Oman negotiations are imminent; will Iran loosen its stance on enriched uranium?

A Negotiation Interrupted by War, Then Forced to Restart

On April 12, 2025, representatives of the United States and Iran sat across from each other in Muscat, the capital of Oman. This was the first in-person encounter between the two countries’ highest-level diplomats since Trump tore up the Iran nuclear deal in 2018. When the news broke, oil prices fell on the spot, and the Middle East seemed to glimpse a long-awaited dawn of peace.

However, that light soon dimmed.

After that, the following five rounds of indirect negotiations—two in Rome and three in Muscat—kept circling in place. The U.S. special envoy Witkoff and Iran’s foreign minister Alaragzi never met face-to-face; instead, Oman’s foreign minister Badel served as the go-between, shuttling messages back and forth. After each round ended, both sides said there was “progress,” but what that progress actually was was never made clear.

The core differences were obvious: the U.S. demanded that Iran permanently dismantle its uranium enrichment facilities, while Iran insisted that the peaceful use of nuclear energy is a sovereign right granted by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and neither side was willing to take a step backward.

When the 60-day deadline passed, bombs fell. On June 13, 2025, Israel carried out airstrikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities, followed by U.S. forces. By the ceasefire on the 24th, Iran’s Natanz, Fordo, and Isfahan nuclear sites had been severely damaged. But enriched uranium materials were still there, and underground bunkers still remained—war did not solve any problems; it only knocked everything down and started over.

In February 2026, the fighting flared up again. The Strait of Hormuz was blockaded, and oil prices surged past 100 per unit again. It was not until a two-week ceasefire was reached on April 7 that, in early May, the two sides—mediated by Pakistan—sat down together again, with reports suggesting they were “close to reaching a 14-point ceasefire memorandum.”

That is the real situation of the Oman negotiations: talks were never stopped, but they were also never truly advanced.

Uranium Enrichment: A Red Line You Can’t Cross

To understand why U.S.-Iran negotiations are so difficult, you have to see the parties’ true positions on uranium enrichment.

The U.S. bottom line has escalated—from “restrictions” to “zero enrichment.”

The 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) set clear upper limits for Iran’s uranium enrichment: the enrichment level must not exceed 3.67%, stocks must not exceed 300 kilograms, enrichment activities were limited to a single site in Natanz, and the agreement’s validity period ranged from 8 to 25 years. The deal was viewed by Trump as “the worst deal in U.S. history,” because he believed the “sunset clauses” would allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons legally after the agreement expired.

When negotiations were restarted in 2025, the U.S. requirements were completely different: permanently and irreversibly dismantle all uranium enrichment facilities; transfer all enriched uranium stockpiles to a third country; make the agreement “valid indefinitely”; and simultaneously halt the missile program and cut off funding and weapons support to the “axis of resistance.”

In other words, the U.S. is not seeking to limit Iran’s nuclear capability—it is seeking to completely deprive Iran of that capability.

Iran’s stance also leaves no room to back down.

From the Iranian leadership’s perspective, the right to uranium enrichment is an important component of national sovereignty and is non-negotiable. Foreign minister Alaragzi has repeatedly emphasized publicly that this right is rooted in the NPT framework, and any call for Iran to give it up is a violation of international law.

More critically, Iran regards uranium enrichment as its only effective leverage against U.S. military threats. The airstrikes in June 2025 have already proved this: conventional military forces can destroy ground facilities, but they cannot eliminate a country’s decades of accumulated technological capability and strategic will. As long as this security anxiety exists, Iran will not voluntarily disarm.

Where does the gap lie between a five-year pause and a twenty-year freeze?

In April 2026, Iran proposed a five-year pause on uranium enrichment that it would accept; the U.S. responded with a demand for twenty years—almost covering all the remaining time of Trump’s current term. This numeric gap is not technical but strategic: the U.S. is trying to use time to buy space, locking Iran into nuclear progress during Trump’s term. Iran, meanwhile, refuses to make unilateral concessions under pressure—even if, on the surface, this “concession” already appears fairly restrained.

That Batch of Enriched Uranium Hanging over the Negotiation Table

If the right to uranium enrichment is the essence of the U.S.-Iran disagreement, then the stockpile of enriched uranium is the most concrete bargaining chip in this game.

As of May 2025, Iran possessed about 460 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%. Although this level is not weapon-grade (90% or higher), U.S. intelligence assessments cited that, together with Iran’s existing equipment, it is enough to produce about 11 nuclear bombs. In February 2026, Oman’s foreign minister Badel announced that Iran had agreed to a “zero stockpile”—no longer possessing any nuclear materials that could be used to make nuclear bombs, with existing stockpiles converted into civilian nuclear fuel, and the conversion process being irreversible.

This was the boldest statement Iran had made so far.

But before the words could settle, war broke out again. Iran transferred high-enriched uranium to deep underground facilities; since then, IAEA inspectors have been unable to enter the site, and it has now been over ten months. In April 2026, IAEA Director-General Grossi acknowledged that the agency could not confirm the whereabouts of that near-weapon-grade material.

After the war, the latest 14-point ceasefire memorandum’s terms did not include the issue of the enriched uranium stockpile. The U.S. had previously proposed “using Iran’s money to get Iran’s uranium”—unfreezing about 20 billion U.S. dollars in Iranian funds in exchange for Iran handing over its enriched uranium stockpiles—but that also failed to materialize.

This means: even if an agreement is eventually reached, the “time bomb” of enriched uranium will still remain hanging in the air, waiting to be reignited at the next crisis.

Oman: An Irreplaceable Middleman

In this long-running game, Oman’s presence far exceeds that of an ordinary intermediary.

Since the 1970s, Oman has played the role of a covert backchannel for secret U.S.-Iran diplomacy. After the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, that line never stopped. During the Iran-Iraq War, Oman provided Iran with limited channels to obtain international supplies; after the Cold War ended, it became one of the few remaining windows for occasional exchanges of signals between the U.S. and Iran.

Why Oman?

The answer lies in its scarcity: it can both cooperate closely with the United States and still be an acceptable counterpart to Iran. Oman is a military ally of the U.S., hosts U.S. military bases on its territory, and keeps intelligence and diplomatic channels with Washington running smoothly; at the same time, Oman has no sectarian conflicts with Iran, does not take part in the regional power rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and maintains relatively friendly relations with Iran across the Strait of Hormuz. This “acceptable to both sides” quality is something that Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey cannot fully replace.

Since 2025, Badel has accompanied nearly every round of negotiations throughout. From Muscat to Rome, from Geneva to Washington—this Omani foreign minister flew to all relevant cities, repeatedly shuttling back and forth between the U.S. delegation and the Iranian delegation. He is not only a messenger; to a certain extent, he also plays the role of a “keystone” for the negotiations. When both sides refused to change the format and location of the talks, it was Badel who stepped in to coordinate; when the negotiations were on the verge of breaking down, it was him who flew to Washington to pressure the U.S.

In February 2026, he met with U.S. Vice President Vance and National Security Advisor Sullivan in person to present Iran’s position. That same month, he returned to Muscat to hold extended closed-door talks with Iran’s foreign minister Alaragzi. This kind of willingness to invest without regard for cost has earned Oman a trust account that other countries are hard to obtain.

Of course, Oman’s capability also has limits. It can convey information, provide venues, and keep both sides from tearing into each other during crises—but it cannot make any substantive concessions on behalf of the U.S. and Iran. In the end, the choice always rests with Washington and Tehran.

Will Iran Make a Concession? Five Variables You Can’t Avoid

To answer this question, you can’t rely on a simple yes or no—you have to examine, one by one, the factors that truly shape Iran’s decision-making structure.

First, whether economic pressure has reached its breaking point.

The cost of sanctions is real and ongoing. Iran’s inflation has remained high for a long time; foreign exchange shortages have led to tight supplies of imported goods; and the living standards of ordinary people have continued to decline throughout the years of sanctions. Removing sanctions and restoring oil exports are Iran’s most direct motivation to sit back at the negotiation table.

But the question is: how much sanctions relief is the U.S. willing to offer in exchange for substantive Iranian concessions on nuclear issues? The historical experience after the 2025 collapse of the Iran nuclear deal shows that loosening only part of the sanctions is not enough to make Iran believe in the U.S.’s sincerity—they need to see real economic returns. This means that if the U.S. insists on “nuclear first, economy second” (resolving the uranium enrichment issue before discussing sanctions relief), negotiations may once again fall into a deadlock.

Second, whether security anxieties can be eased.

For Iran’s decision-makers, acquiring nuclear capability is not the end goal—it is a means, an insurance mechanism to prevent military strikes by the United States or Israel. The airstrikes in June 2025 and the war in February 2026 have already shown that even when sitting at the negotiation table, military threats remain the preferred tool in America’s policy toolbox. This means that as long as Iran believes the U.S. keeps the option of “using force to advance talks,” it will not make irreversible concessions on nuclear matters.

Conversely, if the U.S. is willing to provide some form of security guarantee—for example, a clear commitment not to seek regime change, or recognition of Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy within the framework of an agreement—then Iran’s space for negotiation could expand significantly.

Third, how domestic politics constrains decision-making space.

Supreme Leader Khamenei is the ultimate decision-maker, but he does not make decisions in isolation. Iran’s parliament, the Revolutionary Guards, hardline media, and other factions form an ecosystem that can attack “weakness” signals at any time. Every bid by foreign minister Alaragzi must be calculated in advance against the intensity of domestic opposition.

During the February 2026 war, hardliners openly called for not negotiating with the U.S.; and during the talks, any compromise details that leaked would trigger fierce debates in parliament. This internal tension means that the flexibility available to Iran’s negotiators at the table is far more limited than it appears on the surface.

Fourth, whether Iran will use retreat as a step forward.

A strategy worth watching is: accept a ceasefire and sanctions relief first, and then push the uranium enrichment issue into discussion within a long-term agreement framework. A five-year pause is not the endpoint but the starting point—if sanctions are lifted, the economy recovers, and the security environment improves, Iran might be willing to discuss stricter restriction arrangements under longer timelines and higher transparency conditions.

The premise of this logic is that both sides have enough patience and enough accumulated mutual trust. Precisely these two things are currently in serious short supply.

Fifth, whether the regional landscape supports compromise.

The Houthis’ blockade of the Red Sea, the process of normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, and Russia’s technical support to Iran in nuclear matters—all shape Iran’s regional strategic environment. If Saudi Arabia allows U.S.-Iran negotiations and regional security architecture loosens, the external pressure on Iran to abandon uranium enrichment will correspondingly ease. On the other hand, if Israel continues to push a hardline policy toward Iran and U.S. domestic politics demand high pressure to keep Iran under strain, Iran’s room to compromise will be sharply reduced.

Conclusion: Uranium Enrichment Won’t Disappear—It Will Only Be Temporarily Shelved

If the 14-point ceasefire memorandum in May 2026 is ultimately signed, at minimum it could stop the Gulf war that has lasted for months. The memorandum itself does not contain clauses restricting uranium enrichment, which gives both sides a chance to breathe: the U.S. gets “face” by stopping the war, while Iran preserves “substance” by keeping the uranium enrichment track.

But the core problem has not been resolved.

The U.S. wants a twenty-year freeze; Iran is only willing to provide five years. The enriched uranium stockpile issue is excluded from the ceasefire agreement, and the IAEA has been unable to enter the site for nuclear inspections for ten months. Missile issues, regional proxy issues, and sanctions against Iran—each item is a mountain that must be crossed.

From this perspective, the real outlook for U.S.-Iran negotiations may not be a binary choice between “reaching an agreement” or “talks breaking down.” Instead, it may be a longer, more painful in-between state: ceasefire, partial agreements, partial violations, renewed pressure, then back to the negotiating table—again and again, measured in years.

In this cycle, will Iran make concessions? It will—but each concession will come with conditions; every step back will be framed as “rights,” not “gifts.”

Uranium enrichment—this card—Tehran will not put down in the short term. But the chips on the table are gradually running out.