CoW Swap releases a full post-incident report on domain hijacking, with user losses totaling approximately $1.2 million

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ME News Report, April 17 (UTC+8), CoW Swap releases a full post-incident report on the domain hijacking event.
The incident was a supply chain attack: attackers used social engineering tactics targeting the .fi domain registry Traficom and registrar Gandi SAS, successfully redirecting the domain DNS to attacker-controlled Cloudflare servers, which provided phishing websites to users for several hours.
CoW Protocol smart contracts, backend API, solver network, and signature infrastructure remained unaffected; the attack occurred entirely at the domain registration supply chain level.
The team detected the issue within 19 minutes and migrated services to cow.finance in about 3.5 hours.
The domain was fully restored on April 15 and RegistryLock was enabled.
Initial estimates suggest user losses of approximately $1.2 million. (Source: Foresight News)
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SushiLatency
· 6m ago
.fi Registry Traficom, this blame is well deserved; the top-level domain manager has become a critical weakness.
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DrinkWaterBeforeTheMarket
· 5h ago
Domain layer security must be included in the audit checklist going forward; just focusing on the contract is not enough.
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RektRecoveryCoach
· 15h ago
The most difficult to defend against on the user side is DNS hijacking; even experienced users can fall victim. Bookmarking habits can save the day.
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Semi-MatureGovernanceVote
· 16h ago
Even established registrars like Gandi can be targeted; in the future, choosing a domain registration provider will require an additional layer of scrutiny.
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HypeVaccinated
· 16h ago
The attack chain is clearly laid out, and CoW’s transparency this time is quite good—other projects should take notes and learn from it.
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0xCandleQuiet
· 16h ago
RegistryLock should have been implemented earlier; fixing it afterward always makes people sweat.
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GasFeesForNightRuns
· 16h ago
Finding it in 19 minutes is considered fast, but it took 3.5 hours to switch the domain name, and the users were really panicked at that time.
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FragmentedSilverStarMap
· 16h ago
1.2M dollars worth of lessons learned; the core system is fine, which is a stroke of luck in misfortune.
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Stop-LossLineForTheEveningGlow
· 16h ago
Supply chain attacks are hard to defend against, even the registry can be social engineered, and Web3 security boundaries are more fragile than imagined.
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