Recently, the MSTR incident is worth discussing in detail because it’s no longer just about one company.

First, let’s talk about the good news from the capital side. In mid-May, Strategy used about $1.38 billion in cash, at roughly an 8% discount, to repurchase $1.5 billion face value of zero-coupon convertible bonds due 2029, reducing the total convertible debt from $8.2 billion to $6.7 billion.
The market’s initial reaction was “defensive” and “forced,” but from a capital structure perspective, this is actually a very clean operation — they repurchased bonds with a conversion price of about $672, which, at MSTR’s current price of around $159, are almost impossible to convert out-of-the-money.
These bonds will eventually shift from “automatically converting as they rise” and “passively deleveraging” to “maturing and needing cash repayment.” Using a discount to buy them back early effectively eliminates a future cash wall and also records a gain on the books. From a debt management perspective, this is a positive move.
But there’s a cost on another front: after this transaction, cash reserves are only about $871 million, which covers roughly $1.6–1.7 billion in annual preferred stock dividends — enough for about six months, whereas their previous target was 24 months.
This leads to a second layer. Using up the buffer instead of holding onto it implicitly signals that Saylor probably believes BTC is close to the bottom, so he’d rather buy back cheap debt now than let cash sit idle. This is always a gamble, but this time he’s betting big.
The immediate consequence is that selling pressure on BTC has increased passively — on Polymarket, the probability of “selling BTC within the year” has jumped from 55% to 84%, and on-chain, we see BTC moving toward Coinbase.
Having only six months of ammunition left is like telling the market, “I will use other sources if necessary,” and the most obvious source is the coins themselves.
Looking a bit further out, I think we’re in a somewhat chaotic phase, for two reasons.
First, the trend of the coin price itself is unclear. The $73k–77k range is oscillating without a clear direction, and everyone is waiting for confirmation.
Second, and more importantly, I believe MSTR has grown large enough that its “reflexivity” can influence the coin price in turn. With 843,738 BTC — nearly 4% of the total supply — when a company reaches this size, “how it manages its capital structure” is no longer just an internal matter but a new variable for the entire market.
The most direct reflection is mNAV: currently around 0.94x, having fallen below 1.0x. This means the “premium issuance of stock → buying coins → per-share BTC increases → stock price rises” flywheel has basically stalled.
Management’s own threshold is 1.22x — above that, selling stock to buy coins is accretive; below that, selling coins to pay debt is more cost-effective. We are still far from that line.
So the conclusion is quite straightforward: I remain optimistic in the long term. I don’t think the fundamental logic of BTC and this digital asset reserve has been disproven.
But in the short term, when everyone is discussing the same narrative simultaneously, the pressure is definitely high.
Currently, almost all of these companies’ debts are in floating loss, with even more exaggerated cases like BMNR (BitMine, on the ETH side), where leverage and dilution are amplified.
The capital market narrative is gradually shifting from “giving these companies a premium” to “repricing them.”
This isn’t a prophecy of a death spiral but rather the beginning of a paradigm shift: from the growth story of infinite issuance to buy coins, to a story of meticulous capital structure management and sustainability.
The valuation methods for these two stories are completely different.
Let’s wait and see.