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#美伊谈判博弈 Are the US and Iran close to reaching a preliminary agreement? The "red line" emphasized by Trump has been temporarily bypassed!
As US-Iran negotiations continue to advance, Iranian media and some American media recently disclosed a 60-day agreement framework involving the Strait of Hormuz, indicating that both sides may be approaching a "limited peace agreement." However, core issues such as the nuclear question, control of the strait, and ongoing military actions remain unresolved. Are the US and Iran really close to an agreement? What difficult contradictions are hidden behind the deal?
A new development worth noting in the US-Iran negotiations: the Iranian version of the agreement framework, initially dismissed by the White House as "completely fabricated," now partially overlaps with a draft 60-day memorandum of understanding disclosed by American media. This suggests that the US and Iran may be on the verge of reaching a "limited peace agreement."
From the current publicly available information, the core of this agreement is becoming clearer: first, Iran reopens the Strait of Hormuz; second, the US gradually relaxes maritime blockade of Iranian ports; third, both sides suspend large-scale military actions and continue formal negotiations on nuclear issues within 60 days.
In other words, what is being discussed now is not a "comprehensive reconciliation," but more like a cooling-off agreement of "stopping the bleeding first, then negotiating later."
And this actually aligns very well with the current practical needs of the Trump administration. Over the past few months, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has driven up international oil prices and continued to impact global shipping and US domestic inflation expectations. With midterm elections approaching, political pressure on the White House has been mounting.
Therefore, the US stance has shown a clear change: compared to the initial insistence on "solving all problems at once," the US now seems to accept a phased approach of "discussing Hormuz first, then nuclear issues."
But the problem is, the most difficult parts have been temporarily bypassed. Whether it’s the 14-point framework disclosed by Iranian state TV or the current US media reports of the 60-day memorandum, core issues such as high-enriched uranium stockpiles, uranium enrichment limits, and international verification mechanisms have not been truly addressed. These are precisely the "red lines" repeatedly emphasized by the Trump administration. This also explains why Trump, on one hand, admits progress in negotiations, but on the other hand, has yet to officially confirm that an agreement is imminent.
Another deeper issue is the Strait of Hormuz itself. The framework disclosed by Iranian media mentions that in the future, the Strait might be jointly managed by Iran and Oman; however, Trump has explicitly stated that no country will be allowed to "control" the Strait of Hormuz, warning that if Oman and Iran jointly lead the passage arrangements, the US will take strong action.
For Washington, the Strait of Hormuz is not just a shipping issue but also part of US military presence in the Middle East and global energy dominance. If the US truly accepts some form of "joint management" of the strait by Iran, it would be seen domestically as a major geopolitical concession.
More importantly, both sides are still negotiating while continuing military actions. On the 28th, US Central Command confirmed that Iran launched a ballistic missile at Kuwait; previously, on the 25th, the US conducted so-called "self-defense strikes" against Iranian ships, missile and drone facilities.
The current negotiations are essentially built on a very fragile military balance. Therefore, the most likely outcome now is a limited agreement that prevents the situation from spiraling out of control. It may temporarily lower oil prices, restore some shipping routes, and buy diplomatic space for both sides, but it cannot truly resolve decades-long core contradictions between the US and Iran. However, this also means that even if the deal is ultimately signed, the situation in the Middle East could escalate again at any time in the coming months.
As US-Iran negotiations continue to advance, Iranian media and some American media recently disclosed a 60-day agreement framework involving the Strait of Hormuz, indicating that both sides may be approaching a "limited peace agreement." However, core issues such as the nuclear question, control of the strait, and ongoing military actions remain unresolved. Are the US and Iran truly close to an agreement? What difficult contradictions are hidden behind this agreement?
The US-Iran negotiations have ushered in a noteworthy new development: the Iranian version of the agreement framework, initially dismissed by the White House as "completely fabricated," now partially overlaps with a draft 60-day memorandum of understanding disclosed by American media. This suggests that the US and Iran may be on the verge of reaching a "limited peace agreement."
Based on current publicly available information, the core of this agreement is becoming clearer: first, Iran reopens the Strait of Hormuz; second, the US gradually relaxes maritime blockade of Iranian ports; third, both sides suspend large-scale military actions and continue formal negotiations on the nuclear issue within 60 days.
In other words, what is being discussed now is not a "comprehensive reconciliation," but more like a cooling-off agreement of "stop the bleeding first, then negotiate later."
And this actually aligns very well with the current practical needs of the Trump administration. Over the past few months, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has driven up international oil prices and continued to impact global shipping and US domestic inflation expectations. With midterm elections approaching, political pressure on the White House has been mounting.
Therefore, the US stance has shown a clear shift: compared to the initial insistence on "solving all problems at once," the US now seems to accept a phased approach of "discussing Hormuz first, then nuclear issues."
But the problem is, the most difficult parts have been temporarily bypassed. Whether it’s the 14-point framework disclosed by Iranian state TV or the current US media reports of the 60-day memorandum, they do not truly address core issues such as high-enriched uranium stockpiles, uranium enrichment limits, and international verification mechanisms. These are precisely the "red lines" repeatedly emphasized by the Trump administration. This also explains why Trump, on one hand, admits progress in negotiations, but on the other hand, has yet to officially confirm that an agreement is imminent.
Another deeper issue concerns the Strait of Hormuz itself. The framework disclosed by Iranian media mentions that in the future, the Strait might be jointly managed by Iran and Oman; however, Trump has explicitly stated that no country will be allowed to "control" the Strait of Hormuz, warning that if Oman and Iran jointly lead the passage arrangements, the US will take strong action.
For Washington, the Strait of Hormuz is not just a shipping issue but also part of US military presence in the Middle East and global energy hegemony. If the US truly accepts some form of "joint management" by Iran over the strait, it would be seen domestically as a major geopolitical concession.
More importantly, both sides are still negotiating while continuing military actions. On the 28th, US Central Command confirmed that Iran launched a ballistic missile at Kuwait; earlier, on the 25th, the US conducted so-called "self-defense strikes" against Iranian ships, missile, and drone facilities.
The current negotiations are essentially built on a very fragile military balance. Therefore, the most likely outcome now is a limited agreement that prevents the situation from spiraling out of control. It may temporarily lower oil prices, restore some shipping routes, and buy diplomatic space for both sides, but it cannot truly resolve decades-long core contradictions between the US and Iran. However, this also means that even if the agreement is ultimately signed, the situation in the Middle East could escalate again at any time in the coming months.