LayerZero discloses KelpDAO rsETH bridge attack incident, with North Korean hacker group identified as the mastermind.

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Wu said that LayerZero released an incident report stating that on April 18, the KelpDAO rsETH bridge built on LayerZero's cross-chain messaging protocol was attacked, resulting in a loss of 116,500 rsETH (approximately $292 million). Mandiant, CrowdStrike, and independent security researchers all attributed the attack to the North Korean hacker group TraderTraitor (also known as UNC4899). The report states that the attack began on March 6, with the attacker using social engineering to obtain session keys from a LayerZero Labs developer, gaining access to the RPC cloud environment and contaminating internal RPC nodes; subsequently, they launched a DoS attack on external RPC providers, forcing LayerZero Labs' DVN signing service to rely only on two compromised internal nodes and generate valid proofs for forged cross-chain messages. LayerZero indicated that the incident's impact was due to the affected OApp using a single validator configuration, and it did not affect other OApps, channels, or transactions.
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PerpPaperTiger
· 53m ago
DoS external providers + polluting internal nodes, this combo punch is well executed, but unfortunately it's against us.
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GateUser-83c80dd0
· 1h ago
The RPC cloud environment has been compromised, and now even the infrastructure layer is no longer secure.
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MintStop-LossPatch
· 13h ago
LayerZero shifts the blame to OApp configuration, but what about the security of their own nodes?
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GovernanceVoting
· 13h ago
289 million just gone like that, cross-chain bridges are really hacker withdrawal machines
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QuietQuants
· 13h ago
DVN signatures depend on two controlled nodes; this single point of failure design is truly outrageous.
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OracleBabysitter
· 13h ago
From March 6th to April 18th, lurking for over a month, this attacker has patience.
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ColdBrewSparklingWater
· 13h ago
Social engineering is always the hardest to defend against; humans are much more vulnerable than code.
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