ASEAN "Not choosing sides" to the end? | Phoenix Focus

Questioning AI · Can the US tariff threats shake ASEAN’s strategic autonomy?

The 48th ASEAN Summit concludes, amid spillover of Middle East conflicts, US tariff pressure, and internal contradictions, ASEAN faces a dilemma of “economic survival and security on a tightrope.” The summit issued multiple statements on energy, the South China Sea, and maritime cooperation, but the old problem of “easy to sign consensus, difficult to implement actions” remains prominent. On one side, great power competition intensifies, weakening ASEAN’s central role; on the other, internal disagreements are hard to reconcile, with some countries acting inconsistently. Can ASEAN maintain its strategic autonomy? How will this summit influence the Indo-Pacific geopolitical landscape?

Behind the lively summit: ASEAN is facing a survival crisis

Local time May 6-8, the 48th ASEAN Summit was held in Cebu, Philippines. Leaders from all eleven ASEAN countries attended, exchanging handshakes warmly, but against the backdrop of prolonged Middle East conflicts and escalating Indo-Pacific rivalries, this summit was no longer routine consultation but an urgent meeting for ASEAN to unite for survival and coordinate positions.

Researcher Zhang Jie from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of Asia-Pacific and Global Strategy believes that the core background of this ASEAN summit is the spillover of Middle East tensions combined with US-China competition under the Indo-Pacific strategy, which has severely impacted ASEAN’s centrality and economic resilience. Professor Song Qingrun from Beiwai Asia Institute adds that this summit’s topics are more urgent and direct, no longer just medium- and long-term planning, but confronting real crises.

The ongoing Middle East conflict, the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz, and sharp oil price fluctuations directly impact ASEAN. Over 90% of ASEAN’s crude oil imports come from the Middle East, so energy shortages directly affect industry, electricity, and prices, increasing social pressures and governance risks.

Zhang Jie mentions that Southeast Asia is an export-oriented economy, heavily dependent on oil and gas, which could trigger regional and long-term social unrest. Song Qingrun believes that most ASEAN countries lack oil and gas, with declining economic growth expectations. Whether the summit can respond quickly will test ASEAN’s cohesion and action capacity.

The summit issued the “ASEAN Leaders’ Statement on the Middle East Crisis,” proposing to strengthen energy security, diversify supplies, and promote clean energy transition. However, this consensus exposes the “structural shortcomings of ASEAN mechanisms”: good at reaching consensus but difficult to implement; willing to form groups but lacking coordination ability.

Song Qingrun points out that most ASEAN countries have extremely low or nearly zero oil reserves, and no regional oil reserves. ASEAN adheres to non-interference in internal affairs and cannot enforce actions like the EU; it can only coordinate, not command, resulting in weak action capability.

Besides the energy crisis, ASEAN also faces “America’s new round of tariff threats.” In April 2026, the US launched a large-scale trade investigation, targeting major ASEAN countries to pave the way for tariff hikes. The Trump administration previously used tariffs to pressure ASEAN countries to choose sides; export-oriented economies like Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia are highly dependent on the US market. Once tariffs are imposed, ASEAN will be forced into a dilemma of balancing between great powers.

Song Qingrun analyzes that US tariff coercion forces ASEAN to compromise, weakening regional cooperation mechanisms, and also pressures ASEAN to decouple from China, suppress China’s economic influence.

ASEAN’s passivity is not a recent phenomenon. Since its founding in 1967, ASEAN has sought strategic autonomy through “not choosing sides, not binding,” but under Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” and US “Indo-Pacific Strategy,” US pressure on ASEAN has become more transactional. On one hand, through tariffs, market access, and supply chain security; on the other, through exclusive multilateral mechanisms like the Quad and AUKUS, attempting to divide and conquer ASEAN. The originally collective multilateral mechanisms have gradually been replaced by opportunistic bilateral deals. Under continuous external intervention and interference, ASEAN’s regional centrality has weakened, and diplomatic autonomy has shrunk.

Zhang Jie evaluates that the survival of ASEAN’s centrality fundamentally depends on recognition from major powers—if China and the US are willing to let ASEAN take the lead, “small horses pulling big carts.” But the US-China rivalry poses a severe challenge to this foundation. Since China’s GDP surpassed Japan in 2010, the US shifted from “offshore balancing” to direct involvement, evolving from Obama’s “Rebalance to Asia” and “Pivot to Asia” to the “Indo-Pacific Strategy.” The logic has always been to build a security network based on rules to maintain US-led regional order. From the Quad to AUKUS, and multilateral groups like US-Japan-Philippines and US-Japan-Australia, the US is effectively implementing “divide and conquer” on ASEAN—members are pulled into new mechanisms, forced to sign mineral resource agreements, severely eroding ASEAN’s unity and centrality.

This summit is also overshadowed by “internal contradictions.” The Philippines, as the rotating chair, mediates the border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia. Leaders from both countries met and reached a verbal consensus, but without legal binding force. Disagreements over border demarcation and maritime boundaries remain, testing ASEAN’s cohesion.

Song Qingrun states that the deep-rooted historical grievances and sovereignty sensitivities in the Thailand-Cambodia conflict mean ASEAN can only mediate and coordinate, lacking the capacity to push for resolution, which is a long-standing pain point.

Focus on the South China Sea: Philippines’ verbal de-escalation, actions provoke

The most closely watched variable at this summit is the Philippines’ subtle shift in attitude toward China on the South China Sea issue. Since President Marcos Jr. took office, the Philippines has been known for a tough stance against China in the South China Sea within ASEAN, often clashing with China in related waters. However, since taking over ASEAN chairmanship in 2026, the Philippines’ public statements have clearly shifted: not only echoing China and ASEAN’s joint push for the Code of Conduct (COC) negotiations, but also last year signaling a desire to jointly promote the formal signing of the COC. During this summit, Marcos reiterated, “One of our hopes is to finalize the South China Sea Code of Conduct by the end of the year.”

Song Qingrun believes that the recent signals of cooperation from the Philippines are mainly aimed at easing domestic energy crises and social tensions. Oil and gas shortages cause huge social pressures, and the Philippines hopes that Chinese technologies, equipment, and funds for photovoltaics, electric vehicles, and energy storage can arrive quickly. To this end, the Philippines has softened its stance on the South China Sea, including expressing willingness to discuss joint resource development—something rarely mentioned before. As ASEAN chair, the Philippines must respond to the overall ASEAN call for “a peaceful, cooperative South China Sea,” even if reluctantly, to appear conciliatory.

The Philippines’ softening attitude toward China also reflects the “deeply intertwined economic and trade reality” between China and ASEAN. In 2025, bilateral trade exceeded $1 trillion for the first time, with China and ASEAN remaining each other’s largest trading partners for six consecutive years. The China-Laos railway and the new land-sea corridor are connecting, and fields like renewable energy and agricultural green transformation are highly complementary. Song Qingrun comments that ASEAN faces a single energy structure and severe crises, and China can provide long-term support in green transition and energy cooperation.

But ironically, “Philippines’ verbal de-escalation is accompanied by continued provocations.” On the opening day of the summit, May 6, Philippine Coast Guard aircraft harassed China’s “Yanchenghong 33” scientific research vessel near Houtong Reef, then the Philippine government issued a statement claiming the Chinese vessel’s normal operations as “illegal intrusion.”

Meanwhile, the Philippines pushed the summit to adopt the “ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Maritime Cooperation,” and sought to establish an ASEAN Maritime Center in the Philippines, attempting to package its unilateral claims as ASEAN’s collective stance, and to create a platform for external powers to promote multilateralization of South China Sea issues. It’s clear that the so-called de-escalation is only verbal; actual policies and actions contradict this.

Song Qingrun assesses that the Philippines is using ASEAN to mask its provocations, trying to leverage ASEAN’s influence to confront China.

More contradictions: while the summit emphasized “peaceful resolution of South China Sea disputes,” the Philippines simultaneously conducted the “largest-ever US-Philippines joint military exercises,” involving 17k troops, with drills directly along the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait routes. Japanese Defense Minister also visited the Philippines, deepening military ties and increasing containment of China.

Zhang Jie comments that Philippine diplomacy is extremely contradictory—seeking to ease relations with China while provoking in the maritime domain, cozying up to Japan and the US—“wanting both, but unable to truly balance.”

The future of ASEAN: autonomy is difficult, opportunism even harder

Looking back, the Philippines has often issued verbal signals of de-escalation but has continued provocations. From the 1999 illegal occupation of Ren’ai Reef with warships, to the 2016 South China Sea arbitration drama, and since 2024, provocations at Ren’ai Reef, Xianbin Reef, and Houtong Reef have repeatedly led to maritime standoffs with China, bringing the situation close to conflict. The US-Philippines military alliance continues to escalate, providing external backing for risky actions, making the Philippines’ double-dealing in the South China Sea more routine.

Song Qingrun summarizes that, especially under Marcos Jr., the Philippines has long been the most aggressive ASEAN country in provoking China over the South China Sea and a close US ally in balancing China. Future conflicts between China and the Philippines will likely persist, continuously disrupting the easing of Philippines-China relations and constraining long-term cooperation and stability.

The nearly 60-year history of ASEAN’s development has proven that maintaining strategic autonomy and ASEAN centrality is fundamental to its position amid geopolitical shifts. Currently, the global landscape is undergoing profound adjustments, with intensifying great power competition. Although ASEAN always upholds neutrality and independence in diplomacy, external interference and coercion often put it on the back foot. As a core platform for regional cooperation in Asia, ASEAN’s strategic choices are not internal affairs—they will profoundly influence the balance and prosperity of regional and global security.

The US has created a fissure in ASEAN through the Philippines, maintaining significant deterrence and leverage. But in terms of “economic stability” and “regional identity,” ASEAN pragmatically leans toward China. The greatest challenge to transforming consensus into coordinated action is not external but internal: some members provoke sovereignty claims while seeking to profit from them, full of opportunism—how can this work?

Producer: He Jining

Director: Fu Tuo

Editor: Wang Jinjie