Private banks show major performance divergence: "cut off lending" to seek transformation with a 36-fold asset gap, WeBank's net profit approaches 60% of the industry

Ask AI · How does the transformation of “断助贷” (cutting off assistance loans) affect banks’ proprietary capabilities?

Reporter | Zeng Lingjun

As the annual report season concludes, except for Wuhan Zhongbang Bank which has temporarily disclosed its annual report, the remaining 18 private banks have all announced their 2025 annual reports.

According to a review by Jiemian News, overall the data is not bad, with revenue slightly declining, profits increasing by 1.92%, and asset quality remaining relatively stable.

However, a closer look reveals a stark polarization: the asset sizes among private banks differ by as much as 36 times, with WeBank’s net profit approaching 60% of the industry, while the smaller institutions are nearing the red line of profitability; Jilin Yilian Bank has become the only private bank to report a loss.

Another trend is “断助贷” (cutting off assistance loans), with many private banks reducing their partnerships with loan facilitation agencies. For example, Yilian Bank reduced its partner agencies from 56 to 10 within a year; Blue Ocean Bank ceased cooperation with over 40 loan agencies; Huashui Bank withdrew from 22 partner platforms at once.

“Private banks used to rely on loan facilitation platforms to scale up and earn high interest margins. Under new regulatory rules and the downward cycle of interest rates, this approach has completely failed. Segmentation is an inevitable result. The remaining question is: who has the ability to operate independently, who can survive and thrive better,” said a senior industry insider from East China to Jiemian News.

Severe polarization in performance

In terms of asset size, private banks have formed a “pyramid” hierarchy.

WeBank, with total assets of 766.29B yuan, leads by a large margin, growing 17.57% from the end of last year; MYbank’s total assets are 504.59B yuan, up 7.12%, with both top institutions firmly standing above the 5 trillion yuan mark.

Third place, Su Commercial Bank, has total assets of 1,655.16 billion yuan, with a growth rate of 20.33%, becoming the most competitive challenger to reach 2 trillion yuan.

However, the bottom of the pyramid is loosening. Fujian Huadong Bank’s assets are 349.37 billion yuan, down 4.93% year-on-year, with a net profit of only 34.94B yuan, a 70.93% drop; in the second half, it even reported a net loss of 105 million yuan. The smallest, Jiangxi Yumin Bank, has total assets of only 205.48 billion yuan, a 36-fold difference compared to WeBank.

An industry analyst who preferred to remain anonymous compared to Jiemian News used an analogy: “Looking at private bank data is like viewing an iceberg—WeBank and MYbank are towering above the water, majestic, while many smaller institutions struggle in the cold below. Yumin Bank’s 20 billion yuan size is almost micro-scale in banking, indicating difficulties in capital replenishment, weak talent attraction, and lagging technology investment—creating a vicious cycle.”

The polarization in revenue and net profit is even more extreme than asset size.

WeBank’s revenue in 2025 reached 24M yuan, a 4.84% decline year-on-year, but it remains far ahead; MYbank’s revenue is 20.55B yuan, following closely. These two institutions alone account for over 60% of the industry’s total revenue share.

In the second tier, Xinwang Bank’s annual revenue is 36.28B yuan, up 8.98%, maintaining third place in the industry; Su Commercial Bank’s revenue is 20.56B yuan, up 16.02%.

Further down, Wuxi Xishang Bank, Meizhou Keshang Bank, with 6.94B yuan, and Weihai Blue Ocean Bank, with 5.81B yuan, form a revenue group of around 10 billion yuan. The performance of smaller institutions remains weak—Yumin Bank’s annual revenue is 534 million yuan, and Xinan Bank’s is only 262 million yuan, with a nearly 180-fold difference between the top and bottom.

If revenue polarization is already striking, the gap in net profit is even larger.

WeBank’s net profit in 2025 is 1.14B yuan, a 1.00% increase, maintaining positive profit growth despite the declining net interest margin; MYbank’s net profit is 1.06B yuan, up 3.99%. Together, WeBank and MYbank account for nearly 80% of the industry’s net profit.

On the other end, smaller institutions are approaching the profit-loss threshold. Sanxiang Bank, Yumin Bank, and Xinan Bank all reported annual net profits below 20 million yuan; Zhongguancun Bank’s net profit is 231 million yuan, down 16%, and has been declining for three consecutive years, nearly halving compared to 2022. Notably, Jilin Yilian Bank is the only private bank among the 18 that have disclosed annual reports to report a loss.

“This pattern reflects differences in the fundamental nature and strategies of various private banks. For example, banks with real scenarios and closed-loop traffic can effectively control risks and maintain growth, while those relying on external loan facilitation or lacking differentiated capabilities struggle to adapt to stricter regulations and market changes, with significantly weaker competitiveness,” said Wang Pengbo, Chief Analyst at Botong Consulting, to Jiemian News.

“断助贷” becomes a trend

In recent years, the loan facilitation model has been a key driver of rapid expansion for some private banks. Relying on internet platform traffic and risk control as a safety net, many institutions adopted a “light-asset, quick-disbursement” approach to rapidly grow their credit scale and boost revenue growth.

When regulations tightened, the structural fragility behind this aggressive expansion became evident—risk control gaps, customer base sinking to lower tiers, risk outsourcing, and compliance gaps all surfaced during the economic downturn.

Since 2025, under the dual pressures of worsening performance polarization and comprehensive regulatory tightening, many private banks have simultaneously promoted “断助贷” (cutting off assistance loans) and strengthened their proprietary operations.

Blue Ocean Bank’s adjustment is the most significant. The bank drastically restructured its cooperation ecosystem, actively ceasing cooperation with over 40 loan agencies, reducing partners from 68 to 28, a nearly 60% drop. This “bold move” came at the cost of performance: in 2025, its total revenue was only 1B yuan, with operating profit of 498 million yuan, showing a significant decline.

Huashui Bank’s adjustments are also notable. The bank withdrew from 22 partner platforms at once, reducing its total number of consumer loan partners from 76 to 67. Among those cut were major traffic platforms like iQiyi and Ele.me.

The reason Huashui Bank’s adjustments have sparked widespread discussion is not only because of their scale but also because they reveal the true cost of the loan facilitation model. Its 2025 annual report shows that channel fee expenses reached 1.4 billion yuan, a surge of 480 million yuan from the previous year, directly dragging down net fee and commission income to -1.35 billion yuan.

Additionally, banks like Zhongbang Bank and Yilian Bank are also reducing their reliance on loan facilitation. A retail business head at a city commercial bank told Jiemian News: “Many small and medium-sized banks are essentially working for platforms: traffic belongs to the platform, pricing power is with the platform, but the risk remains on the bank’s books. When regulations tighten, this vulnerability is exposed immediately.”

“Previously, we relied on platforms for traffic, with customer profiling and risk models dominated by the platform. Banks were more like fund channels. Now, regulations clearly state ‘who lends, who is responsible.’ If risks occur, banks must bear full responsibility. This model is no longer viable,” said the retail head.

A retail business leader from a city commercial bank in East China shared a common industry dilemma: “The more loan facilitation business we do, the more the bank becomes a ‘fund wholesaler’ for platforms. The platform takes the biggest share—customer acquisition and traffic fees—while the bank bears all the credit risk and regulatory pressure, earning only a thin margin. But the larger the scale, the more concentrated the risk.”

This city commercial bank retail head added, “We are gradually stopping cooperation with some mid-tier traffic platforms. Partnering with larger platforms is safer—on one hand, they are less likely to cause a major incident; on the other, they have a large user base, rich data, and good customer segmentation, enabling precise matching and reducing the bank’s risk exposure.”

“断助贷” is not just a simple contraction but a strategic restructuring. Starting in 2025, the transformation path for private banks is becoming clearer: reduce dependence on traffic, strengthen autonomous risk control, build proprietary systems, and return to core service functions.

A private bank insider from North China told Jiemian News: “We are focusing on local small micro and supply chain finance, leveraging regional industrial clusters, enhancing credit for core enterprises, and mass acquiring quality micro clients, which reduces customer acquisition costs and improves asset quality.”

However, there are significant challenges. “The biggest pain points in the transformation are talent shortages and insufficient data accumulation. In the past, relying on platforms, our risk control teams lacked independent modeling and data analysis capabilities; at the same time, in the early stages of building our own customer base, data was limited, making risk model iteration difficult. But these difficulties are temporary—we are increasing talent recruitment and technological investment,” said the insider.