Final analysis:

Spain: set up with possession to counter-press the opponent.

Spain’s nominal formations are usually 4-3-3 or 4-2-3-1,
but with the ball they actually look closer to 2-3-5 or 3-2-5.
Their style is no longer the same as that 2010 champion team.
It’s not pure Tiki-taka.

1. How the back line builds up
Rodri keeps adjusting the angles for receiving:
The two center-backs spread out to draw the opponent’s forwards higher.
Rodri receives in front of the center-backs;
when he’s marked,
Pedri or Fabián Ruiz drops back to form a second build-up point.
The left-back can tuck in to form a three-man shield,
or push forward to help Nico Williams.
Once the ball gets past the opponent’s first line of pressing,
it’s immediately played into the 8 on either side (the half-space)
or to the wide wingers.
The goal is:
first, use short passes to pull the opponent into the middle,
then送 the ball to a one-vs-one on the flank.

2. Five attacking channels
When Spain attacks, they strongly emphasize five-lane simultaneous positioning:
Nico stays on the left touchline;
the left-side 8 steps into the left half-space;
Oyarzabal occupies between the center-backs;
Omo (Olmo), Pedri, or Fabián enters the right half-space;
Yamal occupies the right touchline.
This structure makes it hard for the defending team to close both the wide channels and the half-spaces at the same time:
if the opponent’s full-back doesn’t step out, Yamal or Nico gets space to receive and turn;
once the full-back widens, Spain’s 8 inserts into the half-space from behind him;
a center-back slides to cover the half-space,
and the striker runs the opposite way to the near post or into the middle.

3. Specific patterns on Yamal’s side
Yamal first hugs the sideline, pulling the left-back toward the touchline;
the right-side 8 slips in from Yamal’s inside;
the striker runs toward the near-post to pin the closest center-back;
Yamal can cut inside to shoot or slide through balls into the half-space,
or suddenly play the ball back to the far post.
In the semifinal, France couldn’t let the left-back handle Yamal alone,
nor could they shut off his inside connections when doubling;
at the same time, Spain spaced France’s front-line players from each other,
making it difficult for them to form continuous counterattacks.

4. The left and right sides aren’t symmetrical
The right side places more emphasis on Yamal’s inside cut, half-space combinations, and the final pass.
The left side places more emphasis on Nico’s pace, forward runs, and one-vs-one on the weak side.
When the ball stays on the right for a long time, Nico generally won’t tuck in early,
but stays on the far side waiting for big switches.
That’s also what makes Spain more dangerous than traditional “tiki-taka”:
it controls the center while still keeping real depth on the wide channels.

5. Off-ball and counter-pressing
Spain’s first reaction after losing the ball is to surround-press with three to four nearby players:
the closest player forces the ball-carrier;
the second player blocks a pass toward the middle or toward a Messi-style central receiver;
Rodri protects the second ball;
the back line pushes up as a whole, compressing the space in midfield.
This makes possession itself become part of the defensive preparation:
the more reasonable the positioning during the attack,
the shorter the counter-press distance after losing the ball.
And the risk is very clear:
if the first round of counter-pressing is beaten by a pass over the line,
large pockets of space open up behind the higher edge full-backs and the center-backs.

Argentina:
The structure is freer than Spain’s,
but the whole thing around organizing through Messi is extremely clear.
Argentina can switch between 4-3-3, 4-4-2, and 3-2-4-1.
Their positioning doesn’t chase strict separation of every channel like Spain,
but instead allows players to cluster around Messi, swap positions, and create local continuous passing.

1. Temporary back three in build-up
When Argentina builds, they often pull one midfielder back:
Mac Allister or Enzo drops near the two center-backs;
this allows the full-backs on both sides to push forward;
De Paul leans toward the right, giving Messi running support and defensive coverage;
Messi doesn’t need to stay fixed on the striker line and can drop into the right half-space to receive.
So 4-3-3 can turn into 3-2-4-1, or even 3-1-5-1.

2. Messi’s runs aren’t always about dropping back to receive
Messi roughly has three kinds of positioning changes:
--when the opponent’s midfield sits low, he stays between the midfield and the back line;
--when the opponent blocks the center, he moves toward the right touchline, forcing the defensive shape to stretch sideways;
--when the back line can’t progress, only then does he keep dropping back to near the center circle to organize.
The second option is especially important. When Messi shifts to the right:
Molina can overlap wide;
De Paul covers in behind;
Alvarez attacks the space between the two center-backs;
the left-side attacker goes into the far-post area;
Messi gets the choice of an inside cut pass, a diagonal switch to the weak side, or a direct cross.
In the semifinal vs England, after Argentina went behind, they moved Messi more to the right,
and surrounded the opponent through continuous crosses, long shots, and the number of players in the box;

3. Alvarez’s value isn’t only in goals
Alvarez’s main tasks include:
cutting in from the blind side behind the center-backs;
dropping back to drag center-backs out of position;
when the opponent builds, pressing from the side/back;
when Messi gets the ball, running in reverse to take away the nearest center-back.
He’s different from a traditional target-man striker,
and his running is often to create a second layer of space for Messi, Enzo, or Mac Allister.
If you swap in Lautaro, the style becomes more direct:
more attackers in the box to attack set pieces/near-post moments;
a greater threat to crosses and second balls;
Messi can be more comfortable staying on the right to deliver;
but with fewer midfielders, the risk during transitions rises.

4. Argentina’s main weakness
Egypt used a narrow 4-5-1 to block the vertical lanes between Enzo, Mac Allister, and Messi,
forcing Argentina to perform U-shaped passes along the flanks.
Messi had to return to a very deep position to get the ball,
and Argentina could only rely on the full-backs pushing forward and crossing;
at the same time, space behind the full-backs was quickly attacked on the counter.
So the biggest fear for Argentina isn’t lacking possession,
but having the central lanes closed;
Messi being pushed away from the box;
full-backs forced forward at the same time;
after the first counter-press fails,
the opponent directly attacks behind the flank line.

The three most crucial matchups for the final
1. Yamal vs Argentina’s left side
Argentina will most likely not allow the left-back to isolate and man-mark Yamal,
but instead will have the left midfielder drop back to create a 2 vs 1.
But that protection triggers a chain reaction:
the left midfielder gets sucked to the flank;
the passing lane from Rodri to the right half-space opens;
Spain’s right-side 8 can receive on the inside of Yamal;
Argentina’s left center-back must choose between doubling on the half-space and tracking the striker.
To limit Yamal, Argentina’s focus is to force him to receive with his back to goal,
and cut off his second-one passes with the inside 8.

2. Messi vs the space behind Rodri
This is the single most important central problem of the whole match.
When Spain presses,
Rodri needs to step up to control Enzo or Mac Allister;
but once Rodri leaves his starting position,
Messi drops into his space behind him.
Spain doesn’t suit man-marking Rodri onto Messi for the whole way,
because Messi will actively lead him toward the right side.
A more sensible approach is zonal handoff:
Rodri blocks Messi’s return and turning directions;
the left center-back steps up the instant Messi receives;
Koundé (?) (Kukurella) narrows to protect the lane behind the center-back;
the left winger temporarily retreats to mark Molina.

3. Spain’s first touch after losing the ball
The counter sequence Argentina wants most is:
tackle → Enzo/Mac Allister finds Messi with the first touch →
Alvarez slips in behind the center-backs → the weak-side player enters the far-post.
Spain’s most important thing is
to ensure that after Argentina wins the first tackle, the first pass can only go sideways or backward.
As long as Argentina can’t immediately find Messi,
Spain will have time to restore a 4-1-4-1 shape.

Possible final strategies for both teams
Spain
Keep possession for the first 20 minutes,
avoid the match going straight into physical contact and chaos;
attack Argentina’s left side with focus;
spread Yamal wide, and have the right-side 8 constantly attack the half-space;
after losing the ball, first cut off Messi,
and prevent both full-backs from stepping up to the last line at the same time.

Argentina
When off-ball, compress into a 4-4-2,
with Messi and Alvarez staying up front;
allow Spain’s center-backs to carry the ball,
but block the routes from Rodri to either-side 8s;
after a turnover, first attack the space between Kukurella and Spain’s left center-back;
shift Messi to the right to draw Spain’s left side, then suddenly switch to the weak side;
if they are still not leading after 60 minutes,
Lautaro and high balls on the flanks will become key to the crossing style.

My tactical take
Spain is more likely to control the game,
and Argentina is more likely to control the key moments within it.
If the match stays in a prolonged set-possession battle with stable tempo,
Spain’s five-channel positioning, midfield numbers, and counter-press structure will be superior;
if the match is frequently interrupted, with fast transitions, second-ball situations, and box scrambles,
Argentina’s adaptability, Messi’s final pass, and Lautaro’s near-post pressing value will rise significantly.

Alright, gamblers—go ahead and visit my bagel link;
my earnings on bagel have already squeezed into the top 20,
feel free to follow along with me—there’s a fee discount: