Just submitted a DAO proposal, and on the surface it reads very gently: optimize parameters, increase participation… but when you get to the end, the incentive design is the real focus. To put it plainly, it’s not “whether to do this,” but who gets the keys, whose votes are worth more, and who will be able to speak louder later on. Once you flip these little switches—who the subsidies go to, who the default delegation is set to, and how the voting thresholds are configured—the power structure becomes fixed.

Recently, in those extreme moments of funding rates, the chat has been arguing about whether to reverse the trend or keep squeezing the bubble. It’s actually just like voting: people talk about the direction with their mouths, but what they care about more is whether their own positions can be looked after. Anyway, I’m watching first; when liquidity gets thinner around midnight, the real comments will start to show up in the proposal discussion section.