Recently looking at a few DAO proposals, they all seem to be talking about “upgrades/budgets/collaborations” on the surface—but the more I look, the more it feels like I’m watching how incentives are hidden and how power is arranged. For example, writing the voting threshold in a very “reasonable” way, only for it to turn out that only big holders or a certain delegate can consistently cross the line. And for example, deciding who receives subsidies, how long the cycles are, and how the funds are unlocked—these are basically decisions about who gets to sit at the table for the long term. When it comes to on-chain interactions, I’ll first calculate gas; and when it comes to voting, I start by estimating the cost of “who gets the voice.”

Over the past couple of days, retail investors have been complaining that validators earn too much, and that MEV and transaction ordering aren’t fair—and I can understand that sense of frustration. You think you’re participating in governance, but in reality you might just be stamping approval on some prearranged ordering… Anyway, these days when I look at proposals, I first check three things: where the money flows, where the votes come from, and how high the cost of opposition is.
What I’ve learned isn’t techniques—the way proposals are written is itself part of the power structure.