Recently, I saw more news about cross-chain bridge hacks, and I got the itch to run to low-fee chains, but thinking about "who is actually trusted in this cross-chain," I held back. Honestly, whether it's called IBC or message passing, in the end, someone/something has to tell you: the other chain indeed experienced that event. What you trust are the consensus of both chains + light clients/verification mechanisms, and you also have to trust that relayers/relayers don't go rogue, that the contract implementation isn't flawed, and that upgrade permissions aren't changed in the middle of the night... For bridges, there's also an additional layer of custody/multisig/validator sets. The more components there are, the higher the chance of errors stacking up. The recent collective caution about oracle abnormal quotes—"wait for confirmation first"—I now copy that approach for cross-chain: try small amounts first, credit first, take it slow and worry less. Anyway, the savings on fees should be spent on sleep.