Recently, DAO voting proposals are increasingly resembling task breakdowns: on the surface, they say "optimize governance/improve participation," but when you look at the end, how incentives are distributed, who can claim them, and where the thresholds are, it’s actually outlining the power structure. In the past, I would just look at the title and agree, as long as there was some reward; now I first consider the costs: how long to lock, whether to delegate voting, whether rewards are only feeding the whales, so I don’t get caught up in circles and treat my address as a "participation rate" decoration.

Some people compare on-chain yield products with RWA and US bond yields, but honestly, returns aren’t the only variable; who sets the rules is more critical. If a proposal concentrates "emergency rights," "whitelists," and "parameter modifications" into a few multi-signature signers, I’d rather take less than be treated as a leek indicator... For now, that’s it, I’ll keep moving on to the next proposal.