Surface Unity, Underlying Systemic Cracks: A Panoramic View of FOMC Divisions

In May 2025, the Federal Reserve, with a unanimous 12-0 vote, kept the target range for the federal funds rate unchanged at 4.25%-4.5%, exactly as markets had expected. However, beneath the appearance of unified voting, underlying disagreements had quietly begun to surface and, within the following year, evolved into a deep institutional crisis. By April 2026, the FOMC maintained the rate unchanged at 3.5%-3.75% with an 8-4 vote; the four dissenting votes set the highest record since 1992, marking the complete end of the Fed’s “consensus era.”

Taking the evolving trajectory of these internal disagreements as the entry point, this split presents three core dimensions:

First, the institutional rift from “unanimous agreement” to “two-way dissent.” The 12-0 vote at the May meeting was tidy, but the appointment of Minneapolis Fed President Kashkari—who stepped in for the absent Schmid—subtly shifted the internal balance of power. By September, the Fed’s policy decision featured its first dissenting votes: two governors raised different demands regarding the pace of rate cuts, bringing the disagreement into the open in an official way. After that, in the policy decisions of July, September, October, December, January 2026, and March, the dissenting votes reached 2, 1, 2, 3, 2, and 1 respectively. For six consecutive meetings, there was no vote that passed unanimously. Even harder to ignore was that, since July, the Fed had faced dissent in five consecutive policy meetings. Even for resolutions that held the rate unchanged, dissent still emerged in different directions: Fed Governor Milan continued to vote in favor of rate cuts, while multiple regional Fed presidents voted in favor of not cutting—forming a rare “two-way opposition” pattern.

Second, the “campal” split between the Board of Governors and the regional Federal Reserve banks. The disagreement is no longer a simple divide traditionally between “hawks” and “doves,” but has evolved into a structural institutional opposition. JPMorgan’s hawk-dove camp chart makes the stance clear: among the six officials viewed as the most dovish, as many as five are Fed Governors (Milan, Waller, Bal, Jefferson, Bowman); meanwhile, the presidents of Fed banks such as Dallas, Kansas City, Cleveland, and Chicago are almost entirely hawkish or centrist. In other words, many Fed Governors nominated by Trump form a “central army” leaning toward easing, while regional Fed officials, more focused on local economic realities, have become a “local army” leaning toward tightening. The divide in stance between the Board and regional Fed banks means that Fed decision-making is no longer merely a question of policy choices, but a deeper conflict intertwined with interest demands and institutional structure.

Third, the “silent dissent” between voting power and opinions. A more hidden fissure is reflected in the statements of members without voting rights. In the dot-plot chart after the December policy meeting, six decision-makers indicated that the 2025 benchmark interest rate should be in the 3.75%-4% range—an interval consistent with holding rates unchanged—directly implying that they were actually opposed to rate cuts. But because these officials are mostly non-voting members, their positions cannot be expressed through formal dissenting votes; they can only be conveyed indirectly in the dot-plot projections and discount-rate recommendations. From a geopolitical perspective, among the 12 regional Fed banks, only 4 recommend rate cuts, while as many as 8 suggest keeping rates unchanged—hinting that policy pressure will be delayed substantially until the next Chair takes office. This “silent dissent” makes the Fed’s decision-making process even more unpredictable.

The deeper underlying drivers of these internal disagreements are that the Fed faces a “stagflation” risk—its first since the 1980s—when tariffs could both intensify inflation and slow economic growth. The May statement clearly noted that “upside risks to unemployment and inflation have increased,” shifting the wording from “greater uncertainty about the economic outlook” to “further increased uncertainty.” Powell repeatedly emphasized “waiting” during press conferences, but there are fundamental disagreements among officials about how long to wait and what data to wait for.

The more far-reaching significance of this split is not how many dissenting votes it has generated, but that it has ended the Fed’s decades-long culture of consensus. As the chief economist of BNP Paribas said, the “high consensus” that investors are accustomed to may become “elusive” in the coming months. For Waller, the incoming Chair set to succeed Powell, the combination of severe uncertainty about the policy path and the leadership transition creates an unprecedented governance challenge—how to manage a Fed with “unprecedented” divisions may be even more urgent than reshaping the Fed itself. #美联储利率不变但内部分歧加剧