I just reviewed a DAO proposal. On the surface, it says “optimize the governance experience,” but if you look closely, the incentive structure is actually pretty interesting: the more actively you vote, the more you get distributed—but the thresholds and weights still naturally lift large holders into position. In plain terms, it’s basically using sugar to lure you into choosing sides. What’s more subtle is that some proposals are vague about whether the rewards go to the “delegator” or the “delegatee,” and in the end, where the power consolidates mostly depends on just these few lines of text.

During that stretch when funding rates were extremely volatile, when the group was arguing about whether to reverse course or keep squeezing the bubble, I ended up looking at these proposals instead: the hotter market sentiment is, the easier governance is to get swept along by “incentive design.” Now, before I vote, I always first look for hidden conditions, snapshot times, and how the “anti-sybil” rules are written… otherwise, after going through all the interaction, I’m just left helping others carry their sedan chairs.