Recently reviewing several DAO proposals, on the surface they all talk about "optimization/upgrade," but what I care more about is how those few lines of incentives are written: who can get them, for how long, whether they are one-time or distributed weekly.

In other words, voting isn't about right or wrong; it's about redistributing power—like moving funds from the treasury to a specific working group, or giving parameter permissions to a small multi-signature group.

And now everyone is focused on testnet incentives and points, guessing daily whether the mainnet will issue tokens.
I, for one, am more worried about this kind of expectation being written into proposals: shouting about decentralization on one hand, while using points to bind people to a specific path, ultimately leading voting power to concentrate in the addresses that are best at "completing tasks."
Looking at it calmly, what’s hidden in the proposals isn’t ideals, but structure.