“After July 1, there are no more small accounts.” Document No. 65 ramps up momentum; short-term growth in the bank–insurance channel sharply drops

July 1, two policies were implemented for the bank-insurance (bank distribution) channel: first, Document No. 65 [“Notice on Further Strengthening Fee Management for Bank Agency Channels” (Jin Shouxian Han [2026] No. 65)] was officially put into effect, upgrading fee control from “managing commissions” to “managing fee structure”; second, the demonstration interest rate upper limit for dividend-type insurance was simultaneously lowered to 3.5%.

In fact, the “early signals” of the policy effects had already arrived. Data from an industry exchange obtained by 21st Century Business Herald showed that, in the first five months, the year-on-year growth rate of premium scale for new business in the bank-insurance channel had plunged from 28% in the first quarter to less than 7%.

Long Ge, deputy director of the Innovation and Risk Management Research Center of the University of International Business and Economics, told reporters that under the dual impact of the current “report-and-pay-to-one” (reporting and paying in line with unified rules) and the simultaneous lowering of the demonstration interest rate upper limit for dividend-type insurance (from 3.9% down to 3.5%), the reshuffling of the industry may accelerate. Product structure will shift from “savings substitution” to “long-term protection + steady dividends,” and bank-insurance cooperation will move from shallow agency sales toward deep integration through “ecosystem co-building.”

“Small-account” gray space is being blocked

The target of Document No. 65 is directly aimed at the long-standing problem of “off-the-books expenses” in the industry.

Relevant industry insiders pointed out that the main purpose of Document No. 65 is to further address the “small-account” issue in bank-insurance. So-called “small-account” refers to policy-sales rebates that insurance companies give to bank employees, outside of the “big account” (agency procedure fees signed between the insurance company and the bank). For a long time, “big account + small account” has been a common practice in bank-insurance business.

After the implementation of “report-and-pay-to-one,” some top insurance companies, leveraging their advantages in integrated financial services, have continued to have strong resource investment capacity in the bank-insurance channel. Meanwhile, some other insurance companies use “small-account” or disguised incentives and other gray methods, meaning the actual channel fees may still be higher than the filed levels.

In the “Questions and Answers on Issues Concerning Bank Agency Channel Fee Management (I)” accompanying Document No. 65, it is clearly stated that insurance companies must not use leftover fees such as commissions, training fees, and customer service fees to reallocate into paying salaries for bank-insurance specialists; nor may they disguise and pay channel fees under names such as issuance fees, information fees, and technology service fees.

A person in charge of a local branch network of a state-owned large bank told reporters clearly, “We have already received the notice; starting from July 1, there will be no small accounts.”

At the same time, she also expressed concern about front-line sales: “After the reduction of small accounts, the enthusiasm of front-line sales has noticeably declined. After there are no small accounts, we don’t know what will happen to performance.”

Zhou Jin, a partner at Tianzhi International Financial Consulting, told 21st Century Business Herald that the introduction of Document No. 65 inevitably puts short-term pressure on the industry, but in the long run it is beneficial. With the trend of bank-insurance channels continuing to rise in recent years, the “competing on fees and chasing scale” model in bank-insurance channels is no longer sustainable, and it also does not align with the industry’s shift toward high-quality development. In the future, bank-insurance channels should abandon the “only commission” theory and instead move toward a high-quality development path based on products, services, and brand.

First five months already “cooled down” early

Although Document No. 65 only officially took effect on July 1, the premium growth rate in the bank-insurance channel had already clearly fallen in April and May.

Data obtained by 21st Century Business Herald from an industry exchange showed that in the first five months, the year-on-year growth rate of premium for new-business single payments in the bank-insurance channel was less than 7%; in the first quarter, the figure was still around 28%. The year-on-year growth rate of new policy periodic payment premiums also fell from 19% in the first quarter to around 10%. This indicates that premium growth from April to May saw a much larger decline than in the first quarter.

Industry insiders pointed out that Document No. 65 set a three-month “new-old split” transition period (issued in March, with sales ending at the end of June). By the second quarter, substantive rectification had entered. The drop in May data was mainly due to the clearing of “small accounts,” which sharply reduced banks’ front-line sales motivation, combined with the demand that was “exhausted by earlier sales” in the first quarter, so growth naturally fell.

However, the decline was not a nationwide drop across the board. Greater fee transparency affects insurers of different sizes in very different ways, and the industry’s “Matthew effect” is being intensified.

Top insurers leverage stronger system integration capabilities, resource endowments, and brand effects to maintain advantages in the bank-insurance channel. In May, the combined premiums for periodical payments of the “Old Seven” (China Life, Ping An Life, Pacific Life, New China Life, Taikang Life, Taiping Life, and PICC Life) totaled 10 billion yuan, accounting for nearly 40% of the total industry exchange data. Among them, Ping An Life and China Life still maintained relatively high growth rates in the bank-insurance channel.

Song Zhanjun, deputy secretary-general of the Insurance Research Center at Beijing Technology and Business University, told 21st Century Business Herald that when fee compliance is ensured in the bank-insurance channel, insurers’ products tend to be highly homogeneous, and large insurers have brand premium, which gives them greater competitiveness in the bank-insurance channel as well.

At the same time, Zhou Jin noted that with the implementation of Document No. 65, the “fee competition” model of small and mid-sized companies can no longer be sustained, and the comprehensive advantages of top companies—capital, brand, scale, service, risk control, and technology—become even more prominent, so the “Matthew effect” will further intensify.

By contrast, small and mid-sized insurers face greater pressure in bank-insurance channels—fixed costs cannot be spread thinly enough, resource-swap capability is insufficient, and front-end sales competitiveness is hard to maintain.

Some executives of small and mid-sized insurers said directly: “In the long run, Document No. 65 is definitely a good thing, but in the short run it is certainly a redistribution of benefits. For small companies, the difficulty lies in allocating fixed expenses. You have to ensure that expense allocation meets regulatory requirements, you also need to ensure products can be sold, and it also has to be executable—so it’s very hard to balance.”

How will bank-insurance be driven in a “fully transparent” era?

An insider related to an insurer said, “In the past, on the front line, professionalism was worth nothing in the face of fees.” Their attitude toward Document No. 65 is complicated—on one hand, they expect the new rules to bring everyone back to the same starting line; on the other hand, they must face the reality that fixed costs cannot be spread enough and that front-end sales competitiveness is insufficient.

After fee transparency, the competitive rules in the bank-insurance channel are being rewritten.

For banks, bank-insurance is still “popular.” Some industry participants compared bank-insurance business to a “stabilizer” for intermediary business—bank-insurance income is more predictable, helping smooth periodic fluctuations in a bank’s intermediary business income, unlike fund distribution which is highly dependent on market conditions. In 2025, insurance business income at state-owned large banks generally grew. For example, Agricultural Bank’s insurance business income increased year-on-year by 46.64%; China Postal Savings Bank’s agency insurance periodic payment premiums broke 103.4 billion yuan, and the share of periodic payments rose to 58.26%.

But bank incentives do not equal counter-sales incentives. After fee transparency, the sales enthusiasm of bank front-line employees faces a test. Industry believes that in the short term, the inertia of bank-insurance development will still exist; banks still need fee-based intermediary income, which is a favorable condition. But if they don’t rely on fees, what will drive bank counter sales in the future—that is the real question.

An executive at a large insurer said, “The market situation is not yet clear. We are also watching how much the deepening and detailing of the ‘report-and-pay-to-one’ rules will specifically impact things, and how the market will respond.”

Long Ge pointed out that the “gold-plating era” of extensive scale-chasing is already over, but the “new golden era” driven by value is beginning. Document No. 65 is not “turning off the engine,” but “correcting course,” forcing the industry to move from being “overweight” to becoming “strong.” As the risk of negative spread losses is cleared, the new business value rate (NBV Margin) of top insurers is expected to bottom out and recover, enabling high-quality development.

For small and mid-sized insurers, Long Ge suggested that after “fee competition” fails, they should give up nationwide expansion and shift to “regional deep cultivation + segmented tracks.” They can rely on local rural commercial banks and city commercial banks, focusing on specific customer groups (such as new urban residents and county-based elderly care) to develop customized products. By delivering value-added services such as “insurance + health and care / tax-related services,” they can empower banks and use service stickiness to replace fee-game tactics, building differentiated barriers.

However, the industry generally judges that short-term pains are hard to avoid, and the lackluster momentum is likely to continue until the end of the year. When bank-insurance channels can regain momentum remains uncertain.

After fee transparency, the next stage for bank-insurance channels is no longer about who can charge forward faster, but about who can live more steadily and run farther.

[Author: Sun Shihui] (Editor: Wen Jing)

Keywords:

                                                            Insurance