Just went back through some old commodity market data from 2010, and there's actually an interesting case study here about how governments handle fuel price pressures.

So back then, India's government was facing a real dilemma. The petrol price in 2010 was heavily subsidized, and state-owned oil companies - Indian Oil, Hindustan Petroleum, and Bharat Petroleum - were bleeding money. We're talking Rs 203 crore per day in losses just from selling fuel below cost.

The breakdown was pretty brutal. They were selling petrol at a loss of Rs 3.35 per litre, diesel at Rs 3.49, and LPG cylinders at Rs 261.90 each. Meanwhile, the international crude oil market had softened to around $72-74 per barrel, which actually gave the government some breathing room to act.

A ministerial committee was pushing for decontrol - basically letting market forces set the petrol price in 2010 rather than keeping it artificially low. The proposal was that prices could rise by Rs 3.35 per litre if they went through with it. LPG would jump Rs 25-50 per cylinder, and kerosene would see marginal increases too.

What's interesting about this whole situation is how it mirrors broader market dynamics. When you artificially suppress fuel prices, you create massive inefficiencies. The petrol price in 2010 was a textbook example of how government intervention, while politically popular, creates massive losses for state enterprises.

The government eventually had to make the call - you can't sustain those kinds of daily losses indefinitely. It's a reminder that commodity markets, whether we're talking about 2010 or today, ultimately follow economic gravity.