Recently, I've been a bit obsessed with DAO voting proposals, talking about "changing parameters" and "optimizing incentives."

Only at the end, in the appendix, did I realize that how rewards are distributed, who can propose, and who has the power to pause urgently are all smoothly written into the structure...
Basically, it looks like voting on features on the surface, but in reality, it's voting on who will have the final say in the future.
Then I saw the "yield stacking" of re-staking/shared security being criticized as a copycat scheme, but it’s actually similar: incentives layered one on top of another, and in the end, everyone is focused on APR, not seriously questioning the risks and governance boundaries.
Anyway, I now see proposals as a game theory problem: first figure out who benefits, who bears the risk, then decide whether to like or support it.
I no longer believe in the phrase "community consensus will naturally bring fairness."