Recently, reviewing DAO proposals feels a bit like reading the fine print on the back of a menu: on the surface, it’s “good for the ecosystem,” but the real flavor lies in how incentives are divided and who has more voting power. For example, shifting subsidies from “users” to “voters” makes short-term voting results look better, but the long-term cash flow of the protocol might be drained; and that seemingly neutral “delegation/representation mechanism” is basically handing the keys to the kitchen over to a few people to guard.

These days, everyone is also checking staking unlocks and token unlock calendars, worried about selling pressure. I, on the other hand, tend to look for whether the proposal has already laid out “exit incentives”: rewards for passing the vote, longer lockups for more rewards… It’s a bit like covering up unlocking anxiety with a sugar coating. Not that it’s necessarily bad, but once the power structure is set, it’s hard to change.

My first glance at a proposal now isn’t about the narrative, but about who’s paying, who’s getting votes, and who can exit. What about you?