Recently looking at several DAO voting proposals, on the surface they all sound quite gentle: optimizing parameters, offering some incentives, doing some collaborations… but I tend to first glance at “who gets the money,” “who has veto power,” “how voting rights are obtained,” essentially the power structure is hidden in the attachments and details.

Adding incentives indeed increases participation, but it can also easily turn into “those who receive airdrops are more willing to agree,” and ultimately decision-making is driven by the reward mechanism.

In the group these days, there’s been a lot of talk about stablecoin regulation, reserve audits, and various rumors of “de-pegging,” which quickly stirs everyone’s emotions. It’s quite similar to that “vote quickly, or miss out” mentality in DAO communities.
Later I realized it’s pretty funny; I myself can also be carried away by this sense of urgency… Anyway, I’d rather take it slow now, read through those small print in proposals, and if I don’t understand it, I won’t vote for now. When the flowers bloom, that vote isn’t a big deal either.