Tonight I’m snacking on late-night food while browsing DAO voting records. The more I read, the more it feels like—no matter how nice and polished the proposal wording is—the incentive and power structure underneath is the real point: who puts forward proposals, who can change parameters, who receives subsidies, and who has veto power are basically all spelled out in the details. A lot of the time it isn’t “community consensus,” but rather concentrating voting power in the hands of a small number of addresses, and then using a bit of reward to coax everyone into coming over and clicking a like. The more I think about it later, the more ridiculous it seems.

Lately, with taxation in some regions tightening and then loosening, and compliance signals going strong and then weak, people’s expectations around in-and-out fund flows tend to swing along with it. Voting is therefore more easily steered by “short-term panic / short-term positives.” For now, I’ll just look first at where the money comes from, how the voting threshold is set, and whether “no” votes have any real consequences. If I can’t make sense of the narrative, I won’t chase it—I’d rather miss out, because anyway.