Recently, I've been reviewing several DAO proposals again, and the more I look, the more I feel that voting on the surface is "community decision-making," but underneath, it's actually about writing incentives and power structures: who can get subsidies, who is qualified to nominate, whose votes are more valuable, and whether execution authority is held by multisig or a small circle. Frankly, proposals are not about discussing visions; they are about redistributing discourse rights.

Lately, retail investors have been complaining about validator income, MEV, and fairness in ordering, and I can understand that frustration: you think you're queuing, but someone cuts in line and even takes a tip. Many governance proposals are similar "cut-in-line rules," just expressed with more polite words.

What I fear most is not slowness but chaos—slowness is at least predictable, but chaos means rules that change today’s way and another tomorrow, ultimately causing UX to collapse directly, and no matter how advanced the chain is, it’s useless. Anyway, when I look at proposals now, I first ask "where does the money come from, who gets it, who executes it / can it be rolled back," otherwise, voting is just a token gesture.