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Strait of Hormuz, can Iran "control" it?
Source: Xinhua News Agency
According to a report by Iran’s Mehr News Agency on the 25th, citing comments from an Iranian parliament member, Iran has developed a comprehensive plan for the management of the Strait of Hormuz. Analysts said Iran’s move has multiple purposes, including strengthening pressure on the United States and Israel, and obtaining new stable sources of income, among others. However, since charging transit ships has drawn opposition internationally, and the United States is pressuring Iran by blocking Iranian ports and ships, it remains uncertain whether Iran’s strait-management plan can truly be implemented.
This is an information photo of the Strait of Hormuz taken on February 19, 2025. Photo by Wang Qiang, Xinhua News Agency.
What are the purposes?
According to Mehr News Agency, the above information was disclosed by Iranian Islamic Majlis (parliament) member Behnam Saeedi. Previously, Iranian media had reported that on the 5th, the Iranian Parliament deliberated multiple proposals on governing the Strait of Hormuz and decided to set up a dedicated committee to draft comprehensive plans and legal safeguard documents for exercising jurisdiction over the strait.
According to Saeedi, the contents of the comprehensive plan include:
Sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz will be fully held by Iran;
Vessels and warships navigating in the area must obtain permission from Iran;
Ships passing through the area must pay relevant fees for matters such as safety, environmental protection, shipping management, and permit issuance, and payment will be made primarily in rials;
Ships that are identified by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council or the General Staff of the Armed Forces as belonging to hostile countries may not pass through the Strait of Hormuz; Israeli ships are absolutely banned from passing through the area;
For countries that cause losses to Iran, the relevant countries must first reach an agreement with Iran on compensation arrangements, and only then will the Iranian side issue passage permits to their ships.
Analysts believe the plan reveals Iran’s multiple objectives.
First, to continue pressuring the U.S. and Israel. By controlling the Strait of Hormuz—a global shipping chokepoint—Iran affects international oil prices. This not only exacerbates inflation pressure and economic burdens on the U.S. and Israel, but also prompts the international community to call for cooling tensions and keeping shipping routes open, thereby placing dual economic and diplomatic pressure on the U.S. and Israel. Banning “hostile countries” ships from transiting directly also targets the U.S. and Israel. In addition, tying the issue of strait transit to demands for war reparations is intended to push the U.S. to concede on the issue of compensation.
Second, to leave room for U.S.-Iran negotiations. Although Iran has consistently taken a hardline stance toward the U.S., it has not completely closed the door to talks. Earlier, Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian visited Pakistan, but claimed that it would not negotiate with the U.S.; however, it also conveyed messages to the U.S. via Pakistan and revealed that Amir-Abdollahian may soon return to Islamabad. In introducing the comprehensive plan, Saeedi listed Israel as an “absolute ban” target, but did not name the U.S., which may suggest that U.S. ships’ ability to pass could be used as a bargaining chip.
On April 25, 2026, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz (left) held talks with Iran’s Foreign Minister Amir-Abdollahian in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. Photo by Xinhua (provided by the Office of the Pakistani Prime Minister)
Third, to provide Iran with new sources of income. Data show that if Iran charges $1 for each barrel of oil transiting through the Strait of Hormuz—based on the volume of traffic through the strait before the outbreak of hostilities—then Iran would receive more than $7.7 billion in revenue each year. International public opinion believes this could become an important source of funds for Iran to resist the U.S.-led West’s blockade and carry out post-war reconstruction. Moreover, requiring payment primarily in rials is to prevent transit-fee income from being constrained by the U.S. dollar system.
Can it be implemented?
Regarding the follow-up procedures, Saeedi said the plan has been submitted to Iran’s Islamic Parliament’s National Security Committee. Once the full parliament session resumes, it will be submitted to the Speaker’s group for review and deliberated upon in the full-session meeting. The plan may also be approved and issued by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council.
In response, Abdulaziz Shabani, a researcher at the Riyadh-based Center for Political and Strategic Studies, analyzed that approval by the full parliament would give the plan an official legal status, but the process is complicated and more likely to prompt opposition from the international community. Approval and issuance by the Supreme National Security Council, by contrast, is a more flexible and faster route, and also makes it easier to adjust according to developments in the situation.
However, Shabani believes that from an operational standpoint, given the massive volume of traffic through the strait and the presence of other countries’ military forces, carrying out a comprehensive interception and charging scheme for all ships passing through the strait would be very difficult. In the future, the plan’s implementation is more likely to be limited and selective.
At the same time, Iran’s move is controversial under international law, and it has also prompted a great deal of opposition. Collecting transit fees at this maritime chokepoint would inevitably increase the transportation time and costs for ships passing through, exerting broad impacts on the economies of multiple countries. Many countries around the world, including Gulf countries, have said they want the Strait of Hormuz to remain open. The United Kingdom and France previously took the lead in forming an alliance, attempting to conduct multilateral actions to ensure the strait stays open. If Iran forcibly charges fees, it may face international pressure and become diplomatically passive.
In addition, the United States is carrying out countermeasures by blocking Iranian ports and ships. The U.S. has made clear that it will not allow Iran to permanently control the strait or set up a fee system, among other actions. If the blockade continues and Iran’s oil storage facilities “reach the limit,” Iran may be forced to halt production, which could cause major damage to its oil extraction facilities. The U.S. also threatens to intercept and inspect all ships that pay transit fees to Iran in international waters. This could result in no ships passing through the strait, and Iran also being unable to receive transit fees.
Of course, U.S. efforts to blockade Iran would come at a huge cost, and the longer the blockade lasts, the more it could affect the polling situation for the Republican Party’s midterm elections. The U.S. may not be able to sustain such measures for long. Iran may also treat charging fees as a bargaining chip exchanged for interests with the U.S., rather than truly pushing for full implementation. Therefore, whether the plan will be implemented and to what extent remain uncertain.