Recently, I’ve been reviewing several DAO proposals. On the surface, they talk about “improving efficiency / attracting new users,” but upon closer inspection, they’re really about changing who can receive incentives and who can set the rules. The most common tactic: binding voting rights and subsidies together, which doesn’t lead to “a more active community,” but rather gives large holders more reason to concentrate their votes; then adding a committee/multisig “temporary custody,” essentially collecting power first and then seeing if they still have it.

There are also proposals that split the budget into several parts, each requiring a vote again. It looks democratic, but in reality, it’s about tiring out opponents until they pass it by default… Now I look at DAOs not first by their narrative, but by their ownership concentration, unlock schedules, and who the final signatories are, so I won’t be fooled by the word “governance.”

By the way, I want to vent a bit: recently, some people have been using ETF capital flows and US stock market risk appetite to explain all price movements. It sounds reasonable, but when it comes down to specific protocols, unless the power structure changes, the money just makes certain people’s exit liquidity look better. Anyway, before I vote, I always ask myself: who is this incentive actually rewarding?