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Trump discusses revenue sharing with AI companies, a narrative pressure approaching industrial revolution levels begins
Title: Trump Discusses Revenue Sharing with AI Companies, Marking the Start of a Near-Industrial Revolution-Level Narrative Pressure
Author: Rhythm BlockBeats
Source:
Repost: Mars Finance
TL;DR
Over the past two years, the AI market has only focused on one question: who can make the most money?
NVIDIA orders, cloud provider capital expenditures, data center construction, valuation of model companies, and enterprise adoption speed form the main storyline of this AI wave. Capital is betting on growth, gambling on profit pools, and discussing how much economic value AI can convert into company revenue.
But now, another question is beginning to emerge:
If AI truly creates unprecedented wealth, should this money only belong to companies, employees, and shareholders?
This is the real focus of the OpenAI Public Wealth Fund discussion.
It’s not a regulatory policy that has already been implemented, nor is it the U.S. government about to "seize AI company equity." More accurately, it’s the first time the AI industry has pushed the question of "how to distribute future excess profits" onto the public policy agenda.
The counterintuitive aspect of this matter is that the market isn’t discussing profit sharing because it doubts AI can make money. On the contrary, it’s because more and more people believe AI will generate substantial excess profits that the political system is starting to ask: can these gains be exclusively enjoyed by a few companies and investors?
AI Trading Begins to Show a Policy Bill
First, clarify the factual boundaries.
According to NOTUS on June 4, senior White House officials have had preliminary discussions with leading AI companies about "voluntarily ceding some equity." This approach is similar to the Alaska Permanent Fund: the government or public trust holds a portion of assets and shares some of the benefits with residents.
In the white paper released by OpenAI in April, there was also a proposal to establish a public wealth fund. Large model companies could contribute via capital injections, equity, or other means, allowing ordinary families without direct holdings in tech stocks, venture capital assets, or private equity to share in AI growth dividends.
Sanders’s version is more radical. He advocates for large AI firms to cede a higher proportion of rights to the public and grant the public some governance rights. The "50% stock tax" and board seat mentioned in the materials are the most aggressive political examples in this discussion.
But these three matters should not be viewed together.
The White House discussions are still preliminary signals in media reports, without formal ratios, legal structures, or timelines. The OpenAI white paper is a corporate policy proposal, not a government document. Sanders’s proposal is powerful but still far from becoming policy.
Therefore, the most reasonable current judgment is not that "AI companies will be nationalized," but that a new variable has appeared in AI valuation tables:
Will the most profitable AI companies in the future need to cede a portion of their economic rights to gain social and regulatory acceptance?
This has limited short-term impact on the secondary market. Publicly traded AI proxy assets like NVDA, MSFT, AMZN, GOOGL, META are still mainly driven by demand for computing power, cloud capital expenditure, order expectations, and profit realization.
But for unlisted model companies, the impact is more direct.
If companies like OpenAI, Anthropic, or xAI go public in the future, investors will not only ask how much they can earn but also how much of that money needs to be ceded to public funds, governments, or other public mechanisms.
This is not a valuation hit already realized but a new policy discount.
OpenAI’s Proposal for Social License
OpenAI’s proactive proposal of a public wealth fund essentially aims to buy "social license" for future expansion.
Social license is not an official license but the public, regulators, and political system’s tolerance for a company’s ongoing expansion. The more successful an AI company becomes, the sharper this issue becomes.
As model capabilities grow stronger, discussions about replacing human labor increase. Higher valuations make it easier for ordinary people to see AI as a wealth machine exclusively enjoyed by a few companies, employees, and shareholders.
OpenAI faces not just typical tech company issues but a narrative pressure approaching that of an industrial revolution:
If AI truly changes productivity, who should share in this part of the gains?
Its white paper emphasizes maintaining AI leadership in the U.S. while acknowledging automation could reshape many jobs. The public wealth fund is one of its buffer solutions.
In market terms, OpenAI might hope to use a controllable portion of future economic rights to reduce more uncontrollable political risks.
Ignoring the narrative of "AI stealing jobs and profits belonging to the few" could lead to higher taxes, stricter regulations, antitrust pressures, or even forced disclosure of more complex policy risks during IPOs.
Proactively designing a moderate sharing mechanism might turn "unknown political shocks" into "estimable long-term costs."
It’s somewhat like resource companies designing local employment, infrastructure, and benefit-sharing plans before entering a region. The difference is, AI companies are dealing not with residents around a mine but with the entire labor market and electorate.
They are not just compensating once but managing how future excess profits are socially accepted.
5% Sharing vs. 50% Mandatory Equity
The phrase "ceding equity" can be intimidating, but different paths have vastly different impacts on valuation.
The first is voluntary, where companies contribute a small proportion of economic rights—possibly non-voting—to a public wealth fund.
If the proportion is limited and rights are clear, it’s more like a long-term policy cost. For example, if an AI company’s future valuation is $1 trillion, ceding 5% of economic rights to a public fund would dilute existing shareholders but could be reflected as a clear discount in the market.
The second involves government acquiring economic rights through industrial policies.
For example, certain subsidies, loans, or industry support might come with warrants, meaning the government gains a share of profits under agreed conditions. It’s important to distinguish: warrants are not the same as directly taking control of common stock, and non-voting economic rights are not the same as board seats.
The former resembles fiscal sharing, while the latter involves corporate governance.
The third is Sanders-style forced high-percentage public ownership.
If large AI firms are required to cede a high proportion of equity and allow public or government representatives on the board, the influence shifts from profit sharing to control, governance conflicts, and innovation incentives.
When the government acts as both regulator and shareholder, new conflicts of interest arise: is it protecting consumers and competition or safeguarding the value of its own holdings?
This is why aggressive proposals, though highly publicized, are not yet priced as high-probability scenarios.
A more realistic scenario remains small, voluntary, primarily economic rights-based sharing. It may not be immediately implemented but will be an unavoidable issue in AI company financing, IPOs, and policy communication.
For OpenAI, the real concern isn’t "whether to share" but whether the sharing mechanism will affect governance structures.
Microsoft, venture capitalists, employee shareholders, and strategic investors will care: does the public fund hold economic rights or voting rights? How large is the share? Will it impact exit valuations? Will it alter future IPO pricing logic?
Corporate clients will also ask: if the government becomes a kind of economic beneficiary, will procurement, data governance, and regulatory neutrality become more complicated?
Thus, the market implication isn’t that AI company profits will be immediately cut off but that the profit pool is now being discussed within a public distribution framework for the first time.
The True Risk: From "Voluntary Sharing" to "Mandatory Governance"
This line is still in its early stages.
The evidence already shows that the publicization of AI benefits is entering the realm of public policy exploration; but it’s not enough to say that AI industry rules have already changed.
The four key upcoming observations are:
First, whether companies beyond OpenAI follow suit:
If Anthropic, xAI, or other leading model companies also support similar mechanisms, it could shift from OpenAI’s single-company strategy to an industry negotiation framework. Conversely, if more companies openly avoid or oppose it, the market will tend to see it as a special case of OpenAI.
Second, whether the White House and executive agencies formalize:
If departments like the Treasury, Commerce, or the National Economic Council begin proposing fund structures, tax arrangements, or warrant schemes, policy exploration will move toward a quantifiable phase. If it remains at the level of meetings and media leaks, the impact is mainly emotional risk.
Third, examine financing documents and future IPO filings:
If OpenAI, Anthropic, or others include disclosures about "public wealth funds, profit sharing, government economic rights, or special governance arrangements" in future financing or listing documents, valuation discounts will move from discussion to transaction.
Fourth, observe market prices:
If AI-themed ETFs, semiconductor ETFs, leading cloud companies, or related options see trading volume increases, volatility rises, or underperform the broader market in tandem with policy news, it indicates capital is starting to treat this variable as a trading mainline. Currently, there’s no such evidence.
Therefore, this shouldn’t be seen as an imminent collapse of AI industry valuations.
More accurately:
The AI market has historically priced only growth; now it begins to price distribution.
If the final approach is just a small proportion, non-voting, clearly disclosed economic rights, it’s more like an insurance premium paid by AI companies for long-term expansion. The cost exists but is estimable, tradable, and acceptable.
But if voluntary sharing is pushed by political pressure toward mandatory equity holdings, even into governance and board arrangements, valuation logic will change significantly.
Because at that point, the market will be discounting not just a portion of profits but control rights and long-term growth freedom.