Review of the four correct prediction cases in the US-Iran puzzle: clues in public information

Original | Odaily Planet Daily (@OdailyChina)

Author | jk

On February 28, 2026, the US and Israel launched a joint airstrike against Iran. Less than two hours after Trump posted that 8-minute video on Truth Social, and before Tehran officially acknowledged the death of Khamenei.

But on Polymarket, “Will the US strike Iran before February 2026” has already traded up to $0.98.

From February 28 to April 30, contracts around the US-Iran conflict on Polymarket generated over $300 million in trading volume. During this period, the market experienced multiple high-volatility nodes—war breakout, Strait of Hormuz blockade, ceasefire announcements, ceasefire breaches, extended ceasefires—each major event causing sharp re-pricing of the contracts.

In this article, Odaily Planet Daily dissects four accounts that profited significantly during this period, with a core question: What was the publicly available information environment when they placed their bets, and was their judgment supported by the information at the time?

Case 1: Fully Bet on Ceasefire, 3,503% in a Day, Over $450k Profit

Account: Fernandoinfante

On April 7, Trump announced a ceasefire between the US and Iran on Truth Social, and the contract “US and Iran will cease fire before April 7” jumped from single digits to nearly $1. This trader, Fernandoinfante, bought 477,543 Yes contracts at an average price of 2.8 cents, costing $13,200.

Single trade return of 3,503%, settled the same day, profit over $450k, roughly over 3 million RMB.

Before April 7, the public information on ceasefire negotiations was as follows: On April 5, Pakistan proposed a two-week ceasefire draft, Iran formally rejected it and countered with a 10-point plan including troop withdrawal, compensation, and sanctions relief. On April 6, Trump threatened to expand strikes on power plants and bridges but then delayed by 5 days, citing “ongoing negotiations.” In the early hours of April 7, the market’s consensus pricing for a ceasefire was still extremely low; 2.8¢ implied less than a 3% chance of a ceasefire being reached that day.

From a public information perspective, Iran had just rejected Pakistan’s draft, Trump was still threatening bombings, negotiations had no formal channels, and the Strait of Hormuz remained blocked. No mainstream media reported an imminent ceasefire on the evening of April 6.

What is the basis for this judgment?

First, information asymmetry. Polysights on Twitter pointed out that this trade was placed two days before the ceasefire announcement. If true, the buy-in was around April 5, when Trump had already begun softening his tone (delaying strikes by 5 days), and Pakistan’s diplomatic channels were still open. Some Washington observers had already started discussing “Trump needs a result” on April 5–6. A trader tracking negotiation channels continuously might have had faster access to inside information than the market, but this would require very strong information access or internal channels.

Second, extreme odds betting. A price of 2.8¢ implies that even if the probability of a ceasefire was only 10%, it would still be a positive expected value bet. The strategy: during the tail phase of geopolitical contracts, systematically buy all low-priced Yes contracts, using small capital to cover multiple expiry dates, waiting for one to trigger.

Fernandoinfante also made other failed bets, such as predicting the Strait of Hormuz would normalize, a permanent peace agreement would be reached, or the Iranian regime would fall—all of which failed. This confirms the logic: he bet on multiple directions, with ceasefire being just one that happened to hit.

Of course, his own explanation was “Jesus told him.”

He claims to have been inspired by divine revelation.

So, what can we learn from this?

This trader was not betting on a specific outcome, but on the broad trend that “conflict will de-escalate somehow.” He bought bets on ceasefire, permanent peace, Strait of Hormuz reopening, regime change—diversified directional bets.

He only hit on the ceasefire, losing on the others, but a 3,500% return was enough to cover all losses and net tens of thousands of dollars.

The logic behind this structure is that the market systematically underestimates the probability of sudden geopolitical shifts in low-liquidity tail contracts. When an event’s implied probability is priced at 2–3%, but the actual chance might be 10–15%, buying in bulk is expected-value positive, even if most contracts end up worthless.

Case 2: Continuous Losses, Last Day All Correct: “Steadfast Choice” Strategy

Account: Vivaldi007

Vivaldi007 registered on Polymarket in early February 2026, less than three weeks before the geopolitical conflict erupted. From day one, he did one thing: bet that the US would strike Iran.

His trading record is extremely reckless: Starting February 11, he bought Yes contracts for every expiry—11th, 12th, 13th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 20th, 22nd, 25th, 26th—at prices between 0.4¢ and 3.6¢. Each bet ended in zero, all losses, totaling about $39,000.

Repeated failures, but he kept trying.

Then, on February 28, the US-Israel joint airstrike began, and Khamenei was killed that day.

He held 504,416 Yes contracts expiring on February 28, at an average price of 12.7¢, investing $63,986. Ultimately, he made $437,930, a return of 684%. Plus, he held bets on “Will Khamenei step down” (bought at 53¢, +88%) and “Will Israel strike Iran” (14.9¢, +571%), which on the same day netted over $629,000, covering all previous losses and netting $511,098.

Timeline and information environment at that moment

Vivaldi007 registered in early February, when several key events occurred publicly:

• Feb 6: Indirect US-Iran negotiations restart in Muscat, with Witkoff, Kushner, and CENTCOM commander Brad Cooper on the US delegation—military involvement signals high alert.
• Feb 13: Trump orders the Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group to the Middle East.
• Feb 17: Khamenei publicly states “US Navy can be sunk.”
• Feb 20: Trump sets a 10-day deadline, publicly threatening military action.
• Feb 24: Trump claims Iran has restarted nuclear activities in his State of the Union.
• Feb 26: Geneva talks break down, US delegation leaves disappointed.
• Feb 27: Multiple embassies begin evacuating non-essential personnel from Tehran.

Of course, the Trump administration had precedent with Venezuela, which also influenced the assessment.

From Feb 11 to Feb 27, the market’s implied probability of “US striking Iran within February” never exceeded 15¢. Buying all these expiry options was very cheap, as the market still believed negotiations would continue.

What is the logic of this strategy?

Vivaldi007’s approach does not predict specific dates but instead lays out all expiry dates within a window, covering as many as possible at very low cost, waiting for one to trigger.

This strategy relies on several assumptions: First, he has a strong conviction that “the US will ultimately strike.” Otherwise, he wouldn’t keep betting from early February to the end of the month. Second, he accepts ongoing losses—up to $39,000. Third, he significantly increased his position on the Feb 28 contracts ($63,986 vs. $250–$11,000 on other dates), indicating he added heavily to that specific date rather than spreading evenly.

Case 3: $2.1M Bet on “Nothing Will Happen”: A Large-Scale Risk-Averse Strategy

Account: AdrianCronauer

This account’s logic is completely different from the previous two. Fernandoinfante and Vivaldi007 bet on “what will happen,” while AdrianCronauer bets on “nothing will happen.”

He bet No on all major Iran contracts before April: no permanent peace, Trump won’t end military operations, Iran won’t surrender enriched uranium, Strait of Hormuz blockade won’t be officially lifted by the US, and no diplomatic meetings before expiry. Every bet was No, and every one won.

Compared to the previous two, the returns aren’t very high; the highest was 8.45%, the lowest 0.44%. But the principal size made up for it. For example, the bet “No peace before April 30” involved $630,305, yielding $53,257 profit.
“Trump stops military action before April 30” involved $529,058, yielding $10,568.
In total, 38 bets with a 79% win rate, deploying over $2.1 million, netting $147,464.

Timeline and information environment

These bets were mostly placed in early to mid-April, after the ceasefire but before negotiations broke down.

When the ceasefire was announced on April 7, the market’s prices for “permanent peace” and “end of military operations” briefly rose. AdrianCronauer’s No positions were built during this window: as the market became optimistic due to the ceasefire, he bought No at 92¢ when the Yes for “before April 30, peace” was pushed to 7–8¢, locking in the optimistic premium.

Between April 11–12, Pakistan-led negotiations lasted 21 hours and ended without agreement. JD Vance publicly said Iran “rejected our conditions.”
On April 13, the US announced sanctions on Iranian ports.
On April 17, Iran announced the Strait of Hormuz was reopened, then closed again on April 18.
By April 21, when Trump extended the ceasefire, only 9 days remained until April 30, and negotiations were effectively deadlocked.

In this context, the market’s low prices for “before April 30, peace” and “Trump halts military action” (7–8¢) were overestimations of the likelihood of a breakthrough for AdrianCronauer.

Core logic of this strategy

AdrianCronauer’s approach is based on a simple but continuously validated assumption: In high-uncertainty geopolitical deadlocks, major breakthroughs within short expiry windows are always overestimated by the market.

He bets not on specific outcomes but on “not enough time.”
The events—permanent peace, ending military operations, uranium transfer—are all low-probability within a few weeks, even if they will happen eventually.
When the market prices Yes at 1–8¢, No is at 92–99¢, with only 1–8% expected return but very low risk.
He uses scale to harvest the market’s optimism: spreading $2.1 million across multiple contracts, systematically capturing the overpricing.

Where is the risk?

The fatal weakness is the black swan of a single event.
If Trump actually announces the end of military operations before April 30, his $529,058 No position would go to zero.
He bought No at 97¢, implying he believed the event’s probability was no more than 3%.
But Trump’s decisions are notoriously unpredictable.

From the overall April information environment, this judgment is supported: negotiations are broken, bilateral trust is low, Iran’s leadership is divided, and the Strait of Hormuz is repeatedly opened and closed—making a formal agreement within 30 days highly unlikely.

Case 4: How can small capital produce the effect of Case 3? High-Frequency Trading Strategy

Account: 0xcd7…0d127

This account has no single big win story.
20,000 trades, $25.9M total volume, $7,900 average position, 75.5% win rate, $292,000 total profit.

The PnL curve from June 2025 shows slow, steady, almost linear growth—no jumps, no big drawdowns.

Core of the strategy: systematic shorting of market panic

X’s analyst Jay Godiyadada sharply observed:

Iran’s regime historically resists external shocks with about 95% success, but in panic, the market prices “regime change” Yes at around 20%, underestimating the No by 15–20¢.
Whenever an event (war, leader killed, ceasefire breach) pushes Yes higher, this account uses large positions to buy No, harvesting the overestimated panic.
Then, as stability returns, it profits from the correction.

For example, “Will Iran’s regime fall before June 30?”
During the initial chaos, the No price was around 91¢, implying about a 10% implied probability of regime change.
He bought at that point.
As ceasefire stabilizes the situation, the No price climbs to 95¢, with a 4% unrealized profit.

Overall, this account is trading in market swings.

Difference from Case 3

Both strategies seem similar, but a key difference:
AdrianCronauer is concentrated, low-frequency, large positions—single bets of $500,000–$630,000, with only 29 trades.
0xcd7 is diversified, high-frequency, medium-sized positions—average $7,900, 2,000 trades, across multiple markets (Iran, Greenland, Fed Chair), operating nearly a year.

AdrianCronauer’s approach resembles arbitrage, while 0xcd7 acts more like a market maker: continuously identifying overestimated Yes contracts driven by emotion, systematically shorting, and accumulating gains through volume and high win rate.

$25.9M traded, $7,900 average position, 2,000 trades

This means the account maintains high turnover most of the time.
It’s very meme-like: traders don’t wait for settlement but constantly scan for mispricings when the probability has only a 5–10% edge.
A 75.5% win rate over 2,000 trades is statistically significant, unlikely to be luck.

The core advantage, as Jay puts it, is “status quo bias”—a systematic bet that “the current state will continue.”
In geopolitics, major changes are always overestimated, and gradual deadlocks underestimated.

Knowing this, and having enough capital and discipline to execute continuously, is enough.