Lately, while reviewing DAO proposals, I found that many people only focus on "vote/abstain," but the real drama lies in how incentives are written: who can propose, who can modify parameters, whether the voting threshold is based on tokens or lock-up duration, plus those clauses like "Emergency Committee can execute first and ratify later"... Basically, it's just packaging the power structure into a process, and who ultimately gets liquidated, who benefits, has been pre-determined all along.

In the group, there's also talk about stablecoin regulation, reserve audits, and various screenshots of "de-pegging" concerns. When everyone's emotions run high, it's easier to vote for schemes that seem to "stop the bleeding immediately." I can understand the anxiety, but especially in times like these, we need to keep a close eye on those seemingly boring permissions and rewards in proposals. Otherwise, next time, you'll be mechanically harvested without even knowing who to blame. Anyway, I’ll run some simulations of what can be done first.