Yesterday I reviewed a DAO proposal, which on the surface was titled "Increase Participation," but after opening the incentive details I realized: the voting weight is too tightly bound to subsidies, ultimately turning into whoever acts more like a "professional voter" gets the say. To put it simply, the proposal isn't just about changing parameters; it's about redrawing the power structure—who can propose, who can veto, who can receive ongoing subsidies.

Recently, everyone has been comparing RWA, US bond yields, and various on-chain yield products. I also find it a bit tiring: the yields look quite straightforward, but the real issues are how permissions are managed behind the scenes, who can move the funds, and who takes responsibility if something goes wrong—that's the real interest rate. Anyway, I’m used to first checking the multi-signature threshold, what administrators can change, and then deciding whether to vote. If it’s slow, so be it; at least I won’t be led around by the "incentives."