Recently, I saw an interesting debate on the Bitcoin forum in Silicon Valley time, revolving around whether quantum computing will truly threaten Bitcoin. Honestly, this topic has always been somewhat divisive within the community.

First, let's discuss the voices warning of the threat. Alex Prudin from Project 11 pointed out that once a quantum computer runs Shor's algorithm, it could theoretically crack the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem that Bitcoin relies on. In other words, if an attacker gains control of your public key, they can derive the private key and forge signatures. That sounds indeed frightening. Physicist Scott Aaronson even warned that quantum computers might be developed within 10 years.

But skeptics Brandon Black and James O'Beirne are less worried. They point out that there is currently no evidence that humans can build truly cryptographically meaningful quantum computers, and past so-called "quantum breakthroughs" have often been overhyped. This divergence has caused significant rifts within the community.

Interestingly, the Bitcoin community isn't just sitting idly. Hunter Beast from Surmount Systems introduced the BIP 360 proposal. This is designed as a "non-mandatory, no new output type" scheme, allowing wallets to pre-submit future post-quantum cryptographic script paths based on existing elliptic curve foundations. Simply put, it leaves room for future technological migration without compromising current security assumptions. Additionally, discussions around BIP 54's consensus cleanup are ongoing.

The current problem is that there are no post-quantum algorithms capable of fully replacing secp256k1 on the market yet. Moreover, post-quantum signatures tend to be 100 times larger in data size and require 10 times more verification effort than traditional signatures. Nevertheless, ongoing technological research is considered a necessary insurance for Bitcoin. Even if the quantum threat is ultimately proven to be science fiction, these studies have long-term value in preventing the degradation of traditional cryptography.

Another core issue in the forum is what to do about addresses vulnerable to quantum attacks, especially the early mined millions of Bitcoin by Satoshi. Statistics show that about 6.9 million BTC (35% of the total supply) are exposed to risk, mainly addresses using old P2PK formats or reused addresses, which directly expose public keys.

The community holds various opinions on this. One camp believes no action should be taken, emphasizing the sanctity of private property rights, and warns that altering the protocol to restrict certain addresses would break Bitcoin’s social contract. Another camp advocates for hard forks, freezing, or even burning coins to prevent quantum attackers from dumping large amounts of tokens suddenly and causing market crashes. Clara Shiklman proposed a compromise called the "Hourglass Plan," limiting the amount of Bitcoin transferred per block to force funds to flow out gradually. Although some quantum computing companies see Satoshi’s coins as potential profit targets, the consensus seems to favor respecting the original rules and letting the market decide.

From a risk management perspective, the technical and economic costs provide Bitcoin with natural protection. Brandon Black pointed out that even if quantum computers become operational, the initial costs are extremely high—cracking a private key could cost over $50,000 per attempt. This means small addresses will remain absolutely safe for a long time, and early quantum attacks will likely target exchanges or large institutions holding massive amounts.

As institutional investors like BlackRock enter Bitcoin governance, the role of risk managers becomes increasingly important. For these large entities, Bitcoin’s core value lies in its resistance to change. Short-term FUD might suppress prices, but this pressure also drives Bitcoin’s technical evolution and refinement. Bitcoin’s future depends on evidence-based and rational decision-making, activating appropriate defenses at the right time to ensure holders can transition smoothly.