Gold, fiat currency, Bitcoin, who will dominate the global finance in 10 years?

Written by: Lyn Alden

Compiled by: AididiaoJP, Foresight News

When I write this article in 2026, the world is increasingly moving toward multipolarity, and I expect this trend to continue for the next decade until 2036.

In fact, this recent unipolar era is a rare anomaly in history. Since the end of World War II in 1945—especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991—the United States has existed as the world’s sole superpower. Telecommunications and industry were the first to connect the entire world, enabling truly global influence.

Before that, multipolarity was the norm. Even during the heyday of the Roman Empire nearly two thousand years ago, there were other equally powerful regions in the world, including the Han dynasty and other Asian kingdoms and empires. It was an era far removed from what truly mattered, when great powers could coexist, but interaction was limited.

The multipolarity of power is also reflected in the multipolarity of money. For thousands of years, gold, silver, and secondary commodities have served as money. No single sovereign ledger was large enough to serve the entire world, so only naturally decentralized ledgers could do the job.

But in the telecommunications era, as commerce and currency began to flow at the speed of light in the late 19th century and early 20th century, even gold started to feel insufficient. The US dollar became the primary currency for cross-border lending and contract pricing, and US Treasuries became the central banks’ top reserve asset. People often mention earlier reserve currencies such as the British pound or the Dutch guilder, but they were different from the US dollar. They were proxies for metals, while gold itself was the true reserve currency of that era. Yet in this unipolar superpower era, freely floating dollars and their bond markets have exceeded the known market value of gold, becoming the largest held assets in sovereign reserves.

Many people once believed this unipolar era was “the end of history,” even though history has never truly ended. China and India gradually recovered their economic strength from the lows of colonialism and war—events that shaped their destinies in the 19th and 20th centuries. Today, in the early 21st century, China has become the world’s largest producer of steel, electricity, and manufacturing. Meanwhile, the United States has been suffering from the Triffin Dilemma: to maintain its world reserve-currency status, it must supply its own currency to the world, and this is achieved through persistent deficits. And those deficits, along with the resulting hollowing out of industry, ultimately erode trust in that currency.

Today, many people in the United States in positions of power no longer want to bear the costs of issuing a reserve currency, even though few openly admit it: the imbalance has become too severe. At the same time, other countries do not want their assets arbitrarily devalued or frozen by Washington, nor do they want their liabilities “hardened.” No other sovereign entity is willing and able to take on the responsibility of maintaining the global ledger—this requires immense trust and comes with a heavy burden.

Therefore, we are witnessing a gradual return of the multipolar currency trend.

Gold is the obvious first choice: it is the only store of value that is large enough, liquid, and divisible. It is still not fast enough, but countries have realized they no longer need to bet everything on the dollar the way they did over the past several decades. They can hold more gold in place of government bonds, as a larger share of their savings. Gold has its drawbacks, but it cannot be hacked, cannot be devalued unilaterally, and cannot be frozen—and it endures forever.

The second choice is mundane but realistic: diversification. In a world made up of a small number of major economies, countries can diversify their exposure to fiat. They can hold multiple currencies and bonds in proportion to the scale of their trade partners and capital providers. This disperses the risk of devaluation and confiscation. But the problem lies in network effects: liquidity reinforces itself, and entities are unwilling to price assets and liabilities in different units, so currencies naturally tend to converge into a single standard. A patchwork solution of gold plus two or three major fiat currencies used together as a global ledger is feasible, but it is not ideal.

The third potential choice is still at a relatively early stage: Bitcoin. It naturally provides a slow but decentralized ledger; sovereignty provides a fast but centralized ledger; and Bitcoin provides a ledger that is both decentralized and fast. The unipolar superpower world emerged in an era where transaction speeds could reach the speed of light, but final settlement could not keep up. Fast global transactions (i.e., IOUs) only require Morse code over telegraph—simple and low bandwidth—whereas fast global settlement (i.e., irreversible transfers) requires higher-bandwidth communications and strong encryption. Today, fast settlement has scaled, and the reliance on centralized intermediaries to bridge the gap between fast transactions and slow settlement can be reduced.

However, there are two challenges ahead from here: security and network effects.

Bitcoin’s ultimate security has been questioned since the beginning. Can its economic incentives keep it permissionless and decentralized forever, or will it gradually move toward centralized capture? Can its cryptographic assumptions continue to hold? Related to these questions: despite its decentralization, can it upgrade over time so that it remains functional and secure as the underlying world-computer infrastructure evolves? At only 17 years old, these questions still have no answers. But we—the ones investing in the asset and those participating directly or indirectly by funding its development—believe Bitcoin is our best opportunity, and we are striving to create the reality we want to see.

Bitcoin’s network effects are powerful, but still limited. Combined with its simple yet robust design, these network effects have been enough for it to maintain its position as the largest cryptocurrency continuously for 17 years without any real competitors emerging. However, from a broader perspective, it is still a small fish in the ocean. Its direct user base is only in the millions, while the world has billions of people. Its market capitalization is in the tens of trillions, while the total global asset base is around a quadrillion. When it comes to the dollar, people use the largest and most liquid currency as the unit of account—globally, it is still the dollar; locally, other fiat currencies serve as units of account, as references for contracts, and as tools for settling debts.

To achieve very large growth, Bitcoin inevitably needs to move upward in value. Upward movement comes with enthusiasm and leverage, which in turn creates the conditions for downward volatility. This volatility is likely to persist for decades, because it must gradually erode the existing network effects of the dollar and other major currencies. This limits Bitcoin’s appeal as a unit of account and as a short-term savings tool. It exists as an investable asset, a long-term savings instrument, and the most unstoppable means of payment and settlement for products and services priced in more stable existing currencies. During this adoption window, Bitcoin’s fate depends on the vision of early adopters planning over decades. The larger it becomes, the more stable it is, and the better it can serve as a unit of account and short-term store of value—but reaching that point is a long journey.

As long as Bitcoin continues to remain strong in the face of security threats and continues to erode existing currency networks, it will become more attractive to individuals, businesses, and sovereigns. By 2036, I believe gold will still be popular because people naturally prefer to own physical, enduring things. I also believe that, despite their problems, the biggest fiat currencies will still be widely used: these trains still have a long way to run. If it succeeds, by 2036 Bitcoin’s market capitalization will exceed that of any single stock, and it will rival the market size of the largest currencies and metals.

Bitcoin’s biggest challenge is not governments, not quantum computers, not rogue developers, and not other digital assets. Instead, the biggest challenge—the biggest risk—is ourselves. The people. All of us.

By 2036, war, corruption, and tyranny will still exist. But this is a matter of proportion and quantity. People imagine governments imposing these things on us, but in reality, only some do. In real operation, it is people actively requesting it.

There is a perceived balance between freedom and security. War, tyranny, and the centralized ledgers that provide fuel for them do not come only from human evil; they also come from human fear. When people fear invaders, plagues, technology, and competition for scarce resources, they turn to leaders for protection. As long as they perceive themselves to be under a collective safety umbrella, and as long as state power targets others rather than themselves, they will give up some freedom. This works for a time, but it breeds corruption. Power breeds more power, and eventually turns inward. When a state fails, it must be hidden. State critics, whether from outside or inside, must be silenced. When freedom disappears, the system that once promised security ultimately becomes its greatest threat—ironically.

Those critics who often decry excessive surveillance and bureaucratic overreach tend to embrace these tools immediately once their political allies take power. It is a short-sighted strategy: either it relies on permanent control, or it lacks foresight—unaware that these tools will eventually return to the opponents in a stronger form, again used to deal with them.

If by 2036 Bitcoin is still not popular, I think it is because people do not want it, or they are not ready for it yet. The technology itself is robust; proof-of-work helps maintain network security. Strict limits on bandwidth and storage help keep the network decentralized. The layers on top of it help provide scalability and privacy. There is more work to do, but the foundation is strong, open, available to use, and already operating at scale. Once a major challenge emerges, as long as enough consensus is reached, the network can upgrade.

In this recent bull-bear cycle, Bitcoin has further widened the gap with other cryptocurrencies, but it failed to attract many new users. AI services have been adopted much faster, surpassing Bitcoin, because people and businesses can see the direct benefits of AI, whereas Bitcoin’s benefits are not clear to many people who have not studied it deeply.

There are many available methods for storing value, but volatility is painful. For Bitcoin to truly go mainstream, it must be because people value financial sovereignty. It must be because hundreds of millions of people—not the few millions of today—recognize the importance of self-custody savings, permissionless payments, and financial privacy. These are exactly the attributes Bitcoin uniquely provides at scale.

Before Bitcoin, in this century of fast transactions but slow settlement, governments could control the financial system from behind the scenes. By regulating banks, they could largely monitor and restrict activity without directly limiting any end users. As a result, most people did not see a direct threat to their financial freedom. After Bitcoin, people can run open-source code, transact permissionlessly, and self-custody liquid savings. If governments feel threatened, they can no longer just restrict a few thousand banks—they must restrict millions of end users and developers.

The question is: with technology unmasked, will there be enough people willing to resist and overcome friction to keep moving forward, or will they comply without protest and step back?

We now have the tools, but will we use them? That is the main question to be answered in 2036.