Shiyi Loan and Zhenxin Loan: "Brother Companies" Under the Shadow of 36% Usury, Zhongguancun Bank Appears

Ask AI · Did the cooperative bank fulfill its review responsibilities?

In the judicial protection limit of private lending anchored at 4 times the LPR, on the eve of the official implementation of new lending regulations, under the regulatory high-pressure stance with licensed financial institutions taking 24% as the red line, some platforms still operate under the name “loan super” to bypass regulatory red lines, funneling borrowers to downstream high-interest lending platforms. Recently, Shiyi Dai and its related platform Zhenxin Dai were found to have multiple loans with interest rates approaching 36%, and behind these two “brother companies,” the joint funder Zhongguancun Bank also appeared.

On March 31, a netizen complained on People’s Daily Online that on May 30, 2025, they borrowed 7,700 yuan from Shiyi Dai (operating entity: Shenzhen Zhenhongsheng Technology Co., Ltd.), with the cooperative lender being Zhongguancun Bank. Without their knowledge or explicit authorization, the platform deducted over 100 yuan per month as a financing担 service fee. Based on the screenshots uploaded by the netizen, the actual annualized interest rate of this loan is approximately 35.94%.

On January 21, another netizen reported that on June 5 and August 5, 2025, they borrowed 13,200 yuan and 26,800 yuan respectively from AnXHua via Shiyi Dai, with the repayment interest plus担 service fee exceeding an annualized rate of 36%. According to the screenshots uploaded, borrowing 13,200 yuan in 6 installments, each repayment was 2,436.62 yuan; borrowing 26,800 yuan in 6 installments, each repayment was 4,947.08 yuan. Using the IRR formula, the annualized interest rate for both loans is 35.99%.

On February 26, a netizen reported on the Black Cat platform that they borrowed 4,000 yuan from Shiyi Dai (lender: Zhongguancun Bank), repaid in 12 installments with a total repayment of 4,815.27 yuan. Based on the netizen’s description, the editor calculated with the IRR formula that the actual annualized interest rate for this loan is 35.71%.

Business registration data shows that Shenzhen Zhenhongsheng Technology Co., Ltd. (formerly Shenzhen Huizhiqi Technology Co., Ltd.) was established on September 15, 2023, with a registered capital of 1 million yuan. The legal representative is Wu Haisen, and the sole shareholder is Wu Haisen.

Qichacha data indicates that Shenzhen Zhenhongsheng Technology Co., Ltd. (i.e., “Shiyi Dai”) and Kangzhi Technology (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd. (i.e., “Zhenxin Dai”) are suspected to have the same address. Meanwhile, key figures Wu Haisen of Shiyi Dai and Deng Xiurui of Zhenxin Dai are both shareholders of Shenzhen Jiaqinda Electronic Commerce Co., Ltd. (Deng Xiurui holds 99%, Wu Haisen holds 1%).

Besides the suspected relationship at the registered address and shareholder level, Shiyi Dai and Zhenxin Dai also cooperate with AnX Dai, and their funding partners include Zhongguancun Bank.

On March 30, Zhongguancun Bank disclosed a list of platform operation agencies and credit enhancement service agencies, showing that the bank cooperates with 32 platform agencies (including products like AnXHua) and 26 credit enhancement agencies.

On February 3, KaiJia Finance published an article titled “Uncovering Kangzhi Technology’s ‘Zhenxin Dai’: 36% high-interest loans and over 30k complaints, with state-owned fund involvement,” which detailed the close ties between Zhenxin Dai and Shiyi Dai, both deeply involved in high-interest lending. According to KaiJia Finance, Zhenxin Dai received 2,224 complaints in the past 30 days, with total complaints exceeding 33k. Many borrowers reported that Zhenxin Dai’s actual loan interest rate neared 36%, and overdue penalty interest was also high—one netizen borrowed 19,600 yuan, with a 14-day overdue penalty of 673.89 yuan; another repaid 332 yuan but was overdue for half a month, with a penalty of 105 yuan. More worryingly, many complaints pointed to issues such as mismatched repayment amounts, inability to check loan contracts, and other problems. Despite the appearance of state-owned funds and well-known institutions behind Zhenxin Dai—its parent company Kangzhi Technology’s shareholders include Jiaxing Guozhen Changguang Equity Investment Partnership (Limited Partnership) (National Development City Fund), Minmetals Jintong Equity Investment Fund Management Co., Ltd., and others—this did not prevent continued violations of compliance and user rights.

Shiyi Dai and Zhenxin Dai, two platforms, are not only highly related in registered address, shareholder structure, and cooperation funding but also operate similarly: both raise their actual interest rates close to the 36% regulatory red line under the guise of “担 service fees,” and both channel traffic through platforms like AnX Dai, with cooperation partners including Zhongguancun Bank.

The in-depth investigation by KaiJia Finance into Zhenxin Dai undoubtedly reveals a corner of this “high-interest loan network” hidden behind complex equity structures and relationships.

On the Black Cat complaint platform, although the number of complaints about Shiyi Dai is not as high as Zhenxin Dai’s tens of thousands, the content of complaints is highly similar—extremely high actual interest rates, vague fee categories, and lack of user awareness.

When two “brother companies” share the same business model, the same cooperation channels, and possibly the same operational logic, regulatory authorities and financial consumers must ask: Did the cooperation funder, Zhongguancun Bank, fulfill its obligation to review the risks of its partner platforms? Did platforms like AnX Dai thoroughly vet the compliance of their partner institutions?

The essence of fintech should be technology for good, not high-interest lending disguised as technology. For platforms like Shiyi Dai and Zhenxin Dai that operate under the guise of “担 service fees” but are essentially high-interest lenders, regulators should penetrate complex ownership and relationship structures to clarify the responsibilities of actual controllers; cooperating financial institutions should exercise caution in selecting partners and avoid becoming tools that endorse non-compliant platforms.

After all, behind every loan approaching 36%, there is an ordinary consumer trapped by high-interest costs. When complaints reach tens of thousands and penalty interests snowball by “days,” the question for regulators and the industry is no longer “Is it illegal?” but a countdown to “When will it be rectified?”