SlowMist releases a technical analysis report on the Aztec Connect approximately $2.19 million asset theft incident. The report points out that the attacker exploited a bypass vulnerability in the settlement boundary of the deprecated Aztec Connect RollupProcessor contract, causing a mismatch between L1 and L2 states, and stole assets from the protocol. The vulnerability stems from the inconsistent verification logic between numRealTxs and decoded_slots, allowing forged deposits to pass ZK proof verification but failing to be correctly recognized by the L1 settlement layer.

AZTEC1.91%
View Original
This page may contain third-party content, which is provided for information purposes only (not representations/warranties) and should not be considered as an endorsement of its views by Gate, nor as financial or professional advice. See Disclaimer for details.
  • Reward
  • 3
  • 1
  • Share
Comment
Add a comment
Add a comment
DegenLibrarian
· 4h ago
2.19 million dollars is not too much, not too little; the key is this kind of boundary bypass technique—attackers clearly studied contract lifecycle management, and when the project team takes down old contracts, they must thoroughly clean out all permissions.
View OriginalReply0
GateUser-0fdb3438
· 6h ago
Abandoned contracts can still be utilized, and the issue of inconsistent states between L1 and L2 is a real headache in cross-layer protocols. ZK proofs have been verified, but the settlement layer doesn't recognize them; this design flaw is quite covert.
View OriginalReply0
GateUser-4e0e3bcf
· 6h ago
SlowMist's analysis this time is very detailed; they can even uncover low-level logic issues like the misalignment between numRealTxs and decoded_slots. Security audits definitely need to be handled by professionals.
View OriginalReply0
  • Pinned