PARTI Token Plummets 63%: Wintermute's Liquidation Rumors and Market Maker-Dominated Price Control Battle

Cryptocurrency asset price discovery mechanisms differ fundamentally from those in traditional financial markets. In conventional markets, prices are formed through a broad distribution of buyers and sellers engaging in a game of supply and demand, with liquidity dispersed across multiple independent market makers. In crypto markets, however, leading market makers control the majority of token liquidity provision, and a single institution’s position adjustments can often trigger sharp token price swings. On April 10, 2026, the PARTI token plummeted 63% within hours, with on-chain data and market timing showing high correlation, once again bringing this core industry contradiction into public debate. As of the time of writing, PARTI is temporarily priced at $0.0486, with the 24-hour decline narrowing to 45%.

The core function of market makers is to place buy and sell orders on both sides of the order book, earning profits from the bid-ask spread while providing market liquidity. Take Wintermute as an example: this institution offers liquidity services across over 50 exchanges, with total trading volume approaching $3.7 trillion by the end of 2023. Under normal market conditions, market makers maintain stable spreads through high-frequency trading algorithms, with delta-neutral strategies aimed at eliminating directional price volatility risk. However, this strategy has structural flaws: when a token’s price hits preset thresholds or risk control models determine that positions exceed acceptable risk levels, rebalancing operations can cause significant short-term selling pressure on the market.

On-Chain Timing of Wintermute Hot Wallet Transfers and Price Crashes

Crypto influencer Gorkeu pointed out on April 10, 2026, that the sharp decline of the PARTI token was directly linked to Wintermute’s market activities. On-chain data shows that in the hours before the price collapse, Wintermute transferred large amounts of PARTI tokens from its designated hot wallet, followed by a large-scale sell-off, causing the token’s price to drop 63% in a short period. The timing of this transfer—occurring before the price decline—is the key basis for causal inference. From the on-chain data perspective, if selling pressure originates from spontaneous seller activity, one would typically see positions transferred to exchanges during or after the price drops; but Wintermute’s transfers happened prior to the decline, making the explanation that “hot wallet token transfers triggered market sell-off” logically plausible in terms of timing.

It’s worth noting that Wintermute faced similar questions during the April 2025 flash crashes of tokens like ACT. At that time, Wintermute’s founder responded that the sell-offs were for arbitraging AMM pool price anomalies, and that the operations occurred after sharp price swings, not as deliberate market dumps. However, in the case of PARTI, the shorter time gap between hot wallet transfers and price crashes, along with the deeper price declines, challenge the “arbitrage rebalancing” explanation more strongly.

Profit Logic and Historical Operations of Leading Market Makers

Wintermute’s market-making approach is not simply placing bid-ask orders to earn spreads. Analyzing its historical operational patterns reveals that the firm often employs more complex strategies when participating in token market making. For example, in the market making of tokens like griffain, Wintermute typically first reaches agreements with existing token holders—either project teams or whales—to borrow tokens, while simultaneously buying call options to hedge risk. After borrowing, Wintermute sells these tokens on the market, creating a short position; as the token price drops due to the sell-off, the firm repurchases tokens at lower prices to return the borrowed tokens, thus profiting from the decline. This allows market makers to profit both during price drops and rises.

Community members have summarized this price movement pattern as the “Wintermute Mode”: opening high, selling off, shaking out weak hands, accumulating positions, and then pushing the price higher again. Data analysis by crypto influencer dethective shows that among tokens involved with Wintermute, 67% experienced price declines. Over the past year, investors following this firm’s market-making or holding strategies have seen an average return of -26%. Gorkeu further pointed out that last year, Wintermute used similar tactics to liquidate about 10 projects simultaneously.

Token Unlocks, Circulating Supply, and Selling Pressure Amplification

The sharp decline of PARTI was not an event occurring in a vacuum. On March 25, 2026, Particle Network completed a large token unlock, releasing approximately 89.3 million PARTI tokens—about 19.86% of the circulating supply, worth roughly $7.81 million. This unlock happened roughly two weeks before the April 10 crash. From a market microstructure perspective, large-scale unlocks tend to increase the tradable supply in the secondary market in the short term, and the thinner the liquidity, the greater the marginal price impact of this incremental supply.

When structural supply increases coincide with large transfers by top market makers within a narrow time window, the logic chain leading to price pressure becomes clearer. It’s important to note that token unlocks are typically planned events within a project’s tokenomics, and markets often price in some expectations before the unlock. However, the actual flow of tokens post-unlock—especially whether tokens enter the secondary market via market makers—is the key variable determining the magnitude of price impact. In this case, Wintermute’s hot wallet transfers occurred after the unlock, making it difficult to dismiss a causal link outright.

Price Recovery, Volume Surge, and Subsequent Market Performance

As of April 10, 2026, according to Gate’s market data, after the early morning crash, PARTI experienced a rebound, with a 24-hour price fluctuation of 173.2%, briefly hitting a low of $0.0358, and currently trading around $0.0485. The 24-hour decline narrowed to 44.22%. The simultaneous surge in trading volume is a crucial clue: PARTI’s 24-hour trading volume skyrocketed over 900%, indicating significant buy-side absorption following the crash.

This pattern of “sharp decline followed by rapid rebound accompanied by volume expansion” is not uncommon in crypto markets, but its interpretation can go in two directions. One is that panic selling released excess leverage, and the price rebounded as buy-side traders stepped in after reaching a liquidity-starved zone. The other is that market makers, such as Wintermute, may have been replenishing previously sold positions—if Wintermute had borrowed tokens at high prices and then bought back tokens after the price fell sharply to close out their positions, this would be a core profit mechanism in the “Wintermute Mode.” Due to incomplete on-chain address clustering and token flow transparency, both explanations remain plausible at this stage.

Market Maker Liquidity Withdrawal and Trust Crisis

The PARTI crash was not Wintermute’s first instance of market panic triggered by large transfers, nor is it likely to be the last. During the market collapse in October 2025, Wintermute transferred over $700 million worth of assets to exchange hot wallets, causing severe liquidity disruptions. In April of the same year, on-chain data showed Wintermute concentrated sales of tokens like ACT, BONK, and BABYDOGE, leading to sharp price drops across those tokens. In March 2026, a wallet linked to FTX’s estate transferred 37k ZRO tokens (about $8.17 million) to Wintermute, after which ZRO’s price immediately fell 6%.

Repeated incidents reveal deeper structural issues in crypto markets: a fundamental tension exists between market makers’ commercial interests and market stability. The core profit model of market makers involves high-frequency trading and cross-market arbitrage to earn spreads, which in normal conditions provides liquidity. But in extreme market conditions, risk control models may prompt them to withdraw liquidity or liquidate positions proactively, actions that resemble market manipulation. Wintermute’s founder has stated, “Market makers are not the ‘bad guys’—people need someone to blame,” but also acknowledged the industry’s need for disclosure mechanisms to improve transparency.

Future Evolution of Token Pricing Power and Market Maker Dynamics

Market makers play a dual role in token price formation—as liquidity providers and as amplifiers of price volatility—becoming an unavoidable governance issue in crypto. From project teams’ perspectives, collaborating with top market makers is a necessary route for listing tokens on major exchanges and obtaining initial liquidity; but from retail investors’ view, such partnerships may entail information asymmetry and opaque price discovery mechanisms. Some analyses suggest that Wintermute’s market-making involves not only direct secondary market trading but also multiple fronts such as news and market trends, indicating its style has evolved beyond simple order book management into more complex market game strategies.

Looking ahead, the evolution of token pricing power may follow two paths. One is the standardization of market maker disclosures at the exchange level—requiring market makers to reveal their token holdings and market-making agreements to reduce information asymmetry. The other is the maturation of DeFi-native market-making mechanisms, such as automated market makers (AMMs) and liquidity mining, which could gradually diminish the dominance of centralized market makers in token price setting. Until then, the influence of leading market makers on token prices will remain a core variable in crypto market structure.

Summary

The 63% crash of the PARTI token is supported by a logical chain involving on-chain timing, token unlock background, and Wintermute’s historical operational patterns. The hot wallet transfer occurred before the price decline; the large unlock increased market supply elasticity; and Wintermute has demonstrated recognizable operational patterns across multiple incidents. The convergence of these clues makes the “market maker proactively reducing positions to trigger a price collapse” explanation reasonably compelling. However, key details—such as contractual terms between market makers and project teams, specific arrangements for token borrowing and repayment—remain opaque, preventing external observers from drawing definitive causal conclusions solely from on-chain data. For market participants, understanding the role and interests of market makers in token price formation may be more valuable in the long term than focusing solely on the immediate causes of individual crashes.

FAQ

Q: What was the direct cause of the 63% crash of PARTI?

A: On-chain data shows that Wintermute’s hot wallet transferred large amounts of PARTI tokens hours before the crash, followed by a large sell-off, causing the price to fall 63% in a short period. The token unlock may have contributed as a background factor by increasing supply.

Q: Has Wintermute engaged in similar operations before?

A: Yes. In April 2025, Wintermute’s large-scale sell-offs of tokens like ACT, BONK, and BABYDOGE triggered market panic. In October of the same year, it transferred over $700 million worth of assets before the market collapse. Gorkeu noted that last year, Wintermute liquidated about 10 projects using similar tactics.

Q: Is market maker selling considered market manipulation?

A: Under current regulations, market makers adjusting positions within their market-making agreements are generally not classified as market manipulation. However, because these agreements are not publicly disclosed, external observers cannot easily determine whether specific sell-offs exceed reasonable bounds. Wintermute’s founder has called for industry-wide disclosure standards for market-making agreements.

Q: Has PARTI’s price recovered after the crash?

A: As of April 10, 2026, the price rebounded from a low of about $0.03546 to around $0.04943, with a 24-hour decline of approximately 44.22%, a volatility of 173.2%, and trading volume surging over 900%.

Q: How can investors mitigate similar risks?

A: Monitoring large on-chain holder movements, understanding the background and unlock schedules of tokens, and avoiding high leverage on assets with low liquidity are standard risk mitigation strategies. For tokens heavily held or influenced by market makers, additional risk buffers are advisable.