraged ETPs for commodities including gold, silver, crude oil, and natural gas.
The news quickly sparked heated discussion in the crypto market. Many people confuse ETPs with ETFs. ETPs are exchange-traded products that include categories such as ETFs and ETNs. What was approved this time were products with 3x long leverage.
Simply put, these products come with built-in leverage, allowing investors to bet on Bitcoin and Ethereum rising in U.S. regulated markets without directly entering spot or futures markets.
For the crypto market, the most direct impact is that channels for incremental capital are opening further. Previously, the launch of spot ETFs allowed traditional institutions to gain low-cost exposure to crypto assets; 3x leveraged ETPs now provide higher-risk-tolerance Wall Street capital with a leverage tool. Once institutions become bullish on the market, they can use these products to amplify their long positions, potentially pushing prices higher in the short term and magnifying market volatility.
But high leverage is always a double-edged sword. 3x leveraged products carry a compounding effect, so once the market pulls back, losses are amplified as well. Even a modest decline can cause the product’s net asset value to shrink rapidly. In extreme market conditions, rebalancing operations may be triggered, further intensifying market turbulence. This means Bitcoin and Ethereum prices will likely fluctuate more widely going forward than they have in the past.
In addition, the SEC’s one-time approval of leveraged ETPs covering both crypto assets and commodities sends another signal: U.S. regulators’ acceptance of crypto-related trading products continues to evolve. For overseas institutional investors, crypto assets are gradually being incorporated into the same commodity trading framework as gold and crude oil, and their asset-class attributes are gaining further recognition in mainstream markets.
Retail investors should be even more alert to the significant risks brought by leverage. Leveraged products are suitable for professional institutions, not ordinary retail investors.
Overall, this approval will boost sentiment in the crypto market in the short term and create more room for capital speculation, but it will also amplify sharp rallies and plunges. Going forward, it will be important to closely track capital inflows into these ETPs, as they will become a key indicator of traditional capital’s confidence in the crypto market.$BTC

#FIL Filecoin (FIL): The current price is approximately $1.04. October 15 will be FIL’s most important day of the year—the six-year lock-up period for Protocol Labs and the Filecoin Foundation will end, and annual new supply will plunge from approximately 88.4 million tokens to approximately 22 million tokens, a 75% decrease. This means the largest source of annual selling pressure is about to disappear, significantly tightening supply. Note, however: this does not mean the price will rise that day; the effects will gradually become apparent over the following months.$FIL ‌

#美国9月非农新增2.9万 US stocks may not be as safe as they look!
What makes US stocks most likely to let investors lower their guard right now is that even bad news can be traded as good news. Nonfarm payrolls increased by just 29,000 in September, far below the 90,000 expected in a Reuters poll, while the unemployment rate rose to 4.2%. The market immediately rallied because investors believed the Federal Reserve had less need to continue raising interest rates.
The S&P 500 is up nearly 13% this year and is about 1% below its record high.
Looking at the rally in AI leaders, it is easy to reach a comforting conclusion: the US economy is resilient, the technology revolution has room to run, and any pullback is an opportunity.
But US stocks today are not as safe as the indexes suggest. Put Nvidia’s performance alongside the share prices of Walmart and Costco, then look at the changes in McDonald’s business, and it becomes clear that the market is pricing in two economies at once: one economy is racing to expand computing capacity, while the other is preoccupied with the cost of living. AI companies are selling future efficiency, while consumer companies are testing today’s purchasing power. Gains in the former cannot remove the warning signs in the latter.
This is precisely why the sharp pullback in consumer stocks deserves attention. As of October 2, Walmart’s share price had fallen about 23% from its May high; as of September 30, Costco was down about 17% from its 52-week high.
Declines of this magnitude are enough to remind investors that so-called defensive assets can also inflict heavy losses on a portfolio. But directly translating falling share prices into “the collapse of US consumption” would also misread the issue.
Costco’s latest fiscal-quarter net sales grew 11.2%, while US comparable sales, excluding the impact of gasoline prices and foreign exchange, grew 7.2%. The business is still performing well, yet the share price is substantially below its high.
That is more concerning than a simple deterioration in results: a high-quality company is still growing, but the market is no longer willing to buy it at its previous price.
In the past, investors were willing to pay a high premium for consumer leaders, buying their brands, scale, membership systems, and cash flows that could weather economic cycles. The problem is that once stability is bought at too high a price, it becomes another form of vulnerability. A company can continue making money while its shareholders may not. As long as earnings growth fails to keep up with contracting valuations, even a good company can become a losing investment.
The signal from Walmart is more complicated. In the latest quarter, US comparable sales grew 2.6%, transaction volume rose 1.5%, and average ticket size increased 1.1%; the company also disclosed that market-share gains were led by high-income households. These figures need to be understood separately. Walmart’s growth may simultaneously reflect consumers continuing to spend and consumers shifting money they would otherwise have spent elsewhere. High-income households also beginning to seek better value is a competitive advantage for discount retailers, of course. But gaining market share and expanding the overall consumer market are two different things. A retail giant can produce a solid earnings report by taking customers away from competitors.
McDonald’s reveals the pressure at the other end of consumption. Global comparable sales grew 1.3% in the second quarter, while US sales rose just 0.8%. Reuters reported that the company’s promotions aimed at low-income consumers generated less incremental traffic than expected, and management also acknowledged shortcomings in execution. If consumers visit restaurants one fewer time and shop at supermarkets instead, retailers may benefit.
But if even low-priced meal deals struggle to generate enough incremental traffic, investors must keep asking: are consumers simply changing how they spend, or are they beginning to consume less frequently? The data is not yet sufficient to confirm a broad contraction. But moving from “buying something cheaper” to “buying one fewer time” often happens earlier than an official confirmation of a macroeconomic recession.
More troublesome pressure is coming from the cost of capital. On October 1, the 10-year US Treasury yield briefly rose to 5.34%, its highest level since 2002. Reuters noted that energy inflation, growth expectations, and competition for capital created by companies financing AI expansion are all pushing up long-term yields. This means that even if weakening employment causes the Federal Reserve to pause rate hikes, long-term financing costs may not fall in tandem. The central bank sets short-term policy rates, while the bond market must price in inflation, debt supply, and long-term uncertainty. If investors focus only on whether the next rate-setting meeting will be more dovish, they can easily overlook the fact that companies issuing debt, franchisees opening stores, and households buying homes are facing a different bill.
For consumer leaders, high interest rates create dual pressure: consumers’ disposable budgets are being squeezed, while the valuation of future cash flows is also under pressure.
A company assumed to trade at a P/E ratio of 40x has a current earnings yield of just 2.5%. It of course cannot be equated directly with Treasury yields, and corporate profits can grow, but once Treasury yields exceed 5%, investors naturally raise their demands: how fast must future growth be to compensate for the operating risks and share-price volatility? The market was once willing to pay a high price for “nothing going wrong.” It is now asking: “If nothing goes wrong, why is it still worth so much?” The pullback in consumer stocks may be this question entering prices early.
The AI boom makes the situation even more complicated.
AI investment can indeed create orders, increase demand for equipment, and support earnings across the supply chain. But from an industrial-mechanism perspective, large-scale construction also competes for capital, electricity, and engineering resources. Before the technology revolution delivers long-term efficiency gains, construction costs have already been incurred. Thus, while technology giants with substantial cash flow and financing capacity are expanding, ordinary consumers, franchisees, and traditional companies are carefully managing their finances. These two conditions can coexist completely. Index gains can also coexist with pressure on the purchasing power of some households.
More importantly, AI capital expenditure cannot be counted as two sets of profits. Money paid out by cloud giants is revenue for equipment suppliers; for the cloud giants themselves, it must be realized through subsequent service revenue and returns on investment. If investors both assign high valuations to suppliers’ orders and assume that every dollar spent by buyers will generate high returns, they are effectively buying the optimistic expectations for the same chain twice in advance. This also explains why consumption matters to AI investors.
Demand for advertising, e-commerce, and enterprise software will ultimately still be tested by customers’ income and budgets. Computing capacity can be built in advance, but paying demand cannot be guaranteed by construction itself.
The concern about US stocks is that the market is combining several assumptions that need to be verified separately into one reassuring story: if employment weakens, policy will ease; if AI investment increases, profits will rise; if consumer leaders fall, they will eventually recover. But if employment continues to cool, consumers begin reducing their purchases, and long-term rates remain elevated, the short-lived excitement created by policy expectations may be offset by earnings downgrades and valuation compression.
Going forward, consumer earnings reports need to focus on traffic and purchase volumes, not just sales after price increases; the bond market needs to focus on long-term yields, not just central-bank wording; and AI earnings reports need to focus on the revenue and cash flow generated by investment, not just the size of capital expenditure. The plunge in consumer stocks has not proved that the US economy is already in recession, but it has proved that the word “stability” cannot preserve overly high purchase prices. AI may of course continue to rise. But in a market increasingly dependent on the growth of a small number of companies while requiring consumers to bear higher living and financing costs, the margin of safety needs to be calculated more strictly.
The most dangerous illusion in US stocks is seeing leaders repeatedly reach new highs and assuming that the entire economy is moving upward. Indexes can be lifted by a few companies, but the purchasing power of hundreds of millions of people cannot be restored by rising share prices. The market is still cheering for the future, while consumer stocks have already begun checking today’s wallets.#每周来晒

#美伊谈判陷入僵持布伦特站上106美元 Oil Prices Falling First ≠ Risks Resolved! US-Iran Talks Deadlocked, with a Bigger Storm Brewing
The US-Iran talks have made virtually no substantive breakthroughs, with neither side willing to yield on its core demands. Oil prices fell by about 2.5% in the short term, but the market has already begun issuing warnings: once hostilities resume after the midterm elections, the latent geopolitical premium could quickly return at any time, meaning crude oil risks have not truly dissipated.
A highly intriguing scene is unfolding in the Middle East: negotiations have dragged on without results, while oil prices have instead begun to retreat. Many traders have started to believe that the geopolitical crisis is now behind them, but the market's concerns are actually quietly accumulating. The current indirect talks between the US and Iran have yielded almost no substantive progress. Neither side is giving an inch on its core demands, and both have clearly defined red lines, making it difficult to reach any key compromise. The US is taking a hard-line stance, while Iran is likewise unwilling to back down on key issues.
The back-and-forth indirect consultations have repeatedly taken place, but the sides have still been unable to produce a consensus plan that can be implemented. The talks have reached an impasse, offering the region no genuine sign of easing.
01 Short-term oil prices fell 2.5%—what exactly is the logic?
From the market action, crude oil prices fell by roughly 2.5% in the short term, and many people directly interpreted the decline as a sign that geopolitical risks were receding. In reality, this retreat was more a temporary digestion of short-term risk premiums, rather than a signal that the crisis had been completely resolved.
Earlier, the market had priced in an immediate escalation of the conflict, and a large amount of long capital had already pushed oil prices higher in advance; when the talks maintained communication channels without being directly declared a failure, some longs chose to take profits, directly driving the pullback in oil prices.
But it must be clearly recognized that the talks have neither broken down nor led to reconciliation. The sword hanging over crude oil has not truly fallen.
02 One major market concern: Will large-scale hostilities resume after the midterm elections?
Institutional traders are already beginning to discuss an important risk scenario: if the current talks completely fail, the possibility of large-scale military action resuming after the US midterm elections have concluded cannot be ruled out.
During the election cycle, the US side currently needs to take domestic public opinion into account and does not want to ignite a war immediately, drive up oil prices, intensify domestic inflationary pressure, and affect the vote. Once the election window closes and those constraints disappear, the uncertainties surrounding the Middle East will suddenly increase. If the conflict escalates again, the Strait of Hormuz, the global lifeline for oil, will face the risk of disruption directly, and the specter of crude oil supply interruptions will immediately return to the market's focus.
03 The core contradiction in crude oil trading: The geopolitical premium could return at any time
This is also the most difficult aspect of crude oil trading to gauge. Short-term market action can fall as longs exit, but geopolitical risks will not disappear in sync with the K-line. The current retreat in oil prices amounts to temporarily stripping away part of the geopolitical risk premium; as long as signs of an escalating conflict emerge later, that portion of the vanished premium will quickly return within a short period, and oil prices could once again see a surge at any time. In other words, this current round of declines does not mean one can blindly take a bearish view on crude oil.$XTIUSD ‌

#美国9月非农新增2.9万 #每周来晒 #非农就业数据 Nonfarm payrolls rose by only 29,000, yet U.S. stocks climbed instead of falling: What is this jobs report really saying?
I. What exactly was wrong with the nonfarm data
The two most important figures in the nonfarm payrolls report are nonfarm payroll growth and the unemployment rate.
September payrolls increased by 29,000, just 35% of the expected 84,000. The unemployment rate was 4.2%, up 0.1 percentage point from both the previous reading and expectations. Average hourly earnings rose 3.0% year over year, the lowest since May 2021. More notably, the previous two months were revised downward: July was revised from positive growth to −10,000, while August was revised down from 162,000 to 133,000, for a combined downward revision of 60,000.
It was not just September that was weak: although the previous two months were revised down by a combined 60,000, the weakness was not broad-based across industries. Healthcare, construction, and manufacturing added 17,000, 11,000, and 9,000 jobs, respectively; government, information, and financial activities shed jobs, with government employment falling by 17,000. Part of the rise in unemployment also came from an expansion in labor supply: the labor force participation rate rose from 61.6% to 61.8%, its highest since May; the broader unemployment rate actually fell from 7.7% to 7.6%. So the more accurate description is: employment is cooling, but not collapsing—“low hiring, low layoffs,” rather than widespread unemployment.
II. Why did “bad news” in the jobs data become a “good market”
U.S. stocks are a “machine for discounting the future”: stock price ≈ future cash flows ÷ discount rate.
The most important component of the discount rate is the risk-free rate, anchored by Treasury yields.
The Federal Reserve is currently in a rate-hike cycle and just raised the benchmark rate to 3.75%–4.00% in September, the first hike in three years.
The market had originally worried: If employment and inflation remained strong, would there be another hike in October? After this weak nonfarm report, that concern was significantly reduced.
CME FedWatch showed that the probability of a 25-basis-point rate hike in October fell from 22% before the data to 13.8% afterward—after briefly approaching 80% a week earlier.
The transmission chain has just four steps: weaker employment → cooler rate-hike expectations → lower Treasury yields → higher growth-stock valuations.
That is also why the Nasdaq outperformed the Dow that day: interest-rate-sensitive technology growth stocks account for a larger share of the Nasdaq, giving it the greatest valuation elasticity; the Dow has greater weight in financials, energy, and industrials, making it more closely tied to the real economy.
But this chain has one prerequisite: it works only when “inflation is not the main problem.” Once inflation picks up, the Fed still has to hike, yields rebound, and the chain breaks.
The market had already previewed this once intraday: at 10:59 a.m. Eastern Time, the 2-year Treasury yield reversed from a 6-basis-point decline to a 2.52-basis-point gain, while the 10-year yield also turned higher.
III. When looking at nonfarm payrolls, do not rush to a conclusion
The market did not interpret it as an “economic collapse” for three reasons:
Seasonal adjustments may be distorting the data.
U.S. Labor Day fell on September 1 this year, placing the end of seasonal hiring near the edge of the statistical window. Some economists have pointed out that the seasonal-adjustment model may have overstated August and understated September.
Initial jobless claims remain near historic lows.
During the statistical period, weekly initial unemployment-benefit claims hovered near a 57-year low, while corporate layoff plans also declined—not mass layoffs, just slower hiring.
The fundamentals remain resilient.
This week, the U.S. Department of Commerce revised first- and second-quarter GDP growth up to 2.2% and 2.5%, respectively, while the Atlanta Fed forecasts third-quarter growth could reach 3.7%.
So the correct interpretation is: the labor market is moving from “overheated” to “moderate,” but has not yet slipped into “recession.”
IV. The key is not employment, but inflation
The Federal Reserve has two main goals: price stability and maximum employment. The prevailing view is that the threat from inflation is greater than that from employment. Core inflation remains around 3% annualized, clearly above the 2% target.
The main risks come from three directions:
Energy prices.
Brent crude has climbed above $102 per barrel, while diesel has reached a record high, raising transportation and manufacturing costs before passing through to the services sector.
Geopolitical conflict.
Tensions in the Middle East pose risks to energy supplies and supply chains, with spillover effects potentially not fully materializing until late 2026 or 2027.
Tariff policy.
Corporate concerns over trade disputes are rising, which could restrain capacity expansion and hiring while pushing up the prices of imported goods.
Based on interest-rate market pricing, a hold in October is already highly priced in, but the probability of a rate hike in December remains 63.1%. In other words, the market is not celebrating “the end of the rate-hike cycle and imminent rate cuts,” but rather that “there is room to catch a breath in October.”
V. What this means for U.S. stocks in the short and medium term
There are roughly three possible paths over the next month or two, depending on which condition appears first.
First, inflation continues to cool.
If October CPI falls, oil prices remain contained, and wage growth stays around 3%, both October and December could see no change in rates.
Second, oil prices push inflation back up.
If energy prices drive core inflation higher again, the Fed may be forced to hike once more in December, sending Treasury yields higher again.
Third, employment genuinely deteriorates.
If subsequent nonfarm payrolls continue to weaken and the unemployment rate keeps rising, the rate-hike cycle could end early, but the market would switch to “recession trading.”
The key is that the branching point is not the employment data, but CPI and oil prices: nonfarm payrolls determine “whether the Fed can wait,” while inflation determines “whether the Fed dares to stop.”
VI. A simpler framework for judgment
Remember one sentence: We watch nonfarm payrolls to watch the Fed, watch the Fed to watch interest rates, and watch interest rates to watch valuations.
It ultimately comes down to three combinations: weak nonfarm payrolls + falling inflation → improving rate environmentweak nonfarm payrolls + rising oil prices → rate pressure remainsmuch weaker nonfarm payrolls + high inflation → first trade “no hike,” then trade “economic downturn”It shifts attention from “whether nonfarm payrolls are good or bad” to “what combination of nonfarm payrolls and inflation we are seeing.” The latter is what matters.
VII. If you care about U.S. stocks, watch these four things over the next two months
September CPI (mid-October): Core inflation remains near 3%, determining whether there will be a rate hike in December.
The Fed’s October 27–28 meeting: A hold is already priced in; the focus is the statement’s wording on December.
October nonfarm payrolls (early November): Confirm whether September reflected seasonal-adjustment distortion or a deteriorating trend.
Oil prices and diesel: Brent at $102 and diesel at a record high; whether they can be contained is key.
Returning to the opening point. September nonfarm payrolls rising by only 29,000 was a report that “shocked to the downside,” not one showing a “collapse.” The rise in U.S. stocks that day reflected the market unwinding bets on an October rate hike, rather than repricing the economic outlook. The real deciding factor is not employment, but inflation. Drawing a directional conclusion from just one nonfarm payrolls report makes it easy to be proven wrong by the next CPI reading.

#OneGate见证计划 Will Bitcoin Surge Sharply in October?
Will Bitcoin rise sharply in October? Historical data, signals from major industry figures, on-chain indicators, and sentiment indices all point in one direction, but risks always remain. Many people have been asking the same question recently: Is Bitcoin about to see a major move? October has historically performed well, CZ posted “Soon” in the middle of the night, with an image of awakening beneath a green night sky, and figures such as Bao Er Ye have publicly expressed bullish views, while various indicators have also been repeatedly discussed. Capital appears to be positioning itself, and market sentiment is beginning to heat up. Is this really the starting point of a bull market? Or is it another trap designed to get most people to buy at the top? If a sharp rise really comes, how much room is there? If it does not come, or if a major shakeout arrives at year-end after it does, how should ordinary people view it? Without clear answers to these questions, it is easy to be led by emotion. Below, the situation is broken down layer by layer based on facts and logic, with more specific data and indicators added to make the analysis more solid.
October historical performance: Strong seasonality is supported by data.
Since 2013, Bitcoin has closed higher in October 10 out of 13 times, with an average gain of roughly 18% to 19% and a median gain of around 12% to 14%. The best performance came in 2013, when it rose more than 50%; the worst was in 2014, when it fell approximately 13%.
There have also been plenty of examples in recent years: Bitcoin rose around 28% in October 2023 and more than 10% in 2024. If September rises first, the probability that October will continue strengthening is often higher.
Bitcoin has already recorded a gain of approximately 6% in September 2026, making it one of the better September performances in history. These figures are not guarantees; they merely reflect frequencies observed in the past. Once market participants notice this seasonal pattern, they may position themselves early, thereby amplifying short-term upward momentum. However, the sample covers only a little more than a decade, and any year can break the pattern. October 2025, for example, saw a modest decline. Seasonality is only a reference and cannot serve as the sole basis for a decision.
Signals from major figures and market interpretation: Ambiguous but highly influential
CZ posted “Soon...” on September 29, along with a green-toned selfie. The market quickly interpreted this as a hint about the October market or the BNB ecosystem. An analyst subsequently publicly expressed agreement and asked how much crypto everyone held.
Figures such as Bao Er Ye, who have spoken out in the industry for years, have also repeatedly expressed their expectations for a bull market. These voices attract attention and drive short-term capital inflows. But it is important to understand that statements from major figures are often ambiguous and can be interpreted in any way after the fact. Similar calls to buy have been common throughout history; sometimes they were correct, while at other times they merely fueled sentiment.
Signs of capital positioning can be observed through changes in institutional holdings, ETF inflows and outflows, and large on-chain transfers, but these data change every day and cannot be treated as a definitive trigger for an upward move.
Sentiment index and capital flows: Currently in the greed zone
The Crypto Fear & Greed Index is currently between 70 and 74, clearly within the “Greed” zone. The index combines multiple dimensions, including volatility, market momentum, social media activity, Bitcoin dominance, and search trends. Its average over the past 7 days is approximately 72, while the average over the past 30 days is around 67 to 71.
Historical experience shows that when the index enters the 55-74 greed zone, prices are usually in an uptrend; once it exceeds 75 and enters extreme greed, the risk of a short-term pullback rises significantly.
In terms of capital flows, U.S. spot Bitcoin ETFs saw a clear return of inflows in late September. On September 21, net inflows approached $1 billion in a single day, reaching a one-year high. Cumulative net inflows over several days in late September exceeded $2.4 billion, pushing annual ETF net inflows back into positive territory. The continued entry of institutional capital often provides stronger support for the medium-term trend than retail sentiment.
On-chain data: Valuation remains within a reasonable range
The MVRV ratio, or the ratio of market value to realized value, is currently around 1.58 to 1.59. This means the market as a whole still has approximately 58% in unrealized profits, but remains far from the overheated expansion zone above 2.0 and even farther from the historical top zone above 3.5. The MVRV Z-Score is also at a relatively low level, indicating that valuation has not yet deviated significantly from its long-term average.
Other related indicators are sending similar signals: coins around the cost basis of long-term holders remain relatively concentrated, while SOPR, or the Spent Output Profit Ratio, is slightly above 1, indicating that selling overall remains profitable but has not yet developed into large-scale profit-taking.
Taken together, these data point to one conclusion: the current market is closer to the recovery and early expansion phase in the middle of the cycle than to a euphoric top.
Four-year cycle position and potential upside
Bitcoin broadly follows a four-year halving cycle. After the halving, supply decreases, and if demand keeps pace, prices often enter an accelerated growth phase over the following one to one and a half years.
In past bull markets, October through December was often the window when sentiment progressed from ignition to climax. By the time most people begin entering the market, the media starts reporting extensively, and new highs are repeatedly broken, the market is often already in its middle-to-late stages.
After that, extreme euphoria emerges, and the probability of a major pullback at year-end or the beginning of the following year increases.
This is not a precise forecast, but a recurring pattern from the past several cycles.
The current price is approximately $84,000 to $85,000, still clearly below the historical high. Based on the historical average October gain, the short-term reference upside is roughly 15% to 20%. In a complete bull market cycle, the gain from the start to the top has reached several multiples, but this depends on the starting point, macro liquidity, institutional acceptance, and other conditions. The actual result depends on whether supply and demand remain imbalanced, whether the macro interest-rate environment supports risk assets, and whether the market becomes overheated. No one can provide an accurate figure in advance.
The risks must be stated separately and clearly
Seasonal patterns can be broken. Calls from major figures may be traps, or at least may not be fulfilled immediately. When the majority of people rush in, liquidity may already have gathered at the top, followed by a major shakeout. Excessive leverage can amplify losses. Regulatory policies, macroeconomic shocks, and black swan events can interrupt the trend at any time. Bitcoin is extremely volatile and can fall 20% or more in the short term, while historical bear-market drawdowns have been even greater. Although the Fear & Greed Index is currently in the greed zone, it has not yet entered extreme territory, which instead reduces the probability of an immediate top. Once the index rapidly climbs above 80 while MVRV breaks above 2.5 or higher, vigilance is warranted. No bullish analysis can replace an individual's assessment of their own risk tolerance.
Summary
Strong historical October performance, signals from major figures, ETF capital inflows, reasonable on-chain valuation, and a sentiment index in the greed zone but not at an extreme level together form the current bullish rationale, and all are supported by specific data. But they are probabilities, not certainties. The market can continue rising as most people enter, or it can quickly reverse during a period of euphoria. Viewing this information objectively is more useful than blindly following the crowd or ignoring it entirely. Prices are ultimately determined by buyers and sellers, and any one-sided view is merely a reference. $BTC

#美国30年期国债收益率2002年以来新高 30 U.S. Treasury yields break 5.6% to hit a 22-year high: It’s not runaway inflation, but long-term bonds with no buyers being repriced
30-year U.S. Treasury yields broke 5.6% to hit a 22-year high, even as expectations for near-term rate hikes cooled amid dovish signals from the Federal Reserve—the long end is actually pricing in the return of the term premium.
On September 29, 2026, 30-year U.S. Treasury yields broke 5.6% intraday, the highest since June 2002. That same day, New York Fed President Williams said, “The Fed may only need to raise rates once more this year and is in no rush to act,” prompting the market to lower the probability of an October hike from 70% to 50%.
Expectations for near-term rate hikes are cooling, while long-term yields are hitting new highs. This cannot be explained by “rising rate-hike expectations”—rate-hike pricing is concentrated in the 2-year yield, at 4.92%, which has barely moved. The 30-year yield breaking 5.6% is pricing in something else.
The real driver: the return of the term premium. Long-term yields have two components: rate-hike expectations (transmitted through the short end) and the term premium (the risk compensation for holding long-term bonds). The September 16 FOMC meeting raised rates by 25bp to 3.75-4.00%, while the preliminary September composite PMI came in at 58.4, a 62-month high, but the 2-year breakeven inflation rate barely moved—this rally is driven by real yields, not inflation expectations.
San Francisco Fed data shows the 10-year term premium at 1.35%, up 23bp over the past year. The term premium compensates investors for the additional risk of holding long-term bonds. It widens for only two reasons: either inflation is expected to be more persistent, or supply and demand are expected to become more imbalanced. The 2-year breakeven rate has barely moved, ruling out the former. That leaves a supply-demand imbalance.
Supply is inelastic, while demand is ebbing
On the supply side, the CBO puts the fiscal 2026 deficit at $1.9 trillion, or 5.8% of GDP. Total U.S. debt exceeds $40 trillion. The Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee continues to increase long-duration borrowing, so the supply of long-term bonds is only rising.
Three forces on the demand side are retreating. Japan sold a net $71.4 billion of U.S. Treasuries in the first half of the year. China’s holdings stood at $633.4 billion, the lowest since September 2008, after cumulative reductions of approximately $98 billion over the past year. Official foreign institutions have reduced their holdings by $82 billion since the escalation of the Middle East conflict, the lowest level since 2012. Foreign investors sold $240 billion in a single month in March 2026, setting a new historical record.
The microstructure of the September auctions put this clearly on display. Indirect bids for the 2-year fell from 66% in August to 57.8%, 5-year indirect bids plunged from above 65% to 54.3%, 7-year bids came in at 57.2%, and primary dealers were forced to take down 14.74% of the 30-year issue, the highest in nearly a year. The 5-year auction also produced a 3.1bp tail, the second-largest on record for that maturity.
Overseas buyers are not taking the bonds, while primary dealers are providing the backstop—this is a textbook signal of “absorption fatigue.”
Two common misconceptions
Misconception one: “A rise in the long end means much larger rate hikes are still coming.” Wrong. After Williams’ dovish remarks on September 29, the probability of an October hike fell from 70% to 50%, while the December probability fell from 95% to 91.5%. Near-term rate-hike expectations are cooling, yet the long end is still hitting new highs—the long end is pricing in a repricing of the term premium amid a supply-demand imbalance, while the rate path is not the main factor.
Misconception two: “A new high in yields means inflation is out of control.” Wrong. The 2-year breakeven inflation rate has barely moved this week and remains below its high earlier this year. This rally is driven by real yields, reflecting growth and fiscal factors rather than inflation expectations.
How institutions see it
Opinions vary widely.
Rick Rieder, BlackRock’s global head of fixed income, is bullish, saying that 10-year yields have often produced considerable returns over the following 12 months after breaking 5%, and that he has begun adding to long-duration positions in small batches.
Bridgewater founder Ray Dalio is bearish, warning of systemic risks from America’s massive debt. Annual debt interest expenses exceed $1 trillion, and he recommends avoiding all interest-rate-sensitive assets.
Karen Ward of J.P. Morgan Asset Management forecasts that 10-year yields are unlikely to rise significantly above 5%. ING says yields could rise to 6% before long. In a survey of 173 market experts, just over half expect 30-year yields to exceed 6% this year.
The core condition underpinning this thesis is that the term premium is returning, driven by a supply-demand imbalance.
The view would need to be revised if either of the following occurs: the term premium falls below 1.2%, or auction tails continue to narrow and indirect bids return to above 65% while yields remain above 5.5%—that would indicate the supply-demand imbalance is easing but yields have not fallen, requiring a search for a new main driver, possibly persistent inflation or a repricing of credit risk.
Two things to watch next month: the August TIC data released on October 16, showing the latest changes in foreign buyers’ holdings; and September nonfarm payrolls and August PCE, which could alter the rate path and thereby affect the logic behind the divergence between the short and long ends.