#美国部分解除伊朗制 The reversal came too fast! Trump eases Iran-related sanctions—will Iran take the deal? First, look at this key strait
Trump’s sudden easing of Iran-related sanctions may look like “backing down,” but the real battle is not over the sanctions list at all—it is over the dozens of nautical miles of waterway in the Strait of Hormuz.
The most eye-catching news over the past two days was that on August 5, the U.S. Treasury Department announced the lifting of sanctions on an airline linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and on two aircraft, saying that the company’s conduct had changed.
Going back further, on August 1, Trump also said he agreed to cancel a military strike on Iran; on August 3, he publicly stated that U.S.-Iran negotiations were underway and would proceed in two stages: first, opening the Strait of Hormuz, and second, discussing “denuclearization.”
In short, the U.S. appears to have softened its stance. Many people saw this and immediately reached a conclusion: Trump can’t hold out, the U.S. has backed down, and Iran is winning big.
Don’t rush. On the surface, the U.S. is retreating, but in reality, the core leverage it is focused on has not changed at all:
First, it wants the strait to reopen to traffic;
Second, it wants Iran to surrender the initiative in escalating the situation;
Third, it wants to put the nuclear issue back on the negotiating table. In other words, this is not a gift—it is using “partial easing” in exchange for “key control.” That is where the reversal becomes most interesting.
Existing reference information indicates that the Trump side did claim that negotiations were underway and called this the “last chance”; Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Baghaei, however, denied direct negotiations with the United States, saying that Iran was only discussing the strait issue with Oman. Other reference information mentioned that “arrangements related to the Strait of Hormuz should be decided solely through negotiations between Iran and Oman, and Iran will never accept the intervention of any external force,” but the provided material does not clearly attribute this statement to Baghaei himself. The article directly attributes it to Baghaei, but the basis for that attribution is insufficient.
Do you see it now? The U.S. wants to package this as a “U.S.-Iran deal,” while Iran insists on defining it as a “regional shipping arrangement.” This is not a difference in wording—it is a fight over who takes the lead. Whoever defines the issue wins the first round.
What Trump wants is for the outside world to believe that whether the strait can open depends on whether U.S. pressure works; what Iran wants is for the outside world to understand that how the strait is managed ultimately remains Iran’s decision. At most, the U.S. can shout from the sidelines—it cannot step in and seize control. This is the key point in the headline: first, see who gets to decide what happens in the strait.
The Strait of Hormuz is not an ordinary waterway; it sits at the throat of global energy transportation. As long as the situation there remains unstable, oil prices, shipping, insurance, and Gulf security will all be shaken. Even when the U.S. was at its most forceful rhetorically, it never dared to truly break through this line.
Why? Because if the situation spirals out of control, Iran will not be the only one to suffer first. Gulf allies, European markets, and global shipping will all be hit. According to reference information, Axios reported on August 1 that Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman spoke with Trump that day, expressed concern over the U.S. plan to strike Iran, and urged him not to attack Iran. As for Qatar, the UAE, Turkey, Pakistan, and other countries, the reference material only shows their names appearing in truncated portions of related reports. The article’s direct summary that they “all do not want the situation to blow up” lacks sufficient evidence. This shows one thing: the U.S. is not unwilling to take a hard line; the cost of going all the way is simply too high. So Trump’s current approach is essentially to “lower the tone by one notch, then seek the greatest possible gains.” Canceling the strike plan, slightly easing sanctions, and signaling some willingness to engage are not meant to save Iran’s face, but to use the lowest possible cost to get the strait moving again, stabilize oil prices first, and prevent domestic public opinion from exploding.
But will Iran accept?
Most likely, not so readily. The reason is simple: what Iran fears most right now is not negotiations, but “reaching a deal without getting anything real.” An unofficial report claimed that in the new round of contacts, the U.S. side hopes the strait will be opened free of charge for 60 days and is also asking Iran to restrain its proxy forces; this remains to be further verified. What Iran truly wants, however, is the lifting of oil sanctions, the unfreezing of overseas assets, and a clear guarantee that it will not be subjected to further military strikes. If you ask it to open the door first and discuss everything else gradually, Iran will surely do the math: I put down my biggest bargaining chip first—what if you turn against me later? More realistically, “lifting some sanctions” often does not amount to structural easing. Opening up one company and two aircraft may show that the atmosphere has changed, but it remains far from what Iran values most: oil exports, financial settlements, and the return of overseas assets.
Put bluntly, what the U.S. is offering now looks more like a probe than a full disclosure. And Iran’s strongest card is not its verbal denial of negotiations, but its control over the pace of traffic through the strait.
Pay attention: this is “control over the pace,” not simply “open” or “closed.” Reference reports say that the restoration of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has been slow, with traffic below previous normal levels. Iran can fully allow limited passage to ensure the safety of basic commercial shipping, while refusing to surrender control of the situation entirely. This offers two advantages: it can ease regional and international pressure while preserving its most valuable bargaining chip. The U.S. wants to use partial easing to take away Iran’s core strategic lever, but Iran is not so easy to trap.
This is also the layer many people miss: Trump’s “easing” is not the end point, but a change in the way pressure is applied; Iran’s “engagement” is not a concession, but an attempt to use its control over passage through the strait to dismantle the U.S. narrative.
So don’t rush to say that the U.S. has backed down, and don’t rush to say that Iran is going to agree. What truly determines the direction from here is not which sanctions are lifted, nor what Trump says at the White House about “smooth progress,” but who can write the rules for the Strait of Hormuz and who can make the other side follow their script. If the U.S. cannot gain control of the strait, its easing this round is merely a tactical retreat; if Iran gets back only a few symbolic benefits but hands over control of the strait’s pace, that is when it will truly lose.
For now, it is enough to watch three signals:
First, whether there will be substantive easing of oil sanctions;
Second, who ultimately gets to make the decision in the text of the strait arrangement brokered by Oman;
Third, whether Iran will forcibly separate “freedom of navigation” from “denuclearization” and prevent the U.S. from handling them as a package.
The strait is not merely a waterway. It is a bargaining chip, a door latch, and a trump card. Whoever can control this gate is the one who truly has the final say at the table.
Do you think Trump is making a concession this time, or is he using a different approach to force Iran to show its cards first?