When BTC's biggest buyer becomes a seller, who is buying after Strategy sells 3,588 bitcoins?

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Collation & Compilation: DeepTech Flow

Host / Guests: Austin Campbell, Zero Knowledge Group; Ram Ahluwalia, Lumida Wealth CEO; Chris Perkins, Franklin Crypto
Podcast Source: Bits + Bips (Unchained Network)
Original Title: Strategy Sells Bitcoin Again to Cover Dividends
Air Date: July 7, 2026

Key Points Summary

The background of this episode of Bits + Bips roundtable is that Michael Saylor's Strategy sold Bitcoin for the second time in a month—3,588 BTC, cashing out about $216 million to pay preferred stock dividends. The three regular guests (also co-hosts) Austin Campbell, Ram Ahluwalia, and Chris Perkins dismantled this structural turning point from their professional perspectives: when the biggest BTC buyer becomes a regular seller, the mNAV premium disappears, preferred shares fall below par, and the "print stock to buy Bitcoin" cycle breaks—what cards does Strategy have left?

Austin opened with a quote from a hedge fund friend: "Saylor holds 5% of Bitcoin. Maybe after he blows up, this thing will really take off," pointing out the brutal logic of crypto markets: when someone becomes the protagonist, their collapse may actually be the catalyst. Ram analyzed the dilemma from a macro trader perspective: selling BTC destroys the narrative, issuing new shares dilutes MSTR. He also mentioned hearing Saylor speak twice in London, with Saylor fiercely defending preferred dividends to rebuild confidence. Chris, from an investment banking background, pointed out that the foundation of financial engineering has shaken after the mNAV vanished.

But the discussion went far beyond Strategy. The trio delved into the capital structure issues of tokens vs. equity—why there's no successful "token + equity coexistence" case, the Pokémon card analogy, and the judgment that 99% of tokens will eventually go to zero. The stablecoin war was another heavy topic: Tether abandoning the European MiCA market, the "utility problem" of stablecoins (can you buy a coffee with a stablecoin?), the governance black hole of OUSD's 140-person alliance, and Robinhood entering government money markets. The latter half extended to the strategic significance of bank stablecoins—Scott Bessent's "repatriation of the Eurodollar market" argument, JPMorgan potentially becoming the first trillion-dollar bank, non-US banks' dollar deposit business becoming obsolete—and a valuation breakdown of Securitize's IPO. Finally, the trio touched on the capital siphon effect of AI/semiconductors and the return to fundamentals in crypto markets.

Highlights of Key Perspectives

On Strategy Selling BTC and the "Three-Body Problem"

"A friend in global macro told me it's hard to see the next wave of institutional adoption—from pensions, sovereign funds, central banks—happening while Saylor holds 5% of Bitcoin. His exact words: 'Maybe the best thing is for that guy to blow up, then this thing will really take off.'"

"Every time someone becomes the protagonist in crypto, their downfall is imminent. Strategy has been the protagonist for a while."

"The crypto narrative is now stuck on this MicroStrategy. Strategy is not crypto, crypto is not Strategy, but we're all stuck here. It's like when Bloomberg only talked about PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain) every day—the market will eventually move on."

"What he's doing today says it clearly—he's protecting the dividend, hoping to bring back confidence."

On the Disappearance of mNAV and the Breakdown of Financial Engineering

"They have two paths: issue common stock and dilute MSTR, or sell Bitcoin and suffer narrative destruction."

"When the mNAV premium disappears, the 'print stock to buy Bitcoin' cycle is broken. You can no longer issue at will because the market no longer gives you a premium."

"BTC actually rose during the selling week—Josh Mandel and Pete Rizzo both noticed. It behaved like a buyback. But the bear side will say: the premium is dead, BTC hasn't really rallied, and it's now a seller."

On Tokens vs. Equity

"We already have Delaware corporate law and centuries of capital structures. You can slice cash flows into different layers of debt, and what's left is equity. There's no third thing called a 'token' that can fit into this stack."

"If you have common equity, a token probably needs to function like preferred stock or debt to have independent meaning. If it's just another form of equity, you might as well tokenize your equity directly."

"Pokémon cards are a good analogy—the company issuing the cards and the cards themselves are two separate things. You can tokenize a product without necessarily tokenizing equity."

"If you look at the next ten years, 90% of the current top 500 tokens will disappear. I think it'll be 99%."

"Druckenmiller said during the dot-com bubble: 'I already learned that lesson, I don't need to learn it again.'"

On the Stablecoin War

"Stablecoins are the new net interest income. Everyone wants to grab that interest. Tether made so much money doing the most basic product—how can I do the same?"

"Right now, the biggest challenge for all stablecoins is utility. You can transfer, but what can you actually do with a stablecoin? Can you buy a coffee with it?"

"Tether's attitude is clear: they call it football, not soccer. They won't play by European rules. BNP Paribas can't afford to not do business in France, but Tether can simply abandon a market."

"OUSD is a 'planned plan.' 140 members with completely different economic goals, details not yet filled in. The hardest part—governance—was skipped; the technology was pushed out first."

On Bank Stablecoins and Market Structure

"Stablecoins are essentially the repatriation of the Eurodollar market. If JPMorgan or Bank of America issues a stablecoin, they can earn NIM from a Thai merchant or a Chinese supplier."

"JPMorgan could become the first trillion-dollar market cap bank. They're above $900 billion now, spending $13-16 billion annually on technology."

"The biggest losers might be non-US banks offering dollar deposit accounts. If I can directly buy a stablecoin, why go through a local bank with terrible exchange rates and fees?"

"Securitize's current trade is more like a call option—you're betting 10% chance it's worth $18 billion, 90% chance it's worth nothing."

"Last quarter, every sector in the S&P 500 underperformed the index except semiconductors. Capital is being siphoned by AI."

"Maybe after he blows up, this thing will really take off"

Austin Campbell: Before we officially start, I want to share a conversation. I was chatting with a friend in global macro, one of the best traders I know. I asked him about Bitcoin. He said it's hard to see the next wave of institutional adoption—pensions, sovereign funds, central banks—happening while Saylor holds 5% of Bitcoin and has such a large presence as an individual. His exact words: "Maybe the best thing is for that guy to blow up, then this thing will really take off, and then everyone else will pile in." Every time someone becomes the protagonist in crypto, their downfall is imminent. Strategy has been the protagonist for a while. I can't help but think that, in a sense, they've become an obstacle to Bitcoin's rise—and that itself creates their own problems.

National Security, Export Controls, and the Crypto Industry

Austin Campbell: Before jumping into the main topic, I want to raise a broader issue. The government is now trying to control crypto from a new angle—not by preventing the release of code, but by controlling who can use it. They want to use export control laws to restrict access to things already published under the First Amendment. This is essentially picking winners and losers without applicable laws or due process.

National security is important, but we can't just say "national security" and close our eyes without asking why. We can't tell people "use stablecoins, use crypto rails to build your financial life" while simultaneously cutting it off at a moment's notice due to national security or export controls. The crypto industry isn't angry enough about this—this is our fight.

Strategy Sells Again: 3,588 BTC, $216 Million

Austin Campbell: Onto the main topic. Strategy sold 3,588 Bitcoin, cashing out about $216 million in cash. This is the largest sale so far, following a small sale of 32 BTC to pay preferred dividends. The question is clear: after the MSTR premium disappeared, will selling Bitcoin to cover dividends become routine? Is Strategy still an accumulator, or has it become a regular seller?

First, the facts. They broke their years-long streak of not selling, first with 32 BTC, then a month later with 3,588. As of July 5, Strategy holds 843,775 Bitcoin, with $2.55 billion in dollar reserves and a cost basis of $75,700 per coin—far above the current trading price of just over $60k. MSTR first broke below 1 on June 27, to 99 cents, and has recovered somewhat. STRC bottomed at $74.57, and I see it back around $90 before the show. Dividend yield increased by 50 basis points to 12%. A new authorization framework allows selling up to $1.25 billion in Bitcoin, plus STRC preferred buyback program.

Chris, you have an investment banking background; Ram, you've done a lot of investing. Saylor has shifted from issuing MSTR stock to selling Bitcoin off the balance sheet. What does that tell you?

Two Choices: Sell Bitcoin or Dilute Stock

Ram Ahluwalia: Two paths. Issue common stock—dilute MSTR, stock price drops. Or sell Bitcoin—destroy the narrative. Last week we mentioned MSTR could see a short squeeze rebound, and we saw it in the news. More constructively, STRC and STRF have started moving toward par in the last few days. They need to push back to par. If they succeed, they can breathe; if not, it's a problem. I still see this as a trading asset, susceptible to violent short squeezes, and it may be in the middle of one now. I also want to see the dates they sold Bitcoin compared to the announcement dates—if BTC held up or even rose during the selling period, that's quite encouraging.

Last week I was in London. First, I went to Goldman Sachs' event—packed, oversold, the amount of institutional build-out was undeniable. Then I went to Robinhood's event, and the DeFi stuff they're doing is pretty amazing. Before that, I heard Saylor speak twice. He came on stage very focused on defending and protecting preferred dividends, trying to convince the audience of his commitment to Bitcoin. He's trying to navigate this three-body problem.

Austin Campbell: This also cuts to the divergence between bulls and bears. Bulls will say: mNAV is back to 1.09, STRC is recovering, BTC actually rose during the selling week—Josh Mandel and Pete Rizzo both noticed, it behaved like a buyback. Bears will say: the premium is dead, BTC hasn't really rallied, and it's now a seller. Roland and Peter Schiff have pointed this out. My question: even if preferreds recover significantly, Saylor can sit still for a while, but if BTC doesn't go up, are we back to square one in a year?

Ram Ahluwalia: My guess is that fast money traders bought the dip when volume collapsed last week. That's hot money, not long-term holders. They'll likely sell for profit-taking.

Chris Perkins: From an investment banking perspective, when the mNAV premium disappears, the "print stock to buy Bitcoin" cycle is broken. You can no longer issue at will because the market no longer gives you a premium. So you have to look at the asset side. Selling Bitcoin is accounting-feasible—cost basis $75,700, market price above $60k, book loss but cash repatriation. The problem is that the action itself tells the market: you no longer unconditionally believe in your own thesis.

The "Three-Body Problem": Strategy-Bitcoin-Crypto Narrative Locked

Chris Perkins: Unfortunately, we're stuck. The crypto narrative is now stuck on this MicroStrategy. Strategy is not crypto, crypto is not Strategy, but we're all stuck here, and it feels like we have to digest this before we can move forward. It reminds me of opening Bloomberg back in the day, only talking about PIGS—Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain—every single day, but eventually the market moved on.

I'm ready for us to turn the page. What gives me some encouragement is that BTC showed considerable resilience today. There are also some positive tailwinds—like Trump expressing liking crypto on the day his Trump account went live. I look forward to us no longer focusing on this three-body problem and returning to fundamentals and details of other projects. Crypto is Bitcoin, Bitcoin is crypto, so Strategy is crypto—I hope to break that equation.

There's also an emerging debate: does value flow to tokens or to equity? You see it in both private and public markets. Some people dismissively say "all value is in equity, everything else is bullshit." I think it's more complicated than that.

Tokens vs. Equity: No Third Kind of Capital

Austin Campbell: I think both can work, but it's hard to have both unless you very carefully define their respective rights. We already have Delaware corporate law and centuries of capital structures. You can slice cash flows into different layers of debt, and after paying employees and creditors, what's left is called equity. There's no third thing called a "token" that can fit into this stack. You can make a token play the role of equity or debt, but making it a novel concept alongside debt and equity—that's difficult.

If you have common equity, a token probably needs to function like preferred stock or debt to have independent meaning. If it's just another form of equity, you might as well tokenize your equity directly. You can also tokenize products, services, goods—Pokémon cards are a good analogy. The company issuing the cards and the cards themselves are two separate things; you can tokenize a product without tokenizing equity.

Ram Ahluwalia: It depends on the specific case. From a decentralized technology perspective, it might differ—you can pop up front ends everywhere, and the governance logic of equity and tokens can be separated. In some projects, value clearly flows to tokens, and equity becomes a shell. VCs' approach is to bet on both—take both tokens and equity—so they can catch value regardless of where it ends up. But honestly, I can't think of a clear success case where both tokens and equity coexist with stable value.

Chris Perkins: Some people ask: could the whole token experiment in hindsight be a product of the COVID $3 trillion stimulus and zero-interest-rate era? We created 20,000 tokens, didn't know what they were, thought they were governance rights and economic rights, and ended up back at traditional capitalism?

I don't think so. You can't deny real utility is emerging: stablecoins near all-time highs, perpetual contract market innovation, prediction market growth, RWA and tokenized equity going live. Goldman Sachs' event was packed, Robinhood did a DeFi app store—12 partners, many more coming—backed by Lloyd's insurance, abstracting away risk in the background. The market is maturing.

Austin Campbell: If you look at the next ten years, 90% of the current top 500 tokens will disappear. Is that failure or success?

Ram Ahluwalia: If you put money in, it's failure. I think it's not 90%, it's 99% that will go to zero. The lesson hasn't changed. Druckenmiller said during the dot-com bubble that he already learned that lesson and didn't need to learn it again. These tokens have no value capture, founding teams get liquidity too early, and have no incentive to stay and build the project.

Stablecoin War: Tether, Robinhood, OUSD

Austin Campbell: This set of dynamics—Circle being questioned by securities regulators, Robinhood entering government money markets, Tether's moves, the OUSD alliance—what's your take?

Chris Perkins: I saw this coming long ago. Institutions' profit-seeking desire is insatiable. If you're an exchange, you make money in several ways: data, trading fees, net interest income. Stablecoins are the new net interest income. Everyone is looking at Tether and saying, these people made so much money doing the most basic product—how can I do the same?

But the biggest challenge is utility. You can transfer, but what can you actually do with a stablecoin? Can you buy a coffee with it? Right now it's "musical chairs"—I want to exchange your stablecoin for mine, then you hold my stablecoin, and I earn interest. The stablecoin war has begun, and it will get worse before it gets better. Eventually we'll see consolidation. Look back at the CLARITY Act—banks should push it through.

Austin Campbell: Stablecoins are often discussed as a single product, but they are completely different things. Robinhood is trying to attract deposits and deploy them into DeFi—that's an investment product and retail strategy. Europe looks more like a regulated payment strategy. Tether's reaction is direct—they want to do USAT (US version of Tether), interested in the US economy, but Europe? "No bid." Tether has decided this is called football, not soccer; they won't play by European rules. They completely exited a market. You see them being pushed out of some exchanges, Revolut delisted them. Tether's response: as expected. BNP Paribas can't afford to not do business in France, but Tether can.

OUSD is a "planned plan." A coalition of 140 members with completely different economic goals, details not filled in. You say the issuer retains economic benefits, but how do you track it? Who minted the tokens? Which platform are the tokens on? How do you handle DeFi? If it's based on who minted, can I immediately build a trading team to redeem someone else's OUSD and issue my own? The hardest part—governance—was skipped; the technology was pushed out first.

Coinbase also participated in OUSD, but the smart thing is not to put all eggs in Circle's basket. If this were a serious business alliance requiring you to make OUSD your primary product, Coinbase probably wouldn't participate. So they're hedging their bets.

Ram Ahluwalia: "Move fast and break things" is a winning rule in tech. Elon Musk blew up countless rockets before SpaceX reached today's level. But "move fast and break things" with other people's money? Isn't that a crime? OUSD launched like a torpedo, but some partners got hit before they even boarded—that's the ugly side of tech culture colliding with financial culture.

Bank Stablecoins: The Repatriation of the Eurodollar Market

Austin Campbell: Will banks issue stablecoins? I think they will. In an ideal world, banks keep deposits for domestic use—loans are real. Deposit rates may rise, but repo rates fall, net funding cost is flat. But you also want stablecoins because deposits and stablecoins do different things. Like stocks are not bonds. Clients have deposits and want to transfer to international payees outside the banking system—they can use stablecoins, but not deposits.

The irony—Bank of America could issue a stablecoin, with the reserve being BofA deposits. Then you really get the best of both worlds. If CLARITY doesn't limit returns, they'll be grateful.

Ram Ahluwalia: They'll rush in, and they'll partner with clients that have distribution channels. Look at Zelle's success—Zelle gave big banks an advantage. The stablecoin framework similarly gives big banks an advantage over regional banks. Regional banks haven't made a competitive response.

More importantly, Scott Bessent has repeatedly mentioned: stablecoins are essentially the repatriation of the Eurodollar market. If JPMorgan or Bank of America issues a stablecoin, they can now earn NIM from a Thai merchant or a Chinese supplier. The big four US banks—JPMorgan, Wells Fargo, Citi, Bank of America—only Citi has a real international distribution network. The other three can't earn money from their clients' clients. Stablecoins change that.

Chris Perkins: Don't underestimate JPMorgan. Their e-commerce business is substantial, with distribution channels connecting to these e-commerce platforms. They could do what Meta tried with Diem and Libra—but within their own framework, bringing multiple banks on board. If Democrats take the House, they'll also have a friendly ear in Elizabeth Warren. JPMorgan could become the first trillion-dollar market cap bank. They're above $900 billion now, spending $13-16 billion annually on technology. They are sensitive to disruption—they've all seen fractionalized trading, zero-commission trading impact their margins.

Banks already have "stablecoins" now—called deposits. People give you dollars, you keep most of the interest, occasionally give a bit back. But the problem is that bank deposits only work within their network. Stablecoins let JPMorgan earn money from clients' clients worldwide, not just their own clients.

Non-US Banks: The Biggest Losers

Austin Campbell: ZUSD is already a registered code—they're working on stablecoins. But let me be more direct: the biggest losers from dollar stablecoins might be non-US banks that offer dollar deposit accounts. If I can open a dollar account through a local bank—usually with terrible exchange rates and high fees—and now I can directly buy a stablecoin, that business becomes obsolete. And it's no longer just for ultra-high-net-worth clients.

If we're talking about losers, dollar stablecoins are good for the big four US banks, the losers are probably banks like UBS.

Chris Perkins: Any product where "you give me dollars, I give you dollars, but I keep the interest forever" is a good product.

Securitize IPO: Trades Like a Call Option

Austin Campbell: Let's talk about Securitize just going public. Q1 revenue grew 39% year-over-year, but lost $7 million. Market cap $1.8 billion. What do you think?

Chris Perkins: Securitize's current trade is more like a call option. You're not saying "I think it's worth $1.8 billion right now." You're saying "I think there's a 10% chance it's worth $18 billion in the future, and 90% chance it's worth nothing, acquired at a low price, or dead." The high volatility is evidence.

Ram Ahluwalia: Looking at IPO trends, almost all IPOs over $1 billion have a 50% drawdown in the first year. If you want to hold Securitize, the right approach might be to put in a low bid and wait. Circle is also near lows, but they have a real moat. Meanwhile, Ripple got the MiCA license—from Luxembourg, with passporting rights—but it doesn't help XRP or RLUSD in the short term.

Market Landscape: AI Siphoning and Return to Fundamentals

Ram Ahluwalia: Last quarter, every sector in the S&P 500 underperformed the index except semiconductors. Capital is being heavily siphoned by AI. But in the last two weeks, you've seen quality stocks rebounding: Progressive, Allstate, Berkshire Hathaway, S&P Global, Moody's. World-class enterprises are on sale.

Austin Campbell: This should be good for crypto. Back to fundamentals. Things with revenue are rising. BTC back to $64K, Hyperliquid at $71.35. Everything eventually comes back to fundamentals and cash flow.