Lately, I’ve been a bit distracted by DAO governance: delegated voting is originally just because you’re lazy—find a “knowledgeable person” to vote for you—but over time it slowly turns into a handful of people holding a huge stack of votes, and by the time a proposal is even ready for debate, the outcome is almost already decided. Plainly put, governance tokens don’t really govern the “community.” They’re more like managing attention and networks—who can speak up consistently, who can receive delegations, and who is more able to set the rules.

When I was working on treasury management, what I feared most was permissions running wild, and governance is pretty similar: once voting power concentrates, the risk isn’t just “voting wrong.” It’s that, on top of that, even the correction mechanisms slow down. Lately, people outside have been talking about rate-cut expectations and the U.S. dollar index, and that “risk assets rise and fall together” kind of synchronization is even stronger—when emotions flare up, everyone is more willing to hand their votes to the people who seem “stable”… Anyway, now whenever I see large delegations, I’ll look twice: at the very least, make sure the process for withdrawing a delegation or splitting delegations is written clearly, so it doesn’t end up as an oligarchs’ meeting.