Ledger CTO: The post-quantum cryptography migration has entered a critical period, and blockchain is more inclined to choose hash-based signature schemes

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BlockBeats message, April 23 — Ledger’s Chief Technology Officer Charles Guillemet wrote, “Post-quantum cryptography is entering a critical phase. Although it remains uncertain when quantum computers with practical cryptographic impact will appear, the industry generally believes that migration to post-quantum systems is inevitable. The traditional sector has already formed a clear timeline: led forward by the National Institute of Standards and Technology of the United States, it plans to phase out existing vulnerable algorithms before 2030 and fully ban them before 2035. Large enterprises and government agencies are currently accelerating preparations, aiming to complete migration capability building by 2029.

In terms of technical pathways, encryption and key exchange will shift to ML-KEM (formerly CRYSTALS-Kyber) to address the risk of quantum attacks of the “collect first, decrypt later” type. However, in blockchain systems, the core issue is more concentrated on digital signatures. Current mainstream post-quantum signature schemes are divided into two categories: lattice-based ML-DSA (formerly CRYSTALS-Dilithium) and hash-based SLH-DSA (formerly SPHINCS+). The traditional industry is more inclined to adopt ML-DSA and its hybrid schemes with ECC, while the blockchain field is more inclined toward hash signature schemes that are more conservative in security and simpler in structure.

Both schemes have their trade-offs: ML-DSA has better performance, but its security assumptions have not yet undergone long-term validation; SLH-DSA is less efficient, but it relies on a mature hash-function system, making its security more deterministic. For blockchains that emphasize long-term security and validation pathways, the latter is more appealing. However, regardless of which scheme is chosen, the compatibility of multi-party computation (MPC) and threshold signatures remains an unresolved problem; this risk is especially critical in an industry built on custodial and collaborative signatures.”

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