Original Title: The Iran Deal Is Not a Deal. It Is a 60-Day Bet.
Original Author: Velina Tchakarova
Compiled by: Peggy

Editor’s note: Substantive progress has emerged in Iran’s ceasefire negotiations over the weekend. According to the Associated Press, the US and Iran are close to reaching an agreement: ending the war, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, Iran handing over its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, and specific conditions for sanctions relief and asset unfreezing will be negotiated within a 60-day window.

But this article argues that what the outside world calls the “Iran deal” is not a genuine peace agreement—it is a 60-day memorandum of understanding. During these 60 days, Iran will gradually clear the Strait of Hormuz, the US will lift the maritime blockade on Iranian ports, Iran will receive sanctions exemptions for selling oil, and both sides will then hold follow-up negotiations on nuclear issues.

However, the author emphasizes that this arrangement only temporarily freezes the conflict and does not resolve the real structural contradictions: whether Iran will hand over its stockpile of highly enriched uranium; who controls the Strait of Hormuz; the order of sanctions relief and nuclear concessions; and whether Israel will unilaterally undermine the agreement—these remain unanswered. The article also suggests that China is participating in mediation indirectly through Pakistan, with the goal of restoring Iranian oil flows and limiting US dominance in the Gulf region; meanwhile, trade corridors in places such as Oman and the UAE also create loopholes in the US blockade.

Overall, the author’s core judgment is this: the agreement gives both Trump and Tehran short-term political breathing room, but the real test is not on the day it is signed—it is on “Day 61” after the 60-day window ends. At that point, the irreconcilable contradictions among Iran’s nuclear concessions, control of the Strait of Hormuz, and the easing of US sanctions will surface again.

The following is the original text:

Everything that happened this weekend has one version that looks like a breakthrough: an American president announces that a war has been “basically settled”; a Pakistani general travels between capitals; Gulf leaders all nod during a phone conference; the ceasefire has already lasted 47 days.

But if you read what each side actually says after the statements are released, you get another version.

This is not the same story.

What Was Announced

On Saturday, Trump wrote on Truth Social that an agreement between the United States, Iran, and “several other countries” has already been “basically settled.” He said the agreement will reopen the Strait of Hormuz and will be formally announced shortly.

A few hours later, Fars News Agency, which is associated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard, published its own account. It said the Strait of Hormuz will still be managed by Iran. Trump’s wording is “incomplete and not in line with reality.” Nuclear issues are not included in the initial agreement.

Two parties, one announcement—yet it sounds as if they are discussing two entirely different documents.

According to a US official confirmed to Axios, what the two sides are truly approaching signing is a 60-day memorandum of understanding. During these 60 days: Iran will clear mines in the strait; the US will lift the maritime blockade on Iranian ports; Iran will receive sanctions exemptions for selling oil; and both sides will begin negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. The US side’s guiding principle is “reward performance with pressure relief”—no concessions will be made before verifiable actions are completed.

This is not a peace agreement; it is a structured pause, accompanied by a highly sensitive negotiation agenda.

The most important, yet almost universally underestimated, line in Axios’s report is: US forces deployed to the region in recent months will continue to remain there throughout the entire 60 days. Troops will withdraw only after a final agreement is reached. Trump is not de-escalating the conflict—he is negotiating with the guns still on the table.

Four Walls That Must Hold

Between this memorandum of understanding and any arrangements similar to long-term solutions, there are four structural contradictions. None of them have been resolved, and all will resurface on Day 61.

The uranium issue. Iran currently holds approximately 408 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium, which is already close to weapons-grade levels; if further refined, it would be enough to produce multiple nuclear devices. The US demands that Iran suspend uranium enrichment for 20 years; Iran only proposes 5 years, and the US rejects it. Tehran has already made clear that it will not agree to include surrendering the stockpile in the initial text. The so-called “clear commitments” mentioned in the Axios report, according to Iran, are merely verbal signals relayed through Pakistan’s mediators—not written obligations. Verbal commitments without verification mechanisms are not concessions; they are only starting points for negotiations.

The Hormuz sovereignty trap. Trump says the Strait of Hormuz will be reopened unconditionally and toll-free. Tehran, meanwhile, says the strait is still managed by Iran and will not revert to the pre-war state. This is not a negotiation gap that can be bridged through clever wording—it is a real strategic clash. Iran views control of the Strait of Hormuz as its most core deterrence tool. As described with unusually precise accuracy by an Israeli official, it is “a weapon no less than nuclear weapons.” Since it is precisely this leverage that brings a superpower to the negotiating table, why would Tehran permanently give it up just to extend a 60-day ceasefire? It wouldn’t. The so-called reopening of the Strait of Hormuz is conditional, reversible, and still managed by Iran.

The sequencing trap. Washington treats nuclear dismantlement as a prerequisite for lasting peace, while Tehran treats it as an agenda item only to be discussed after the war is formally over. The memorandum of understanding tries to bridge this contradiction with a 60-day negotiation window, but this sequencing arrangement means Iran can first obtain sanctions relief, oil sales, and diplomatic legitimacy on Day 1, while the second stage of nuclear talks can be endlessly prolonged, stalled, and filled with ambiguity. Tehran has played this game before. The 2015 Iran nuclear deal was abandoned by the US in 2018 precisely because the “relieve pressure first, fulfill later” structure created irreversible facts on the ground in reality. Now, this memorandum of understanding has the same vulnerabilities—but in the opposite direction.

Israel’s veto power. Netanyahu’s first public response to this potential agreement was not support, but a single sentence: “Iran will never have nuclear weapons.” The White House told him that Trump will hold a “firm stance” on nuclear demands and will not sign a final agreement before Iran fully fulfills its obligations. But Israel is not a party to this memorandum of understanding, so it cannot veto it. What it can do—also the most likely destructive scenario within the next 72 hours—is to take unilateral military action to destroy it before it is signed. The memorandum’s clauses regarding Lebanon are especially alarming to Jerusalem, because they explicitly include an end to the war between Israel and Hezbollah. Even with a ceasefire already in place, Israel has continued strikes against Lebanon. At a politically decisive moment, it is fully capable—and has some incentive—to do so again.

The Architecture Behind the Architecture

On the surface, the visible diplomatic process—Trump, Muneer, Tehran, and the Gulf leaders on Saturday’s phone call—does not tell the whole story. Beneath it, two deeper layers of calculation are at work.

China is also in the picture. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif arrived in China over the weekend, met with Chinese representatives. Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that Iran’s war is one of the topics on the agenda. China’s foreign minister has publicly supported Pakistan playing a “greater role” in resolving the conflict. China is not a passive bystander in this mediation; it is supporting this framework through Pakistan’s proxy channels, shaping the agreement without taking on the exposure risk that comes with direct contact between China and the US.

This matters because China’s interests in this agreement are not the same as the US’s. China buys about 90% of Iran’s oil exports. These revenues fund the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, Iran’s ballistic missile program, and a range of proxy networks from Hezbollah to the Houthi forces. China wants to see an agreement that restores Iran’s oil flows and limits US naval dominance in the Gulf. It does not want to see an agreement that strips Iran of nuclear deterrence and makes the US the unchallenged designer of the Middle East’s security architecture. The two outcomes are not the same.

Washington holds a financial tool that could change this calculation. Section 311 of the Patriot Act allows the US Treasury to cut off foreign banks from their linkage to the dollar clearing and agency system. If this tool is used in Hong Kong, the systemic blow could be extremely serious. A former Treasury official, Max Meizlish, described China’s banking sector as “highly fragmented,” and “quite susceptible to economic coercion.” This tool exists, but it has never been used on a large scale. The reason is not a lack of capability, but concerns about China retaliating in rare earths and manufacturing supply chains. As Meizlish said, “maximum pressure” has always been a “very effective slogan.” The real leverage is in Beijing. Trump has not pulled it yet.

The blockade has loopholes. The port of Hasab on the Musandam Peninsula, 35 km from Iran at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz, has become Iran’s main logistics route to bypass the US maritime blockade. Since the ceasefire, cargo has been shipped first from ports in the UAE by non-Iranian vessels to Hasab, then transferred to Iranian landing craft to ports in Iran outside controlled routes. The cargo includes automobiles, parts, consumer goods, and oil products. The cost of this route is six times that of pre-war logistics. Tehran is paying this cost. As long as Hasab remains operational, the economic suffocation effect needed for Washington in the second stage of nuclear talks to force Iran into concessions cannot be achieved.

There is also a political dimension here that deserves even more attention: these goods originate from ports in the UAE. Although Abu Dhabi officially aligns with the US-Gulf framework, Dubai’s trade networks are quietly sustaining the lifeline of Iranian commercial activity. This is not a minor inconsistency; it is a structural leak in the pressure framework. When second-stage nuclear talks begin, and Washington tries to maximize economic leverage over Tehran, this will become extremely important.

India and the Shape of the Post-Crisis Order

As the Iran situation drew global attention over this weekend, New Delhi was also pursuing a parallel diplomatic track whose long-term strategic implications run even deeper.

US Secretary of State Rubio spent four days in India, meeting Modi and Sudhanshu Jaishankar, and attending the Quad foreign ministers’ meeting. He conveyed a very clear message: the US will not allow Iran to hold global energy markets hostage; the US’s LNG and oil can help India reduce dependence on Gulf energy.

This proposal is not only about energy. It is a structural invitation: to stand more closely within Washington’s security and economic architecture, reduce exposure to disruptions in Iranian supplies and Chinese economic leverage, and anchor India more firmly within the Indo-Pacific framework represented by the Quad.

The problem is that the relationship Rubio is trying to repair on this trip has already been damaged on three levels at the same time. Trump’s tariffs force India to bear the highest batch of tax rates among the US’s partner countries. Washington has elevated Pakistan to the leading role in mediating with Iran—meanwhile, India-Pakistan relations are still highly tense after last year’s air battle—which has sparked what an analyst called a “perfect anxiety storm” in New Delhi. At the same time, Trump’s visit to Beijing has further amplified India’s concerns: is the US seeking a grand-power compromise with China, while India’s strategic interests are left unaddressed?

In Modi’s Saturday meetings, he did not directly mention Iran. This is not neglect—it is a deliberate signal. Throughout the entire crisis, India has continued purchasing Russian oil. It has no intention of being drawn into a Western sanctions framework that would raise its energy costs. At the same time, it is highly vigilant about the Pakistan-China-Iran diplomatic triangle, because within that triangle India is geographically surrounded and strategically exposed.

The Quad foreign ministers’ meeting on May 26 will be a diagnostic. If the meeting issues a joint statement with tough wording on Hormuz, maritime security, and Iran, it would indicate that Washington has successfully anchored India within the legitimacy framework of this agreement. If the statement instead broadly talks about “peace through dialogue”—that is the wording Modi publicly used on Saturday—then it would indicate that India is hedging rather than aligning.

The Energy Chain Reaction Won’t End

No matter what is announced today or tomorrow, one thing is certain: the energy crisis will not end with the signing of the memorandum of understanding.

The International Energy Agency’s May 2026 “Oil Market Report” tells the real story. Since February, global oil supply has decreased by 12.8 million barrels per day. Gulf state output is 14.4 million barrels per day lower than pre-war levels. Global oil inventories fell by 129 million barrels in March and again by 117 million barrels in April. In the second quarter, refinery crude processing volume is expected to drop sharply by 4.5 million barrels per day. Even in April alone, North Sea spot crude prices experienced an unprecedented $50 per barrel fluctuation range.

Full recovery of Middle Eastern oil supply is expected no earlier than 2027, and this is only assuming that the acute disruption phase ends now; energy industry executives have warned that the recovery timeline could be longer.

Even if tomorrow the Strait of Hormuz is reopened cleanly and decisively—unconditionally, verifiably, and fully operational—it cannot erase the consequences brought by three months of inventory depletion, refinery outages, damage to supply chains, and the reshaping of trade flows. A fertilizer chain reaction is already in motion. The transmission of food prices is accelerating into the third quarter. Disruptions in sulfur supply are affecting critical mineral supply chains. Water security in the Gulf region remains a compounded weak point. These are all structural consequences, not diplomatic ones. They will not disappear with a single press release.

Conclusion

The Iran war is entering a managed pause—but that does not mean it is the end.

Trump needs the “visual effect” of an agreement before domestic inflation becomes politically fatal. US inflation is at the highest level in years, and the link between the Strait of Hormuz and fuel and food prices is something every American consumer can feel directly. Tehran needs sanctions relief and economic breathing room to survive. The structure of this memorandum allows both sides to get what they need on Day 1.

But the core strategic contradictions remain fully intact. Washington demands that Iran roll back its nuclear capabilities. Tehran demands that it keep the Strait of Hormuz as a survival deterrence tool. These two demands cannot both be satisfied at the same time. Eventually, one side will have to concede on issues it publicly says are non-negotiable. When Day 61 arrives and the 60-day window closes, we will know which side blinks first—and whether this so-called agreement is a genuine solution, or an elegant way of postponing the war—because both sides, in fact, are not yet ready to finish it.

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