Futures
Access hundreds of perpetual contracts
CFD
Gold
One platform for global traditional assets
Options
Hot
Trade European-style vanilla options
Unified Account
Maximize your capital efficiency
Demo Trading
Introduction to Futures Trading
Learn the basics of futures trading
Futures Events
Join events to earn rewards
Demo Trading
Use virtual funds to practice risk-free trading
CFD
Stock CFD Derivatives
US Stocks
Access real US stocks and ETFs
HK Stocks
Trade quality Hong Kong-listed stocks
Korean Stocks
SK Hynix
Real Korean stocks and top assets
Stock Futures
High leverage, 24/7 trading
Tokenized Stocks
Backed by real stock assets
IPO Access
Unlock full access to global stock IPOs
GUSD
3.8%
Mint GUSD for Treasury RWA yields
Stocks Activities
Trade Popular Stocks and Unlock Generous Airdrops
Launch
CandyDrop
Collect candies to earn airdrops
Launchpool
Quick staking, earn potential new tokens
HODLer Airdrop
Hold GT and get massive airdrops for free
Pre-IPOs
Unlock full access to global stock IPOs
Alpha Points
Trade on-chain assets and earn airdrops
Futures Points
Earn futures points and claim airdrop rewards
Promotions
AI
Gate AI
Your all-in-one conversational AI partner
Gate AI Bot
Use Gate AI directly in your social App
GateClaw
Gate Blue Lobster, ready to go
Gate for AI Agent
AI infrastructure, Gate MCP, Skills, and CLI
Gate Skills Hub
10K+ Skills
From office tasks to trading, the all-in-one skill hub makes AI even more useful.
Kimi K3 is so powerful that it has made OpenAI’s strategic leadership start discussing how the U.S. should fortify its defenses
According to Beating monitoring, OpenAI’s strategy lead Dean W. Ball said Kimi K3 is a very strong model. Its performance in Agent programming is already close to the best publicly available models in the first quarter of 2026. Such capability cannot be explained simply by distillation.
But when he says this, he isn’t just trying to praise Kimi K3.
What Ball really wants to discuss is why China is still willing to open up models at this level, and how this will affect the U.S. AI industry.
In his view, the pressure brought by China’s open-source models isn’t just that there is another cheap competitor. As long as open models are strong enough, developers won’t need to keep paying high prices for closed-source models. Model vendors’ profits will be squeezed, and investors will become more cautious as well. The momentum for U.S. companies to invest tens of billions of dollars in training the next generation of models may weaken accordingly.
Open weights can help technology spread faster, but they may also make it increasingly difficult for training frontier models to make money. In the end, model research and development can only rely on subsidies from other businesses, or on government funding—turning AI into a public infrastructure similar to power grids and roads.
Ball speculates that part of the reason China is willing to do this is that it hasn’t fully appreciated the risks of advanced AI. Another part is that after the U.S. restricts the export of advanced chips, China lacks compute capacity to provide inference services to users worldwide. Since it’s hard to monopolize users through APIs, open weights becomes a way to expand influence instead.
He also predicts that the U.S. government will eventually find a way to prevent Chinese models from entering domestic enterprises. The U.S. doesn’t need to directly ban open-source models; it only needs to continuously raise concerns about backdoors, data security, and compliance risks, and regulated industries such as banks will proactively avoid them.
Ball even believes these warnings don’t need particularly solid evidence. As long as enough uncertainty is created, it can make companies reluctant to adopt the models—while also not forcing all developers to switch to overseas service providers that are harder to regulate.