The third time I read the DAO voting proposal, I couldn't help but laugh a little: on the surface, it says "optimize governance processes," but the real ingredients in the formula are actually incentives and power distribution. Who can submit proposals, who can veto, whether voting rights can be delegated multiple layers, whether rewards are based on participation or results... If the timing isn't right, it just turns into "voting for rewards," and in the end, the outcome favors a few more stable positions.

Recently, that mainstream public chain is about to upgrade/maintain, and the group is guessing whether the project will move. I think we shouldn't focus on whether to migrate or not first; instead, look for sneaky additions like "emergency permissions" or "temporary committees" in the proposals. Once such things pass, they can be more unsettling than a shutdown. Anyway, when I look at DAO now, I first look at who’s holding the spatula.