#Ledger事件损失近9000万 Ledger has run into trouble again—what’s the safest way to store crypto? Can hardware wallets still be used, and how can assets be protected?
Over the past two years, it has been a particularly troubled time for hardware wallets. Every time something happens, people question: If hardware wallets can also be maliciously modified, why buy one at all? Wouldn’t it be better to just use a mobile wallet?
I strongly agree! I have always believed that hardware wallets are not suitable for everyone. Their core advantage lies in physically isolating private keys in a dedicated hardware environment, preventing everyday internet-connected computers and phones from easily accessing the private keys, while confirming transaction details through an independent screen. As a single-point defense, this remains an exceptionally robust design.
The problem is that many people treat them as “万能 safes,” believing that buying one means they can rest easy. For ordinary users, layered defense is more important:
1. An idle old phone as a cold wallet
If you have a retired iPhone or Android phone at home, completely erase its data, configure a reliable open-source offline signing tool, then keep it disconnected from the internet and use it as a dedicated signing device to build a cold wallet. This can also avoid targeted supply-chain attacks that may occur during the purchase and delivery of dedicated hardware wallets.
After all, when you buy a Ledger, SafePal, or OneKey, the product order, delivery information, and even shipping records may not necessarily mean you are a major holder, but they allow people with access to this information to know that you use crypto assets. An ordinary phone is different: If you take an iPhone outside, who would know whether you use it to watch videos or whether it contains BTC worth several million dollars?
Of course, phones themselves also carry risks from software vulnerabilities, device provenance, and hardware supply chains. Simply turning off Wi-Fi and enabling airplane mode does not automatically turn one into a qualified cold wallet.
What truly matters is a trustworthy software source, a strict offline signing process, and proper backup of the seed phrase.
2. Passphrase
Many hardware wallets support the BIP-39 Passphrase, commonly known as the “25th word.” Simply put, in addition to the original seed phrase, you set an additional password phrase known only to you, deriving another wallet from it. Thus, even if an attacker obtains the original seed phrase, they generally cannot recover the accounts protected by this additional layer without knowing the Passphrase.
However, considering the attack method involved this time, a problem arises. If a malicious module can steal the seed phrase displayed on the screen, it can very likely record the Passphrase input process as well, not to mention that the Passphrase itself introduces additional backup and recovery risks. Getting even one character wrong could make the assets unrecoverable.
Therefore, my view is that Passphrase can be used, especially by long-term holders with a certain level of technical knowledge, but only after understanding how it works and then deciding whether to add this layer of complexity.
3. A multisig setup using multiple brands and devices
Given this kind of hardware-tampering-level risk, after considering all the options, multisig is almost the only ultimate solution.
For example, set up a 2-of-3 multisig and purchase three hardware wallets from different brands to manage the same assets. Transfers would require authorization from two signatures. Since the devices come from different manufacturers and procurement channels, this directly eliminates the single-point failure risk of relying on one brand and one supply chain.
Even if a hacker physically compromises one of the devices and obtains one private key, they still cannot transfer your funds.
Of course, multisig has a higher barrier to entry. Implementation varies across different chains and also involves smart contracts and complex backup mechanisms. A security strategy is not necessarily better simply because it has more layers. It must match the size of your assets and your practical capabilities. Do not get yourself tangled up in pursuit of maximum security and end up unable to recover your assets.
Ultimately, I have always preferred “layered custody”:
Small, frequent transactions: keep them directly in a hot wallet for convenience;
Daily trading and liquidity: keep them on a Top2 exchange. To be blunt, for many beginners, the risk controls and technical defenses of leading exchanges are far safer than blindly tinkering with cold wallets themselves;
Large long-term holdings that will remain untouched: use a cold wallet shipped directly by the official source, or configure multisig and Passphrase for segregated storage;
In summary, there is only one principle: Never bet your entire net worth on a single manufacturer or a single link in the process. This suspected Ledger supply-chain attack also serves as a reminder: The security of a hardware wallet is not limited to the chip and firmware themselves; it also includes the entire circulation process from the factory to the user. Once a device leaves the original manufacturer and passes through third-party warehousing or personal intermediaries, the risk of physical tampering, such as disassembly or the insertion of malicious modules, may increase. Even if the device passes official authenticity verification, that does not necessarily mean it has not been tampered with. #WCTCS9