Europe is scrambling to buy Chinese air conditioners—why has Gree been forgotten?

By | Chief Brand Commentator

This summer, Europe is going through an unprecedented bout of air-conditioner anxiety.

In France, Pissos recorded a historic extreme high of 44.3°C, while multiple regions across Germany broke through 41°C. In Paris, more than fifty prefectures sounded the highest-level heatwave warning.

Amid the raging heat, an air conditioner manufactured in China unexpectedly became Europe’s hottest, most sought-after commodity this summer.

The latest statistics released by the General Administration of Customs show that in the first half of 2026, China exported air conditioners to the European Union with a value of $3.76 billion, up 43.2% year over year, setting a new record high for the same period in history. In just June alone, the export growth rate reached 72.8%.

During this heatwave, China’s entire air-conditioner industry entered a moment of glory. However, as the undisputed leader in China’s domestic air-conditioner industry, Gree’s presence at this European feast is unexpectedly low.

1. Gree Gets Cold-Shouldered

First, take a look at some comparison data, and you’ll understand the awkwardness of Gree.

Midea is the biggest winner this round. Its PortaSplit mobile split air conditioner, developed specifically for the European market, shattered the structural pain points that have long plagued Europe’s older buildings—where drilling holes in exterior walls is difficult and installation fees can easily run into thousands of euros—based on a single selling point: “no drilling, self-installed in ten minutes.”

In the first half of the year, across the Western European market, Midea’s overall air-conditioner sales increased by more than 70% year over year. In just the German market alone, the PortaSplit line sold 60,000 units. Across all of Europe, full-year sales for this product are expected to exceed 300,000 units.

Haier followed closely behind Midea, taking another localization route.

It has figured out the “unspoken rules” of the European market: 70% of home air-conditioner orders are recommended by HVAC installation technicians. So Haier launched its Expert series high-end wall-mounted units. By cutting installation time directly by 50%, and with designs that are easy to disassemble and clean and easy to repair, Haier made installation technicians more willing to actively promote and sell the product.

Today, Haier’s market share in Eastern Europe reaches 34%, holding steady at No. 1; in Western Europe, its share is 9%, ranking No. 2. In Spain, it has even maintained double-digit market share for six consecutive years—so much so that district-level governments in Paris also purchase Haier air conditioners for air-conditioning installation schools.

Finally, let’s look at Gree.

According to data disclosed by the company, in the first half of 2026, Gree’s European air-conditioner sales revenue grew by more than 40% year over year. France’s end-market sales increased by 50%, mobile air conditioners sold out, and installation slots for wall-mounted units are booked out until the end of August.

Judging purely by the numbers, it doesn’t seem too bad. But according to data from EMI, a European home-appliance monitoring institution, Gree’s overall market share in Europe’s home air-conditioner market is only 2%-5%. Combined with customs export breakdown statistics, Gree’s share in the overall volume of China’s air-conditioner exports to the EU is about 12%-15%, with its scale ranking after Midea and Haier.

Public data shows that in 2025, Midea’s overseas revenue was 195.9 billion yuan, accounting for 42.73% of total revenue. Haier’s overseas revenue share exceeds 50%. Meanwhile, Gree’s export revenue was 27.375 billion yuan, accounting for only 16.06% of total revenue—and among the four major white-goods leaders, it is the only company whose overseas business saw negative year-round growth.

2. Why Was Gree Forgotten?

In China, Gree is firmly the No. 1 air-conditioner brand, with top-tier technical strength. So why can it not sell as well as its peers in Europe?

The answer may surprise many people: Gree’s advantages in China are precisely what turned into constraints in the European market.

What Gree missed was not just a one-off heatwave-driven sales opportunity, but an entire era’s logic for going global.

First is the path dependence of the product strategy.

From first principles, the core of this surge in demand in Europe is not high-quality traditional air conditioners, but cooling solutions that can be installed quickly, used compliantly, and priced appropriately.

The European market has its own unique structural contradictions: there are many older buildings; approvals for drilling holes in exterior walls are difficult; installation labor costs are extremely high; regulations are not uniform across countries; and rules and constraints regarding noise, energy efficiency, and refrigerant charging quantities are numerous.

As a result, the main force behind this wave of explosive sales is mobile air conditioners and split units that don’t require installation.

Midea took three years to refine PortaSplit, a Europe-specific model. This isn’t really any kind of black technology; it’s simply local requirements taken to the extreme.

By comparison, in Gree’s product lineup, while mobile air conditioners do exist, they have always been a supplement to traditional split units, rather than a strategic-level single product.

Gree’s technical strengths—such as self-developed compressors, energy efficiency ratios, and durability—are all built on the evaluation framework for traditional home split air conditioners. But when faced with the different “rules of the game” in the European market, the product standards that Gree is good at instantly became ineffective.

Second is the generational gap in channel models, which is the most fundamental dividing line.

In Europe, Midea uses a direct-operated route. Its subsidiaries directly connect with local department stores and e-commerce platforms, giving local teams autonomy over inventory, replenishment, and pricing. When demand surges, replenishment decisions can be completed within a week.

Meanwhile, Gree has long depended on a multi-tier distributor system overseas. Goods depart from the Zhuhai factory, are handed to national-level agents, then to regional agents, and finally to end terminals. Consumer demand feedback is escalated layer by layer, and a single decision cycle often takes one or two months.

The distributor model is suitable for pioneering blank markets—light assets and fast operation. But to truly understand a mature market, deep cultivation through direct operations is unavoidable.

As early as 2025, the trend toward extreme heat in Europe had already shown early signs. Yet in most European countries, Gree’s agents generally adopted conservative inventory strategies. After this heatwave arrived, mobile air conditioners suited to rental-room and older-building scenarios were cleared out across the board within half a month. The multi-layer approval process plus the replenishment model of shipping from domestic production—by sea freight to Europe—extended the replenishment cycle. With stockouts persisting for a long time, consumers had no patience and switched directly to competitors.

At this year’s shareholders’ meeting, Dong Mingzhu herself also admitted: “The company hasn’t done well with international exports this year.” She said plainly that the overseas market has huge space, and that the company will promote major reforms to its export model.

Said by Dong Mingzhu—who is highly competitive by nature—this clearly reflects genuine recognition of the gap.

Third is the difference in supply-chain flexibility.

Midea has 43 manufacturing bases worldwide. Its Hungary factory directly serves the European market; in peak season, it can expand production locally and ship locally. By contrast, Gree has only two large-scale overseas finished-goods production bases—located in Brazil and Pakistan. There is no local production capacity in the European region. The air conditioners sold to the EU are entirely reliant on production from factories in China, followed by sea and rail transport to Europe.

This is why, when products sell out, Midea can urgently coordinate Central and European freight trains to accelerate replenishment, while Gree’s installation scheduling is booked out directly until the end of August. It’s not that it didn’t want to replenish—it’s that it truly couldn’t.

Finally, and most importantly, Gree’s strategic focus is not on the Western Europe residential market.

Where is Gree’s overseas “core base”? It is in Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the commercial engineering market.

In Romania and Poland, Gree’s market share can rank No. 1. In the Middle East and Africa, its share ranks just behind LG. In Gree’s export structure, the proportion of commercial air conditioners and heat pump unit sets is not low. With higher average selling prices and good margins, it follows a large B2B route.

As for the Western Europe residential consumer market, it has long not been a top strategic priority for Gree. The market rules there are complex, the barriers are high, and competition is fierce. It’s not as reliable as deeply cultivating emerging markets.

There’s nothing inherently right or wrong about this; it’s simply a strategic choice by the company. But when extreme heat suddenly tore open the “ceiling” of demand for Western Europe residential air conditioners, strategic neglect turned into tactical inability to respond in time.

3. Gree’s Pride and Predicament

However, even after writing all this, we still have to say something fair: Gree hasn’t lost. It has simply chosen a harder road.

Even with the same foundation of Made in China, going overseas can take different forms.

Midea follows a full-area penetration route: it acquires local brands, builds local factories, conducts local R&D, and operates local channels through direct operations—going wherever there’s an opportunity.

Gree follows a brand-commitment route: it insists on independent technology, insists on independent brands, doesn’t easily do OEM manufacturing, and gradually penetrates the market through technology and quality.

There is no absolute right or wrong—only different choices.

Many people don’t know that in its early years, Gree actually started out by doing OEM work. During the 2008 financial crisis, Europe’s century-old brand Electrolux proactively came knocking, offering sticker-label orders at a scale of one million units, with substantial profits. At that time, more than 60% of Gree’s overseas income came from OEM work, and that order was basically lifesaving money delivered to its doorstep. But Dong Mingzhu refused.

That decision sparked massive controversy at the time.

Giving up stable OEM cash flow and instead pursuing an independent brand path—one with higher difficulty and slower payoff—doesn’t look like a good deal no matter how you view it. But Dong Mingzhu’s logic was clear: sticker-label work is always serving someone else, and it never gives you market voice or control.

After Dong Mingzhu took full control of Gree in 2012, the company formally established a long-term overseas independent brand development strategy. In 2015, Gree carried out a large-scale withdrawal of overseas sticker-label OEM orders. The vast majority of OEM business stopped accepting orders, and the company’s resources fully tilted toward the OBM route of its own brands.

From this perspective, Gree is one of the Chinese home-appliance enterprises with the strongest backbone.

Dong Mingzhu is proud. For ten years, she has said, “Let the world fall in love with Made in China,” and Gree has indeed earnestly built its independent brands without chasing quick money for fast scaling through sticker-label manufacturing. Such persistence deserves respect.

But the other side of pride is slowness.

The multi-tier distributor system cannot be changed, because it involves the interests of hundreds of distributors worldwide. Localized production capacity cannot be built, because heavy-asset investment carries high risk and doesn’t match Gree’s consistent cautious style. And breakout products can’t emerge, because the R&D system is accustomed to starting from technology rather than from user scenarios.

Gree is like a top student with a technical background—always practicing internal strength, refining quality, and believing that “good products will speak for themselves.” But the competitive logic in a globalized market has long changed. It’s no longer the case that whoever has the best technology sells best. It’s whoever understands local consumers best, responds fastest, and has the deepest channels who can take the biggest share of the pie.

Good air conditioners are made by Gree. This is true in China. But to make the whole world recognize this saying, good air conditioners alone aren’t enough. You also need good channels, good product definition, and a supply chain that can respond well.

In the second half of “Made in China” going overseas, Gree has to make up for this lesson.