Recently reviewing a few DAO proposals, on the surface they all focus on "optimizing incentives" and "increasing participation," but I now pay attention to one sentence: where does the money come from, and where does the voting power flow. Many designs are actually quite straightforward: funnel subsidies to those who can continuously vote, then raise the threshold a bit, ultimately turning it into a situation where a few addresses have long-term control. To put it simply, incentives are not benefits; they are the lubricant of the power structure.

Thinking about the economic collapse points of blockchain games, it's pretty similar—when inflation kicks in, studios enter the scene, and the token price spirals out of control, all "incentives" become just accelerators. Watching this for a long time can be a bit tiring: the most heated discussions are often not about whether the rules are reasonable, but about who can get the benefits first. Anyway, before voting, I first do an authorization check and review the distribution table; if I can't vote, I won't, preferring to be a lone wolf and take it slow.