Unlike contract vulnerability attacks, this type of attack requires a certain amount of principal to break the price Oracle equilibrium, and there is a certain possibility of failure. The project team usually adjusts the protocol parameters and other prevention and control measures to increase the cost of implementing the attack, coupled with a detailed risk control strategy, fines and confiscation of funds, etc., and of course, can also resort to legal measures. Anyway, it doesn't solve the fundamental problem.

The point is that there is still controversy about the nature of such attacks, and many people will think that the attackers only used the AMM model and liquidity defects to seize arbitrage opportunities, which is speculative behavior and should not be identified as "hacker attacks". This is a problem that has not been solved for a long time.

Recently, we have seen a lot of exploration solutions for the order book trading model on L2, with low fees, no slippage and wear, and can achieve CEX-like privacy protection, which will attract MM market makers to migrate. It's just that the order book model will have thorny problems such as centralized matching, low liquidity depth, and low matching efficiency for a long time, and it is not invulnerable.

Theoretically, the AMM+Order model, coupled with strict risk control strategies, such as abnormal transaction monitoring, automatic stop loss, risk reserves, etc., the combination of the two trading models and the efficient use of trading depth may be a good optimization direction.

Personally, I think that with the popularization and maturity of infrastructure such as L2+L3, Trading will inevitably gradually shift to the application market, and some independent trading chain independent trading applications will gradually emerge.