I just went through a cross-chain transfer process again, and the more I look at it, the more I want to sigh: one IBC/message passing/bridge transfer, you think you're just clicking "confirm," but in reality, you're casually packing trust into a bunch of components. The chain's own consensus/validators do a layer of calculation; the relay (relayer) is a transporter, theoretically unable to be tampered with, but if it goes offline, you're stuck; if the light client/proof verification implementation has flaws, that's the real issue—appears correct but is actually bypassed. Not to mention some bridges add multi-signatures, oracles, custodial contracts... In short, the more chains involved, the more trust is concentrated.

Recently, some people have been criticizing the lag in tagging systems of on-chain data tools, and even that they can be misled, which is quite fitting: seeing "Safe Address/Flagged as Phishing" doesn't mean the true status. In that cross-chain step, if any link gets compromised, the whole chain of trust is affected. Anyway, my habit is: before cross-chain, check the contract and permissions, and immediately verify if there's any extra approval after the transfer. If possible, revoke it—don't leave yourself vulnerable.