I've been looking at a few DAO voting proposals these days, and I realize a bit late: no matter how "community-oriented" the proposal is written, the incentives underneath—how they are distributed, who can claim them, and how—basically lay out the power structure. For example, rewarding voters seems to increase participation, but in reality, it’s more like screening for those willing to spend gas/time; over time, it becomes a fixed circle deciding the direction. Conversely, not providing incentives results in ridiculously low voting turnout, and in the end, it’s still the operators and big holders who call the shots… It’s quite awkward.

Recently, there’s also been chatter outside about expectations of rate cuts, with the dollar index rising and falling along with risk assets. I tend to be more conservative: when I see a proposal with incentives, I first consider whether I want to take a side for that small reward, and I also check if delegation and thresholds are blocking newcomers. To put it simply, voting isn’t just “clicking like,” it’s about writing future distributions into the contract. That’s all for now.