Recently, I have been pondering a historical question—if Qian Hongchu had not submitted a memorial to surrender the land, how much longer could Wu Yue have persisted?

On the surface, this last ruler of Wu Yue is described as "voluntarily offering the land." But a closer look at his situation reveals that this guy had no real choice.

First, let's discuss Wu Yue's geographical fate. Its core territory is today’s Zhejiang region, along with the edges of Suzhou and Fuzhou. To the north and west, it was completely blocked by Southern Tang. This setup has a fatal flaw—Wu Yue needed someone to stand in front as a "shield" to stay alive.

For over seventy years, this role was played by Southern Tang. From Yang Wu to Southern Tang, the Jianghuai region stretched between Wu Yue and the Central Plains, acting like a natural barrier. The Central Plains regimes repeatedly launched southward campaigns, all of which were stopped, with the fighting and casualties mostly on Southern Tang’s side. Meanwhile, Wu Yue could safely focus on building dikes, planting mulberry and hemp, and engaging in maritime trade, with ships at Hangzhou port lined up end to end. This was the survival code set by Qian Liu—befriend the Central Plains, oppose Southern Tang. Three generations and five kings followed this strategy, and for over seventy years, there were no major deviations.

The problem is, this logic relies on a crucial premise: that Southern Tang must exist.

In 974, Zhao Kuangyin ordered the attack on Southern Tang. Qian Hongchu was called to send 50,000 troops to cooperate. Li Yu wrote him a letter, with the core message—"Without me today, how can there be a ruler tomorrow?" In other words, if Southern Tang falls, the next target is Wu Yue.

But Qian Hongchu did not reply. He simply passed the letter unchanged to Zhao Kuangyin.

This move seemed to show loyalty, but in reality, it cut off Wu Yue’s last retreat. From that moment on, all tacit understanding and potential cooperation between Wu Yue and Southern Tang were completely nullified.

In 975, the city of Jinling fell, and Li Yu surrendered. Wu Yue’s prime minister Shen Huzi had already warned—Southern Tang was a shield and should not be attacked. But Qian Hongchu did not listen.

After Southern Tang was destroyed, the situation became even more severe than expected. Song armies encircled Wu Yue from three sides, leaving only the eastern sea open. In March 978, Qian Hongchu was summoned to Kaifeng to meet Zhao Guangyi. On the day of departure, he went to pay respects at his grandfather Qian Liu’s tomb, and broke down crying, unable to stand steadily. He mourned his ancestral legacy, the retreat route he had personally destroyed.

In Kaifeng, Zhao Guangyi showed him great respect—he was led into the hall with sword and boots, and the imperial edict was read without a signature, a treatment usually reserved for Cao Cao. But the more courteous he was, the more dangerous it was. While Qian Hongchu hesitated, Chen Hongjin, who controlled Quanzhou and Zhangzhou, took the initiative to present the "Land Surrender Memorial." This was essentially telling him—if you don’t surrender, others will.

In May, Qian Hongchu submitted a memorial surrendering all thirteen provinces and eighty-six counties of Wu Yue. The peaceful Wu Yue, which had lasted for 72 years, came to an end.

So, did Qian Hongchu really have a chance to preserve Wu Yue?

In theory, yes. Li Yu had already made it clear in his letter—that Wu Yue and Southern Tang would join forces to fight the Song from both sides. At that time, the Song front was stretched extremely long, with supply lines crossing half the Yangtze River. If Wu Yue had instead attacked the Song flank from the east, Zhao Kuangyin might not have been able to conquer Southern Tang so easily. Historically, the Song besieged Jinling for an entire year, and Zhao Kuangyin even considered withdrawing. If chaos erupted on the eastern front, the outcome was unpredictable.

But in reality, Qian Hongchu simply could not do it.

Wu Yue’s military autonomy had been eroding since the Later Zhou era. In 955, when Zhou Shizong attacked Southern Tang, Wu Yue’s army was incorporated into Zhou’s forces, under the command of Zhou generals. This relationship was fully inherited by the Song dynasty. Qian Hongchu wanted to act independently, but the command chain was not in his control.

Financially, Wu Yue had been drained by tributary payments. Yue kiln ceramics, silk, gold and silver, tea—every year, they shipped these to Kaifeng. It wasn’t that they didn’t want to stand firm; they simply lacked the money to do so.

More fundamentally—Qian family’s three generations of accumulated "respect for the Central Plains" ideology had become the political foundation of Wu Yue. Qian Liu’s last instructions were clear: "All Chinese rulers, even if they change surnames, should treat others well." Suddenly turning around to ally with Southern Tang against Song was not only unacceptable to Zhao Kuangyin, but probably unthinkable within Wu Yue itself.

Qian Hongchu was not blind to this path. But he simply could not walk it.

As for Li Yu, as an "incompetent ruler," his final judgment was actually correct. General Lu Jiang once suggested first destroying Wu Yue to cut off Song’s eastern allies. Li Yu did not listen. In the end, he still considered Qian Hongchu a friend and wrote to seek alliance.

But Qian Hongchu took that letter and handed it over to Zhao Kuangyin. Zhao Guangyi read it, said nothing, and didn’t need to. The fate of Wu Yue was sealed the moment that letter was handed over.

On August 24, 988, Qian Hongchu’s 60th birthday, Zhao Guangyi sent gifts and fine wine. After the banquet that night, a shooting star fell in front of his chamber. The next morning, Qian Hongchu died.